CATO's

LETTERS:

OR,

ESSAYS *on* LIBERTY, CIVIL and RELIGIOUS,

And other important SUBJECTS.

In FOUR VOLUMES.

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VOL. III.

ESSAYS on LIBERTY, CIVIL and RELIGIOUS;

AND OTHER TRACTS.

CATO's LETTERS.

Saturday, March 10. 1721. N°. 69.

Addreſs to the freeholders, &c. *about the choice of their repreſentatives.*

SIR,

I Beg leave to interrupt my diſcourſe upon general liberty for one poſt or more, as occaſion ſhall preſent; and deſire you will publiſh the incloſed letter in your journal, in the place which uſed to be filled with one to yourſelf.

To the Freeholders, Citizens, and Burghers of the counties, cities, and towns of Great Britain.

GENTLEMEN,

THERE is no natural or political body but is ſubject to the variations and injuries of time. Both are compoſed of ſprings, wheels, and ligaments, all in perpetual motion, and all liable to wear out

and decay: and as the parts are mortal the whole muſt be mortal too. But as natural bodies may continue their exiſtence, and preſerve their duration, by action, by the addition of new particles, or by removing from time to time all occaſional obſtructions which clog their motion, and check their vigour, as long as their ſtamina, firſt principles, or original conſtitution, is capable of ſubſiſting; ſo a political machine may do the ſame: and ſome writers in politics have aſſerted, that the ſame might be immortal; which is not my opinion.

But whether this be true or not, certain it is, that in many reſpects a political body has the advantage of a natural one. We can often look into its inmoſt frame and contexture; and when any of its conſtituent parts are decayed or worn out, can ſupply it with new ones; (which cannot be done in the other without a total diſſolution of the fabric:) and we can frequently annex additional props and butreſſes to ſupport for ſome time a tottering building, and hinder it from falling upon our heads. This is often all that can be done in decayed governments, when a ſtate is in a catachexy; and this is what is every honeſt man's duty to do, when he can do no better. But, I thank God, the conſtitution of *England* is yet ſound and vigorous: many of its parts are active and ſtrong; and if ſome members be corrupted or decayed, there are materials at hand to ſupply the defect. There is wealth and power in being: our country abounds with men of courage and underſtanding; nor are there wanting thoſe of integrity and public ſpirit: there is an ardent deſire and diffuſive love of liberty throughout the kingdom; and many begin to be tired, ſick, and aſhamed of party-animoſities, and of quarrelling with their neighbours, their relations, and often with their beſt friends, to gratify the pride, the ambition, and rapine of thoſe, who only ſell and betray them. It is yet in our power to ſave ourſelves; moſt men have inclinations to do it; and it is only owing

to the art and addreſs of our common enemies, if we do not agree on the means of doing it.

I dare therefore affirm, that there is ſuch a general diſpoſition towards liberty through the whole kingdom, that if there ſhould be found in the next houſe of commons as many honeſt, bold, and wiſe men, as would have ſaved *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*, *England* is yet ſafe, in ſpite of all the efforts of deluſion and bribery: and I dare as freely affirm, that if ſome vigorous and bold reſolutions are not there taken, to aſſiſt our moſt excellent king towards diſcharging the public debts, and in redreſſing all ſorts of public corruptions, the liberty of *Great Britain*----- My heart can ſpeak no more.

It lies upon you, gentlemen, to give motion to the machine: you are the firſt ſprings that give life to all virtuous reſolutions: ſuch as you ſhew yourſelves, ſuch will be your repreſentatives: ſuch as is the tree, ſuch will be the fruit. Chooſe honeſt men, free and independent men, and they will act honeſtly for the public intereſt, which is your intereſt. It is not to be expected, that criminals will deſtroy their own handywork; that they will either reform or puniſh themſelves; or, that men, who have brought our misfortunes upon us, will go about in good earneſt to redreſs them, or even own that there are any ſuch. Beſides, deep wounds muſt be probed and ſearched to the core, before they can be cured; and thoſe who gave them can ſeldom bear to ſee the operation, much leſs will they pay for the cure, if they can be at eaſe by the death of the patient.

Let us not therefore, my countrymen, deſert or deceive ourſelves, or think we can be ſafe, if ever ſuch men can get into power. Let us not again be deluded with falſe promiſes and deceitful aſſurances; but let us judge what men will do by what they have done. What warm and plauſible remonſtrances have you formerly heard and received? What impetuous ſtorms and hurricanes of falſe and counterfeit zeal againſt oppreſſions and miſcarriages in the late reigns; againſt exorbitant

penſions, outrageous taxes, wild and expenſive expeditions; againſt increaſing the public debts; againſt ſtanding troops quartered up and down your countries; againſt oppreſſive companies, to the deſtruction of your trade and induſtry; againſt private mens raiſing immenſe eſtates upon your ruin; and againſt their bribeing and corrupting the guardians of the public liberty?------And are you at laſt perfectly eaſy in every one of thoſe complaints?

Now; therefore, my beſt friends, is the time to help yourſelves: now act honeſtly and boldly for liberty, or forget the glorious and charming ſound. Let not a public traytor come within the walls of your cities and towns, without treating him, as an enemy to your king and country deſerves. Throw your eyes about your ſeveral countries, and chooſe your patrons, your protectors, your neighbours, and your known friends; chooſe for your repreſentatives men whoſe intereſts are blended with your own; men who have no hands dipt in the public ſpoils, but have ſuffered by them as much as you yourſelves have ſuffered; men who have not jobbed for ſtock, nor for wages, nor for you.

Make not ſo fooliſh a bargain, as for a little looſe money to give up deſperately all you have; your liberties, your eſtates, your families. Is it for your ſakes, think you, that theſe jobbers of ſtocks, and of honeſty, and of their country, come to careſs you, flatter you, and bow to you? Do you, or can you believe that they come to impair their own fortunes to increaſe yours? Or think you not that they will have their pennyworths out of you? Depend upon it, they will; and, for every bucket of water thrown into your wells, they will pump out tuns.

Reaſon not therefore, as too many of you have done, and I fear yet do, That ſince thoſe whom you truſt make perſonal advantages of your confidence and credulity, you ought to ſhare in thoſe advantages. But throw your choice upon ſuch who will neither buy

you, nor ſell you. Whoever purchaſes an office at more than it is honeſtly worth, muſt be ſupported by him who ſells it, in all diſhoneſt gains; or elſe he will call for his money again, if he know how to get it. No man will bribe you into your own intereſts, or give you money that he may have leave to ſerve you by his own labour, and at his farther expence; but will think himſelf at liberty to make repriſals: he will find no difficulty in himſelf to ſell thoſe, who have before ſold themſelves and their country: nor can you have any right or pretence to reprove one that does ſo.

Miſtake not, my countrymen, in believing that men in your condition and circumſtances are too low for the ſcythe, and that you can ſhrink out of public misfortunes. For you, gentlemen, are the firſt principles of wealth and power. From your labour and induſtry ariſes all that can be called riches, and by your hands it muſt be defended: kings, nobility, gentry, clergy, lawyers, and military officers, do all ſupport their grandeur by your ſweat and hazard, and in tyrannical governments upon the people's ſpoils: they there riot upon the ſubſiſtence of the poor people, whoſe poverty is their riches. In corrupt adminiſtrations, your ſuperiors of all kinds make bargains, and purſue ends at the public expence, and grow rich by making the people poor.

You feel the firſt effects of tyrannical government; and great men are generally made the inſtruments of it, and reap the advantages. Exorbitant taxes, want of trade, decay of manufactures, diſcouragement of induſtry, inſolence and oppreſſion of ſoldiers, exactions of civil officers, ignorance, ſuperſtition, and bigotry, are all the conſtant concomitants of tyranny, always produce it, and are produced by it. And all theſe terrible evils muſt fall moſt ſignally upon the middle and inferior ranks of mankind: there muſt be a great number of ſlaves to furniſh up one grand

monarch, and the poor people muſt be thoſe ſlaves. He muſt engage many in his intereſt, before he can eſtabliſh a power which deſtroys the reſt; all theſe many muſt be ſupported, and have their condition bettered by the change; and all this charge and expence the wretched people muſt work for and pay.

Forget therefore, gentlemen, the fooliſh and knaviſh diſtinction of *high church* and *low church*, *Whig* and *Tory*; ſounds which continue in your mouths when the meaning of them is gone; and are now only uſed to ſet you together by the ears, that rogues may pick your pockets. I own myſelf to be one of thoſe, whom one ſide in reſpect, and the other in contumely, call *Whigs*; and yet I never diſcourſed with a candid and ſenſible *Tory*, who did not concur with me in opinion, when we explained our intentions. We both agreed in our notions of old *Engliſh* liberty, in a paſſion for freedom to ourſelves, and to procure it for every one elſe: we were both for preſerving the *Engliſh* monarchy, and the legal conſtitution of the national church againſt its euthuſiaſtic friends and enemies; and were for giving liberty of conſcience to thoſe, who through a prejudiced education, or, as we believed, a leſs capacity of judging, were ſo unhappy as to think differently from ourſelves, in an affair which concerned us not, and which we had nothing to do with.

We both honoured and reſolved to preſerve upon the throne our moſt excellent ſovereign king *GEORGE*, and to endeavour to continue him a glorious king over honeſt men, and freemen; and not to attempt to make him, what he ſcorns to be made, a patron of paraſites, and a lord of ſlaves: and we thought we could not ſhew our duty to him more effectually, than in bringing to exemplary puniſhment all who had betrayed him and us: we wiſhed the old names of diſtinction and faction buried deep as the centre; and nothing heard in their room but court and coun-

try, proteſtant and papiſt, freemen and ſlaves. It will lie at your door, gentlemen, to put an end to the above ſilly and wicked gibberiſh. Chooſe thoſe who have no intereſt to continue it, and it will not be continued.

Conſider, my dear friends and countrymen, what I have ſaid, and think what you are doing, while you are raiſing hue and cry after men who will betray you; while you are ſending afar for courtiers, for directors of bubbles, for companymen, and public pickpockets, to repreſent you; while you are giving up, perhaps, for ever, to the mercy of bloodſuckers your honeſt induſtry, and the juſt profits of your trade, for a poor momentary ſhare of their infamous plunder; and thereby bringing a canker upon your ſubſiſtence, and the juſt reſentment of heaven upon your endeavours. Shew yourſelves once, and once for all, *Britons* and freemen, and not foreign and ſaleable ſlaves; ſhew that you know how to honour your king, and yet to keep your liberties; that you obey him out of choice, and not out of ſervile fear; that you know how to diſtinguiſh your loyalty to your prince, from a blind ſubmiſſion to his and your own ſervants; and that you can make your duty to him conſiſtent with a vigorous reſolution to puniſh all who betray him and you.

If you did but know, gentlemen, how you are uſed above, by thoſe who think it worth their time to flatter you below, and to your faces, you would not want my advice and admonitions. You are called the mob, the canaille, the ſtupid herd, the dregs and beaſts of the people; and your intereſt is never thought of by thoſe men, who thus miſcall you; men who have no more wit, and much leſs honeſty, than yourſelves; and men whoſe inſolence and ſaucineſs are owing to wealth, which they have plundered from you. It depends now upon yourſelves, whether you will deſerve theſe baſe and reproachful names, or not; ſhew that you are

men, and you will be uſed like men; but if you ſell yourſelves like the beaſts in the field, the purchaſers will have a right to ſell you again, and make honeſt gains out of a villainous bargain.

For my own particular, I cannot give myſelf leave to deſpair of you, becauſe I muſt at the ſame time deſpair of old *Engliſh* liberty: you are our *alpha* and *omega*, our firſt and laſt reſource; and when your virtue is gone, all is gone. It is true, you have a wiſe and virtuous prince at preſent, who will not take advantage of your follies; and you may depend upon the ſame ſecurity from his ſon: but neither he nor his ſon, nor his family, are immortal; and therefore I hope you will act wiſely, and truſt to yourſelves alone. But whatever part, gentlemen, you ſhall think fit to take, you ſhall not do it blindfold, and in the dark. You ſhall have the fair and dark ſide of your conduct laid before you, and then you may chooſe whether you will be freemen or vaſſals; whether you will ſpend your own money and eſtates, or let others worſe than you ſpend them for you: methinks the choice ſhould be eaſy. You ſhall hear more from me upon this ſubject; and you may believe me,

T

GENTLEMEN,

Your very ſincere,

and moſt affectionate,

humble ſervant.

Saturday, March 17. 1721. N°. 70.

Second addreſs to the freeholders, &c. upon the ſame ſubject.

GENTLEMEN,

YOU are born to liberty, and it is your intereſt and duty to preſerve it. The conſtitution which you live under is a mixed monarchy, where your governors have every right to protect and defend you, none to injure and oppreſs you. You have a large ſhare in the legiſlature; you have the ſole power over your own purſes; you have an undoubted right to call to account and puniſh the inſtruments of your oppreſſion: but it depends upon yourſelves alone to make theſe rights of yours, theſe noble privileges, of uſe to you. The beſt laws give no ſecurity if they are not executed, but indeed become worſe than no laws; and they never will be executed, unleſs thoſe who are entruſted with the execution of them have an intereſt in their execution.

All men deſire naturally riches and power; almoſt all men will take every method, juſt or unjuſt, to attain them. Hence the difficulty of governing men, and of inſtituting a government equally proper to reſtrain them and protect them; and hence the inſufficiency of ſimple forms of government, to provide for the happineſs and ſecurity of ſocieties. An arbitrary prince will quickly grow into a tyrant; the uncontrouled dominions of the nobles will as certainly produce *oligarchy*, or the tyranny of a few; that is,

pride, combination, and rapine in the ſovereign, and miſery and dejection in the many; and the unreſtrained licentiouſneſs of the multitude will beget confuſion and anarchy. To provide againſt theſe certain and eternal evils, mixed forms of government were invented; where dominion and liberty are ſo equally tempered, and ſo mutually checked one by another, that neither of them can have intereſt and force enough to oppreſs the other.

Theſe inſtitutions have provided againſt many evils, but not againſt all; for, whilſt men continue in this ſtate of degeneracy, that is, whilſt men are men, ambition, avarice, and vanity, and other paſſions, will govern their actions; in ſpite of all equity and reaſon, they will be ever uſurping, or attempting to uſurp, upon the liberty and fortunes of one another, and all men will be ſtriving to enlarge their own. Dominion will always deſire increaſe, and property always to preſerve itſelf; and theſe oppoſite views and intereſts will be cauſing a perpetual ſtruggle: but by this ſtruggle liberty is preſerved, as water is kept ſweet by motion.

The nature and reaſon of this ſort of government, is to make the ſeveral parts of it controul and counterpoiſe one another; and ſo keep all within their proper bounds. The intereſt of the magiſtracy, which is the lot and portion of the great, is to prevent confuſion, which levels all things: the intereſt of the body of the people, is to keep power from oppreſſion, and their magiſtrates from changing into plunderers and murderers; the intereſt of the ſtanding ſenate, which is, or ought to be, compoſed of men diſtinguiſhable for their fortunes and abilities, is to avoid ruin and diſſolution from either of theſe extremes: ſo that, to preſerve liberty, all theſe co-ordinate powers muſt be kept up in their whole ſtrength and independency.

Names will not defend you, gentlemen, when the thing ſignified by them is gone. The emperors of *Rome* were as abſolute with the ſhew of a ſenate, and the appearance of the people's chooſing their prætors, tribunes, and other officers of the commonwealth, as the *Eaſtern* monarchs are now without theſe ſeeming checks, and this ſhew of liberty: and in ſome reſpects they were more ſecure; as the infamy of their tyranny was ſhared by theſe aſſemblies, the advantages were all their own, and the condition of the people was rather the worſe for theſe mock magiſtrates and pretended repreſentatives, who, under the colour and title of the protectors of the people, were, at the people's expence, the real helpers and partakers of the iniquity of the tyrant. The kings of *France* have parliaments, but parliaments which dare not diſpute their royal pleaſure; and the poor people would not fare one jot the better, if theſe parliaments were bribed not to diſpute it.

This wretched caſe, gentlemen, will be yours, and the wretched caſe of your poſterity, if ever an ambitious prince and deſigning miniſter ſhall hereafter be able to corrupt or awe your repreſentatives. And whatever wicked bargains are then made, will be made at your expence, and you muſt pay the terrible reckoning at laſt. You have a king at preſent, from whom you have none of theſe things to fear. But, alas! gentlemen, how few *Titus's* and *Trajans* were there found amongſt the *Roman* emperors! and how few can *England* ſhew ſince the conqueſt! It requires therefore your beſt thoughts and moſt vigorous reſolutions, to preſerve your conſtitution entire in all its parts, without ſuffering any one part to prevail ſo far over the other, as to reduce it in effect, though not in name, to a ſimple form of government, which is always tyranny. It will be all one to you, whether this is brought about by confederacy or by force. Whatever

be the villainous means; violence, oppreſſion, and every rank of evil, will be the end.

In order to this honeſt or public deſign, you ought to chooſe repreſentatives, whoſe intereſts are at preſent the ſame with your own, and likely to continue the ſame; repreſentatives, who are not already pre-engaged, nor, from their circumſtances, education, profeſſion, or manner of life, likely to be engaged, in a contrary intereſt, He will prove but a ſorry advocate, who takes fees from your adverſary; and as indifferent a plenipotentiary, who receives a penſion from the prince whom he is commiſſioned to treat with; nor can there be any ſecurity in the fidelity of one, who can find it more his intereſt to betray you, than to ſerve you faithfully.

Virtue and vice will be but ill balanced, when power and riches are thrown into the wrong ſcale. A great proteſtant peer of *France*, having changed his religion, in compliance with his maſter, *Henry* the fourth of *France*, who had changed too, was ſoon after aſked by that monarch publicly, which of the two religions he thought the beſt? *The Proteſtant, Sir, undoubtedly is the beſt*, ſaid the peer, *by your own royal confeſſion; ſince, in exchange for it, your majeſty has given me Popery, and a marſhal's ſtaff to boot.* Where boot is given, there is always a tacit confeſſion that the exchange is unequal without it. Chooſe not therefore ſuch who are likely to truck away your liberties for an equivalent to themſelves, and to ſell you to thoſe againſt whom it is their duty to defend you. When their duty is in one ſcale, and a thouſand pounds a year, or more, or even leſs, is thrown into the contrary ſcale, you may eaſily gueſs, as the world goes, how the balance is like to turn.

It is the right and duty of the freeholders and burghers of *Great Britain*, to examine into the conduct, and to know the opinions and intentions, of ſuch as offer themſelves to their choice. How can

any of them be truly repreſented, when they know not who repreſents them? And as it was always their right, they had once the frequent means and opportunity to reſent effectually the corruptions of thoſe who had baſely betrayed their ſacred truſt; of rejecting with ſcorn and deteſtation, ſuch traiterous parricides; and of ſending honeſter and wiſer men in their room. This, my dear countrymen, we had once the frequent means of doing; make uſe now, O worthy and free *Britons!* make good uſe of this preſent dawn, this precious day of liberty, to recover once more that invaluable privilege. Do not wildly chooſe any one, who has given up, or attempted to give up, your birthrights, and, above all, that right which ſecures all the reſt. Admit no man to be ſo much as a candidate in your counties and boroughs, till he has declared in the cleareſt manner, in the moſt expreſs and ſolemn words declared, his moſt hearty and vigorous reſolutions, to endeavour to repeal all laws which render you incapable to ſerve your king, or to puniſh traytors, or to preſerve your original and eſſential rights. This, gentlemen, is your time;---------- which, if you ſuffer it to be loſt, will probably be for ever loſt.

There are a ſort of men who proul about the country to buy boroughs; creatues, who accoſt you for your votes, with the ſpirit and deſign, and in the manner of jockeys; and treating you like cattle, would purchaſe you for leſs or more, juſt as they think they can ſell you again. Can you bear this inſult, gentlemen, upon your honeſty, your reaſon, and your liberties? Or if there be any amongſt you, who countenance ſuch vile and execrable bargains, which affect and involve you in all their conſequences, ought they not to be treated like public enemies, as indeed they are, and be hunted from amongſt you? I have often wondered how a little contemptible corporation, conſiſting, as ſome of them do, of broom-makers, hedge-breakers,

and ſheep-ſtealers, could ſtand the looks and rebukes of a rich and honeſt neighbourhood, after theſe dirty rogues had openly ſold at the market-croſs, perhaps for forty ſhillings a-piece, not only their own liberties, but, as far as in them lay, the liberties of that rich neighbourhood, and of all *England*. Such ſaleable vermin ought to be treated as perſons excommunicate, as the peſts and felons of ſociety, which they would ſell for porridge: and if proper abhorrence were every where ſhewn towards them, and no commerce held with them, they would ſoon grow honeſt out of neceſſity; or if they did not, they might juſtly fear, like guilty *Cain*, that every man whom they met would kill them. If this method were taken, it would cure corruption of this kind. Let thoſe who ſell their country be every where renounced and ſhunned by their neighbourhood and their country, and ſuch ſale will ſoon be over.

The majority of you, gentlemen, are yet uncorrupted: indeed none but a few of the worſt and pooreſt of you are yet corrupted. The body of the freeholders know what it is to take money; and chooſe their repreſentatives from amongſt themſelves, and from a thorough acquaintance, either with the men, or with their characters. The little beggarly boroughs only are the pools of corruption; with them money is merit, and full of recommendation. They engage for men without knowing their names, and chooſe them ſometimes without ſeeing their faces; yet their members, when they are choſen, are as good as yours; that is, their votes are as good. It is in your power, gentlemen, and in that of your honeſt neighbours, to cure this mighty evil, which has hitherto been incurable, or not ſuffered to be cured. They are but a few, and an inconſiderable few, in compariſon of you; and cannot live without you, though you can without them.

Try the expedient which I propoſe; neither buy nor ſell with thoſe reprobrate mercenaries, who ſell themſelves and you. Conſider how much it imports you; your all is concerned in it. This is not a diſpute about dreams or ſpeculations, which affect not your property; but it is a diſpute whether you ſhall have any property, which theſe wretches throw away, by chooſing for the guardians of property, men whom they know not, or who are only known to them by a very bad token, that of having corrupted them.

Lay not out your money with thoſe, who for money ſell your liberties, which is the only ſource of your money, and of all the happineſs which you enjoy. Remember, when your all is at ſtake, as it always is in an election of thoſe who are either to guard, or give up your all; I ſay, remember how wantonly and blindly upon that occaſion, theſe wretches ſurrender themſelves, and you, and your all, and all *England*, to the beſt bidder, without knowing, often, who he is. What mercy do theſe cruel ſlaves deſerve at your hands? The moſt horrible thing that they can do againſt you and your poſterity, they do.

When *Hannibal* had gained his laſt and greateſt battle againſt the *Romans*, and many of the nobility were deliberating about leaving *Rome*, the young *Scipio* entered the room with his ſword drawn, and obliged every man preſent to bind himſelf with an oath, not to deſert their country. And will you, gentlemen, ſuffer the little hireling inhabitants of boroughs, who receive from you and your neighbours their daily bread; will you, can you ſuffer them to betray you, to give up your fortunes, and to comprehend you as they do, in the ſale which they make of themſelves? Do you not know how much you are at the mercy of their honeſty, how much it depends upon their breath whether you are to be freemen or ſlaves: yet

will you ſtand ſtupidly by, and ſee them truck you away for looſe guineas? Would you allow the common laws of neighbourhood to ſuch as ſteal or plunder your goods, rob you of your money, ſeize your houſes, drive you from your poſſeſſions, enſlave your perſons, and ſtarve your families? No, ſure, you would not. Yet will you, can you continue to treat as neighbours and friends, thoſe raſh, wicked, and mercileſs profligates; who, as far as in them lies, would bring upon you and your poſterity all thoſe black and melancholy evils, by committing the mighty and ſacred truſt of all your lives and properties to men, who hire them to betray it; and having firſt made them rogues, may afterwards, for ought they know, make them ſlaves, and you with them?

Can you bear this, gentlemen? It is the root of all your heavy ſufferings, and may yet produce worſe and more heavy. You are freemen, and men of reaſon and ſpirit; awaken your ſpirit, exert your reaſon, and aſſert your freedom. You have a right to petition the parliament, you have a right to addreſs the king, to propoſe your thoughts and grievances to both; and to be heard and relieved when you ſuffer any. And from the ſame reaſon and equity, you, gentlemen freeholders, have a right and a near concern to adviſe your neighbouring boroughs in the choice of their members, and to warn them of the conſequences, if they make a bad one.

For God's ſake, gentlemen, and for your own, and for all our ſakes, ſhew your ſpirit, your underſtanding, and your activity, upon this occaſion; and the hearty prayers and wiſhes of every honeſt man will attend you.

Alas! gentlemen, with tears I tell you, that the cure of corruption is left to you.-------A cure from another quarter is cruelly denied to us. A worthy attempt was lately made to deſtroy it effectually; and we hoped that no man, or ſet of men, pretending to

common honeſty, would have had the face to diſcourage or fruſtrate that attempt; but it was fruſtrated, and we know where, and by whom, and for what ends. Thoſe who owe their whole figure, and fortune, and force to corruption, rather than part with it, ſeem determined to ſee the nation conſumed and periſh in it. Your help muſt be from God and yourſelves; be honeſt, and make your neighbours honeſt; both are in your power, and I glory that they are. As you love your liberties, exerciſe your virtue; they depend upon it. Remember the true, but diſmal picture that I have given you of ſlavery and arbitrary power; and if you would avoid them, be virtuous, ſcorn bribes, abhor the man that offers them, and expoſe him. Conſider him as an accurſed tempter, and a barbarous raviſher, who would buy you out of your integrity, and ſpoil you of your liberties.

Give me leave now, gentlemen, to mark out to you more particularly what ſort of men you ought not to chooſe. Chooſe not thoſe who live at a great diſtance from you, and whoſe abilities, probity, and fortunes, are not well known to you. When you have choſen them, it will be too late to know them. Chooſe not the eldeſt ſons of noblemen, who muſt be naturally in the intereſt of the nobility, as the nobility generally are in the intereſt of the court, whatever it be. Reject bigots of all kinds and ſides: thoſe men, whoſe minds are ſhut up in band-boxes, and who walk upon ſtilts, have not thoughts large enough for governing ſociety. Even their honeſty, when they have any, is uſeleſs to the public; and is often, on the contrary, made an ill inſtrument in the hands of thoſe who have none. Reject alſo all thoſe timorous, fearful, and daſtardly ſpirits; men, who having good principles, either dare not own them, or dare not act according to them. Chooſe not men who are noted for non-attendance, and who have been members

of parliament, without waiting upon the buſineſs of parliament; men, who will probably be engaged in a fox-chaſe, in a tavern, or in other debauched houſes, though the kingdom were undoing. While your happineſs or miſery depends ſo much upon the breath of your repreſentatives, it is of great importance to you, that their attendance be as conſtant as their behaviour be honeſt. What excuſe can they offer for themſelves, when by their wanton abſence a vote may paſs, which may coſt you millions? We know what bold advantages have been taken in former parliaments, of a thin houſe, to raiſe great and unexpected ſums from the nation, to enable its worſt foes to carry on an unnatural conſpiracy againſt it.

Reject with indignation thoſe men, who, in the late execrable *South-ſea* conſpiracy, took ſtock for votes; and for an infamous bribe in ſtock, voted your liberties and purſes into the mercileſs claws of the *South-ſea* traitors, and are ſince many of them juſtly undone by the bargain. Think you, gentlemen, that theſe men, who could ſell their country, when they had a ſtake in it, will not ſell it for leſs, when they have none? You ought to add to the ſame claſs, and treat in the ſame manner, all thoſe who headed and abetted that deſtructive ſcheme, or endeavoured to protect thoſe who did ſo.

You are to be particularly careful, that thoſe whom you chooſe be duly qualified according to the law, and that no deceit be practiſed in obtaining temporary qualifications. You ought to enquire into their eſtates, and how they came by them; and if they have none, as many who ſtand candidates, I am told, have not, you may gueſs who aſſiſts them, and what hopeful ſervices are expected from them. Such men you may be ſure will never ſpeak your ſenſe in parliament,------ nor even their own, if they have any; nor be ſuffered to conſult your intereſt. They muſt work for their maſters againſt you, who ought to be ſo.

Neither can you expect to be well ſerved by men, whoſe eſtates are embarked in companies: they themſelves will be engaged with their fortunes in the particular intereſt of ſuch companies, which are always againſt the intereſt of general trade; and they will be but too apt to fall into the juggling and artifices of courts, to raiſe their ſtock to imaginary values. ---- A certain and known method to promote cheating, and to ſink trade.

Shun likewiſe all thoſe who are in the way of ambition; a paſſion which is rarely gratified by integrity, and an honeſt zeal for your good; ſhun all men of narrow fortunes, who are not for your purpoſe, from obvious reaſons; ſhun all lawyers, who have not eſtabliſhed practice or good eſtates, and who are conſequently more liable to corruption, and whom the court has more means of corrupting, than other men; ſhun all men involved in debt, all men of ill morals, and debauched and diſhoneſt lives; all gameſters, and and all men who ſpend more than their income. Their extravagance makes them neceſſitous, and their neceſſities make them venal.

We do not ordinarily truſt a man with a ſmall ſum, without a note, or mortgage, or a bond; and ſuch ſecurity is but reaſonable: and is it not as reaſonable, that, when we truſt men with all that we have, as we do our repreſentatives, we ought to ſeek and procure all the ſecurity which the nature of the thing will admit? would it not be direct madneſs to truſt our all, our whole accumulative portion in this life, to thoſe whom no man would, in a private way, truſt for five ſhillings? Call to mind, gentlemen, whether ſome of you have never formerly made ſuch a raſh and dangerous choice; and for God's ſake mend it now.

I ſuppoſe thus far you will all agree with me; as I dare ſay you will, when I tell you that the gentlemen of the ſword are not proper repreſentatives of a people, whoſe civil conſtitution abhors ſtanding armies, and

cannot ſubſiſt under them. The fortunes and expectations of theſe gentlemen depend upon obſerving the word of command; and it is but natural that they ſhould ſupport power in which they are ſharers. You muſt not therefore expect that they will ever concur in a vote, or an addreſs, to diſband or reduce themſelves; however deſirable or neceſſary the ſame may be to you. Thoſe of them who deſerve well of you, as very many of the preſent officers do, are doubtleſs entitled to thanks and good uſage from you; but to ſhew them reſpect by giving them ſeats in parliament, is by no means a proper, prudent, or natural way of doing it. Beſides, it will create a great and unjuſt partiality to particular boroughs, and ſome ſhall be burdened with ſoldiers, when others ſhall be free from them; juſt at the mercy and expectations of the commanding officer.

It is indeed a misfortune to the army itſelf, to have any of its officers members of the houſe of commons, ſince the greateſt merit in the field ſhall not recommend a man ſo much to juſt preferment, as the want of merit ſometimes ſhall in that houſe. A complaint, however, which, I hope, there is no ground for at preſent.

Chooſe not, gentlemen, any ſort of men, whoſe intereſt may, at any time, and in any circumſtance, conſiſt in confuſion. Neither are men in employments the propereſt men for your choice. If ever your intereſt comes in competition with their places, you may eaſily gueſs which muſt give way; I think there are but few inſtances, where they themſelves ſuffer, and fall in that ſtruggle. Under this head, I would deſire you, gentlemen, to obſerve the behaviour of the officers of the cuſtoms and exciſe, upon the enſuing elections; and remember, that they forfeit one hundred pounds, if they perſuade or deal with any perſon, to vote, or to forbear voting, and are made for ever incapable of holding any employment under

the crown. If you find them buſy and intermeddleing in this election, take the advantage which the law gives you, and ſee it honeſtly put in execution againſt them. Beſides, ſuch conduct of theirs, and proſecution of yours, may give occaſion to a new law, with more terrible penalties upon that ſort of men, whom our misfortunes have made numerous.

For a concluſion. Conſider, gentlemen, Oh! conſider what you are about, and whether you will bring life or death upon us. Oh! take care of yourſelves, and of us all. We are all in your hands, and ſo at preſent are your repreſentatives; but very quickly the ſcene will be ſhifted, and both you and we will be in theirs. Do not judge of them by their preſent humble ſpeeches, and condeſcending carriage; but think what they are like to be, when they are no longer under your eye, when they are no longer ſuing to you, nor want you. Theſe humble creatures, who now bow down before you, will ſoon look down upon you---Oh! chooſe ſuch as are likely to do it with moſt pity and tenderneſs, and are moſt likely to relieve you of thoſe burdens, under which we all ſadly groan, and under which we muſt certainly ſink, never to riſe again, if we be not relieved.

I am, gentlemen, with exceeding ſincerity, and all good wiſhes,

G

Your moſt affectionate humble ſervant.

Saturday, March 31. 1722. N°. 71.

Polite arts and learning naturally produced in free ſtates, and marred by ſuch as are not free.

SIR,

IN the firſt riſe and beginning of ſtates, a rough and unhewn virtue, a rude and ſavage fierceneſs, and an unpoliſhed paſſion for liberty, are the qualities chiefly in repute. To theſe ſucceed military accompliſhments, domeſtic arts and ſciences, and ſuch political knowledge and acquirements, as are neceſſary to make ſtates great and formidable abroad, and to preſerve equality, and domeſtic happineſs, and ſecurity, at home. And laſtly, when theſe are attained, follow politeneſs, ſpeculative knowledge, moral and experimental philoſophy, with other branches of learning, and the whole train of the muſes.

The *Romans* were long maſters of the arts of war and policy, before they knew much of the embelliſhments of letters.

Serus enim Græcis admovit acumina chartis,
Et, poſt punica bella, quietus quærere cœpit,
Quid Sophocles et Theſpis, et Æſchylus utile ferrent.

Theſe were the effects of eaſe, leiſure, ſecurity, and plenty, and the productions of men retired from the hurry and anxieties of war, and ſequeſtered from the tumults of the world; of men not ruffled by diſappointment, nor ſcared with the noiſe of foreign invaſions, nor diſturbed with civil tumults; and of men

not diſtreſſed by want, or wholly employed with the cares of life, and ſolicitous for a ſupport to themſelves and families;

-----præter laudem nullius avaris.

The *Romans* had ſecured their conqueſts, and ſettled their power, before they grew fond of the ornaments of life.

How ſhould my Memmius *have time to read,*
When by his anceſtor's fam'd glory led
To noble deeds, he muſt eſpouſe the cauſe
Of his dear country's liberties and laws?
Amongſt rough wars how can verſe ſmoothly flow,
Or midſt ſuch ſtorms the learned laurel grow?

L. Mummius was one of the principal men of *Rome*; yet ſo late as the taking of *Corinth*, he was ſo ignorant in the polite arts, that when he was ſhipping off the glorious ſpoils of that great city to *Rome*, he ridiculouſly threatned the maſters of the veſſels, that if they broke or loſt any of the ſtatues, paintings, or of the other curious *Greek* monuments, they ſhould be obliged to get others made in their room at their proper expence.

But the *Romans* quickly improved in their taſte, quickly grew fond of works of genius of every kind, having now leiſure to admire them, and encouragement to imitate them. And the *Greeks*, from whom the *Romans* had them, were firſt great in power, and their civil œconomy was excellently eſtabliſhed, before they grew eminent in politeneſs and learning.

But neither will the ſingle invitations of leiſure and eaſe prove ſufficient to engage men in the purſuits of knowledge as far as it may be purſued. Other motives muſt be thrown in; they muſt find certain protection and encouragements in ſuch purſuits, and pro-

per rewards at the end of them. The laurel is often the chief cauſe of the victory. The *Greeks*, who encouraged learning and the ſciences more, and preſerved them longer than any people ever did, kept ſtated, public, and general aſſemblies, on purpoſe for the trial and encouragement of wit and arts, and for the diſtinguiſhing of thoſe who profeſſed them. Thither reſorted all who had any pretenſions that way, or had engaged in performances of that kind: all the moſt illuſtrious men in *Greece*, the nobility, the magiſtracy, the ambaſſadors of princes, ſometimes princes themſelves, were the auditors and judges: by theſe merit was diſtinguiſhed, the contention for glory decided, the victory declared, and by theſe the rewards of it were beſtowed. Thus glorious was the price of excelling: thus equitable, public, and loud was the fame of it. It is therefore no wonder that it was courted by the *Greeks* with as much ardour and application, as the chief dignities in a ſtate are courted by others. And, conſidering how ſtrong were the ſtimulations of the *Greeks* to ſtudy, *Horace* might well ſay.

Graiis ingenium, Graiis dedit ore rotundo
Muſa loqui------

Before this auguſt aſſembly, *Herodotus* repeated his hiſtory with great applauſe; which ſo animated *Thucydides*, then very young, that, in emulation of *Herodotus*, he wrote a better hiſtory than that of *Herodotus*. Here *Cleomenes* recommended himſelf, by only repeating ſome verſes ſkilfully collected out of *Empedocles*; and here *Euripides* and *Xenocles* contended for preference in the *drama*.

Indeed, the honours attending a victory upon theſe occaſions were exceſſive, and, according to *Cicero*, did almoſt equal thoſe of a *Roman* triumph. The victors were reckoned to have arrived at the higheſt

human felicity, to have entailed glory upon all that belonged to them, upon their families, friends, their native city, and the place of their education. Elogiums were made upon them, ſtatues were erected to them, and, ever after, they met every where the ſame preference, which they had met at the *Olympic* aſſemblies------ A preference which ſo fired the emperor *Nero*, that, when he had ridiculouſly ſtood competitor at a ſinging-match, and taken a journey to *Greece* on purpoſe, he firſt declared himſelf victor, and then, to deſtroy all marks and memory of thoſe who had been ſo before him, he commanded all their pictures and ſtatues to be pulled down, and thrown into the privies.

The *Romans*, as ſoon as they had leiſure from their long and many wars, fell quickly into the ſame ſtudies, and into the ſame emulation to excel in them. They no ſooner had any acquaintance with *Greece*, but they were poſſeſſed with a fondneſs for all her refinements.

Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes
Intulit agreſti Latio.

The fierce *Romans* ſubdued *Greece* by their arms; and *Greece* made ruſtic *Italy* a captive to her arts. All the youth of *Rome* were charmed with the beauties of learning, and eager to poſſeſs them: many of the ſenators were caught by the ſame paſſions; even the elder *Cato*, who was at firſt againſt theſe improvements, which, he feared, would ſoften too much the rough *Roman* genius, yet changed his opinion ſo far afterwards, as to learn *Greek* in his old age.

This prodigious progreſs of the *Romans* in learning had no other cauſe than the freedom and equality of their government. The ſpirit of the people, like that of their ſtate, breathed nothing but liberty, which no power ſought to controul, or could controul. The

improvement of knowledge, by bringing no terror to the magiſtrates, brought no danger to the people. Nothing is too hard for liberty; that liberty which made the *Greeks* and *Romans* maſters of the world, made them maſters of all the learning in it: and, when their liberties periſhed, ſo did their learning. That eloquence, and thoſe other abilities and acquirements, which raiſed thoſe who had them to the higheſt dignities in a free ſtate, became under tyranny a certain train to ruin, unleſs they were proſtituted to the ſervice of the tyrant.

That knowledge, and thoſe accompliſhments, which create jealouſy inſtead of applauſe, and danger inſtead of reward, will be but rarely and faintly purſued; and for the moſt part not at all. No man will take great pains, ſpend his youth, and loſe his pleaſures, to purchaſe infamy or puniſhment: and therefore when ſuch obſtacles are thrown in his way, he will take counſel of ſelf-love, acquieſce in the faſhionable ſtupidity, and prefer gilded and thriving folly to dangerous and forbidden wiſdom.

Ignorance accompanies ſlavery, and is introduced by it. People who live in freedom will think with freedom; but when the mind is enſlaved by fear, and the body by chains, inquiry and ſtudy will be at an end. Men will not purſue dangerous knowledge, nor venture their heads to improve their underſtandings. Beſides, their ſpirits, dejected with ſervitude and poverty, will want vigour as well as leiſure to cultivate arts, and propagate truth; which is ever high-treaſon againſt tyranny. Neither the titles nor the deeds of tyrants will bear examination; and their power is concerned to ſtupify and deſtroy the very faculties of reaſon and thinking: nor can reaſon travel far, when force and dread are in the way; and when men dare not ſee, their eyes will ſoon grow uſeleſs.

In *Turky*, printing is forbid, leſt by its means common ſenſe might get the better of violence, and be

too hard for the imperial butcher. It is even capital, and certain death there, only to reaſon freely upon their *Alcoran*.---- A ſure ſign of impoſture! But by impoſture, ſtupidity, and Janizaries, his throne is ſupported; and his vaſt, but thin dominions, know no inhabitants but barbarous, ignorant, and miſerable ſlaves.

Nor is printing in other arbitrary countries of much uſe but to rivet their chains: it is permitted only on one ſide, and made the further means of ſervitude. Even in Chriſtian countries, under arbitrary princes, the people are for the moſt part as ignorant and implacable bigots as the *Turks* are. And as it is rare to find a ſlave who is not a bigot, no man can ſhew me a bigot who is not an ignorant ſlave; for bigotry is a ſlavery of the ſoul to certain religious opinions, fancies, or ſtories, of which the bigot knows little or nothing, and damns all that do.

The leaſt cramp or reſtraint upon reaſoning and inquiry of any kind, will prove ſoon a mighty bar in the way to learning. It is very true, that all ſorts of knowledge, at leaſt all ſorts of ſublime and important knowledge, are ſo complicated and interwoven together, that it is impoſſible to ſearch into any part of it, and to trace the ſame with freedom to its firſt principles, without borrowing and taking in the help of moſt, if not all, of the other parts. Religion and government, particularly, are at the beginning and end of every thing, and are the ſciences in the world the moſt neceſſary and important to be known; and as theſe are more or leſs known, other knowledge will be proportionably greater or ſmaller, or none: but, where theſe cannot be freely examined, and their excellencies ſearched into, and underſtood, all other wiſdom will be maimed and ineffectual, indeed ſcarce worth having,

Now, in all arbitrary governments, and under all created and impoſing religions, nothing muſt be found

true in philoſophy, which thwarts the received ſcheme, and the uppermoſt opinions: the moſt evident mathematical demonſtrations muſt not diſprove orthodox dogma's, and eſtabliſhed ideas; the fineſt poetical flights muſt be reſtrained and diſcouraged, when they would fly over the narrow incloſures and priſon walls of bigots: nor muſt the beſt, the ſtrongeſt, and the moſt beautiful reaſoning dare to break through popular prejudices, or attempt to contend with powerful and lucrative uſurpation. A biſhop was burned before the *reformation*, for diſcovering the world to be round; and, even in the laſt century, the excellent *Galileo* was put into the diſmal priſon of the *inquiſition*, for maintaining the motion of the earth round the ſun as her centre. This propoſition of his, which he had demonſtrated, he was forced to recant, to ſave his life, and ſatisfy the church.

Where religion and government are moſt deformed, as religion ever is where it is ſupported by craft and force, and government ever is when it is maintained by whips and chains, there all examination into either, and all reaſoning about them, is moſt ſtrictly forbid and diſcouraged: and as one ſort of inquiry and knowledge begets another; and as, when the wits of men are ſuffered to exert themſelves freely, no body knows where their purſuits may end; ſo no tyranny of any kind is ſafe, where general, impartial, and uſeful knowledge is purſued. Inhuman violence, and ſtupid ignorance, are the certain and neceſſary ſtay of tyrants; and every thing that is good or valuable in the world is againſt them.

In the *Eaſt* (if we except *China*) there is not a glimmering of knowledge; though the eaſtern people are, from their natural climate and genius, vaſtly capable of all knowledge. *Bernier*, mentioning the cruelty of the government, and the great miſery of the people there, ſays, "From the ſame cauſe, a groſs and profound "ignorance reigns in thoſe ſtates: nor is it poſſible

" there ſhould be academies and colleges well found-
" ed in them. Where are there ſuch founders to
" be met with? And, if they were, where are the
" ſcholars to be had? Where are thoſe who have
" means ſufficient to maintain their children in col-
" leges? And, if there were, who durſt appear to be
" rich? And, if they would, where are thoſe benefi-
" ces, preferments, and dignities, which require
" knowledge and abilities, and animate young men
" to ſtudy?

I will not deny, but that, in arbitrary countries, there are ſometimes found men of great parts and learning. But theſe are either eccleſiaſtics, who, even in the greateſt tyrannies, at leaſt in *Europe*, are bleſſed with great liberty, and many independent privileges, and are freemen in the midſt of ſlaves, and have ſuitable leiſure and revenues to ſupport them in their ſtudies; or they are men invited and encouraged by the prince to flatter his pride, and adminiſter to his pomp and pleaſures, and to recommend his perſon and power. For theſe reaſons alone they are careſſed, protected, and rewarded. They are endowed with the advantages of freemen, merely to be the inſtruments of ſervitude. They are a ſort of *Swiſs*, hired to be the guards of their proud maſter's fame, and to applaud and vindicate all his wickedneſs, wildneſs, uſurpations, prodigalities, and follies. This therefore is the worſt of all proſtitutions, the moſt immortal of all ſort of ſlavery; as it is ſupporting ſervitude with the breath of liberty, and aſſaulting and mangling liberty with her own weapons. A creature that lets out his genius to hire, may ſometimes have a very good one; but he muſt have a vile and beggarly ſoul, and his performances are at beſt but the baſeſt way of petitioning for alms.

France could boaſt many men of wit and letters in the late reign, though it was a very ſevere one, and brought infinite evils upon all *France* and *Europe*.

But theſe great wits were many of them the inſtruments and paraſites of power, who bent the whole force of their genius to ſanctify domeſtic oppreſſion and foreign uſurpation: ſuch were the characters and employment of *Peliſſon*, *Boileau*, *Racine*, and ſeveral others. *France* ſaw at the ſame time ſeveral churchmen of great and exalted talents, ſuch as the late archbiſhop of *Cambray*, the cardinal *de Retz*, *Claude Joly* *, the preſent abbot *Vertot*, and many more excellent men, all lovers of liberty, which, by being churchmen, they poſſeſſed.

But though it be true, that the late *French* king encouraged all ſorts of learning, that contributed to the grandeur of his name and court, and did not contradict his power, and courted great writers all over *Eupope*, either to write for him, or not againſt him; yet the nature of his government was ſo conſtant a damp upon general learning, that it was at laſt brought to a very low paſs in that kingdom, even in his time. Monſieur *Des Maizeaux* tells us, in his dedication of *St. Evremond*'s works to the late lord *Halifax*, That *the great genius's of* France *were*, about the time I ſpeak of, *ſo conſtrained, as either to have forbore writing at all, or to have expreſſed what they thought by halves*; That La Bruyere *complains, that the* French *are cramped in ſatire*; That Regis, *the famous philoſopher, ſolicited ten years for a licence to publiſh his courſe of philoſophy, and at laſt obtained it only on this condition, to retrench whatever diſpleaſed the cen-*

* *Claud Joly, canon of Noſtre Dame, Paris, hath publiſhed a treatiſe, entitled,* "*Recueil de maxims veritables et importantes pour l'inſtitution du roy, contre la fauſſe politique du cardinal Mazarin;*" *wherein he ſhews, that the power of kings is limited by that of their eſtates and parliaments; and gives authentic proofs, that ſuch is the original conſtitution of the government of France. He died* 1700.

ſors; That *monſieur* de Fontenelle *hath been obliged to depart from the freedom which he uſed in the firſt works he publiſhed*; That *but few of the preſent* French *authors diſtinguiſh themſelves either by their learning or wit*; and that all this is *to be attributed to the nature of the government*; which is unqueſtionably true.

What Mr. *Des Maizeaux* ſays upon this argument, is ſo judicious and juſt, that I ſhall borrow another paragraph from the ſame dedication: "Liberty, *ſays* "*he*, inſpires a noble and elevated confidence, which "naturally inlarges the mind, and gives it an emu- "lation to trace out new roads towards attaining the "ſciences; whereas a ſervile dependance terrifies the "ſoul, and fills the mind with a timorous circumſpecti- "on, that renders it mean and groveling, and even "debars the uſe of its moſt refined natural talents.---- "*Greece* and *Italy* never had illuſtrious writers, but "whilſt they preſerved their liberty. The loſs of that "was followed by the decay of wit, and the ruin of "polite learning. *Greece*, formerly the ſeat of the "muſes, is now involved in a frightful barbarity, un- "der the ſlavery of the *Ottoman* empire; and *Italy*, "which, under the influence of a ſenate, was ſo fruit- "ful in great and learned men, now ſubject to the "tribunal of the *inquiſition*, produces no conſiderable "works of erudition or politeneſs."

All the great genius's, who lived in the days of *Auguſtus*, were born and educated in the days of liberty; and he borrowed from the commonwealth all the ornaments of his court and empire. In ſpite of all his boaſted taſte of letters, and the encouragement which he gave them, I do not remember one extraordinary genius bred under his influence: on the contrary, all that were ſo, died in his time, without leaving any ſucceſſors. *Quicquid Romana facundia habet quod inſolenti Græciæ aut opponat aut præferat, circa Ciceronem efflo- ruit. Omnia ingenia quæ lucem ſtudiis noſtris attulerunt,*

tunc nata ſunt. In deterius deinde quotidie data res eſt, ſays *Seneca*. " Every improvement in the *Roman* e-
" loquence, which either equals or excels that of aſſu-
" ming *Greece*, floriſhed in the time of *Cicero*. All the
" great wits, that now animate and direct our ſtudies,
" were then born. But, ever ſince then, wit daily
" decays, and grows lower and lower.

This decay began in the time of *Auguſtus*, who began his reign with butchering *Cicero*, his patron, his father, and his friend, and the prodigy of *Roman* eloquence and learning; and that decay encreaſed ſo faſt, that, from the firſt *Roman* emperor to the laſt, for the ſpace of about five hundred years, the great city of *Rome* did not produce five great genius's; and thoſe that it did produce, were produced near the times of liberty, when they were yet warmed with its memory, before the tyrants had yet time utterly to aboliſh all that was good, though they made infinite haſte. *Tacitus* was their laſt great hiſtorian, and *Juvenal* their laſt great poet, both paſſionate adorers of liberty. It is melancholy what the former ſays upon this ſubject, *Poſt bellatum apud Actium, atque omnem poteſtatem ad unum conferre pacis interfuit, magna illa ingenia ceſſere.* The *Romans* had no longer any great genius's, than while they were free.

The *Greeks* preſerved learning ſome time after the *Romans* had loſt it; for, though they were conquered by the *Romans*, many of the *Greek* cities were ſuffered to enjoy their antient liberties and laws: they paid only an eaſy homage, and no troops were quartered among them, as in the other provinces. However, as they were at the mercy of foreign maſters, the vigour of their ſpirit was gone, and they produced but few good authors: *Dio* and *Plutarch* are, I think, reckoned the chief. It is the obſervation of the learned, polite, and ingenious author of the *Reflections Critiques ſur la poeſie & ſur le peinture*, That *Greece* had more great men of all kinds in the age of *Plato* alone,

when its liberties flouriſhed, than in all the many ages between *Perſeus*, the laſt king of *Macedon*, and the taking of *Conſtantinople* by the *Turks*, amounting to ſeventeen hundred years.

The ſeveral attempts made by *Veſpaſian*, *Titus*, and *Trajan*, to reſtore learning, proved almoſt vain. The Muſes, who, frightened by tyranny, were now fled out of the world, could not be allured back to *Rome*, where baſeneſs, terrors, and ſervitude, had long reigned, and where their ſeats were filled by pedantic praters, by babbling and hypocritical philoſophers: for, the itch and name of learning ſtill ſubſiſted; and therefore *Seneca* ſays, *ut omnium rerum, ſic literarum quoque intemperantia laboramus.*

The root of the evil remained; the empire of mere will had uſurped the throne of the laws, and the place of learning. The genius, that bold and glorious genius, inſpired by liberty, was gone; and the trial to reſtore learning without reſtoring liberty, only ſerved to ſhew, that they who would do good to a community, which is ill conſtituted or corrupted, muſt either begin with the government, and alter or reform that, or deſpair of ſucceſs. All that the beſt *Roman* emperors could at laſt do, was, not to butcher nor oppreſs their people; which yet they could not reſtrain their miniſters from doing. *Mucianus* blackened the reign of *Veſpaſian* by his pride, inſolence, and cruelties; and the miniſters of *Nerva*, under colour of puniſhing the informers, a crew of rogues licenſed and encouraged by the former emperors, to enſnare and deſtroy their dreadful foes, the innocent and virtuous, made uſe of that good prince's authority, and his hatred of theſe vermin, to baniſh, plunder, kill, and ruin, many of the beſt men in *Rome*.

The government, the arbitrary ſingle government, had long diſcouraged and baniſhed every thing that was good; and, with the reſt, learning irretrievably.

Saturday, April 7. 1722. N°. 72.

In abſolute monarchies the monarch ſeldom rules, but his creatures inſtead of him.---That ſort of government a gradation of tyrants.

SIR,

THE advocates for abſolute monarchy argue as ignorantly as perverſely, and build without a foundation; ſince, while they contend for unlimited ſubmiſſion to the monarch's will, they muſt either ſuppoſe, that all acts of power proceed from his will, or elſe that the will of his miniſters is alſo unlimited, and their orders are irreſiſtable. So that either all his ſervants, inſtruments, and executioners, are abſolute monarchs too; which none but a madman will ſay: Or that he himſelf does immediately direct every thing that is done; which no man of common ſenſe will affirm. Indeed ſuch princes have the leaſt ſhare of their own power, and ſeldom know what is done, or care.

Monſieur *Thevenot* tells us, that the *Grand Signor* minds nothing but his pleaſures, the pranks of mutes and buffoons, who are his conſtant attendants, and always ſtudying new freaks and grimaces to divert him; and the dalliances of women, ſent to him from all quarters by his *baſhaws*. His power is abſolutely deſpotic: his will, that is to ſay, his luſt, his maggots, or his rage, is his only law, and the only bounds to the authority of this vicegerent of God. By virtue of this ſacred power, he may rob any man, or all men,

of their eſtates, and no man has a right to complain: he may put the beſt men to the moſt ignominious and barbarous death, and exalt the vileſt criminals to the higheſt dignities; and no man muſt aſk why. *This unlimited power of the* Sultan, ſays monſieur *Thevenot, is founded on the* Mohamedan *religion, which enjoins a blind ſubmiſſion to all his commands, on pain of damnation.*

A bleſſed and beneficent religion this! and a ſingle ſovereignty with a witneſs! But this monſtrous and formidable power, which is holden by him, is directed by his miniſters without him. They employ both him and themſelves; him, far from his duty, in unmanly pleaſures; themſelves in the miſmanagement of his affairs, and in proſtituting his name and authority, to ſerve their own views. He wears the crown, and lives in a brothel; they ſway the ſceptre, ſuck the people's blood, and fill their own coffers. The *Grand Viſier*, or firſt miniſter, is, in effect, king over his maſter: he has the cuſtody of the imperial power, and diſcharges the office of the *Grand Signor:* and as to the *Baſhaws*, who are likewiſe ſo many kings in their povinces, *Thevenot* ſays, "They abuſe their "authority, and are more arbitrary than the *Sultan* "himſelf, their deſign and buſineſs being to raiſe ſud-"den fortunes by their ſpoils and oppreſſion: and "the *Grand Signor* is forced to diſſemble his know-"ledge of this rapine and exorbitancy, for want of "power to puniſh or redreſs them; for that theſe "men have the ſoldiers more at their devotion than "he has.

As to the *Turkiſh* civil officers and judges, he ſays, they do what they will, and judge as they pleaſe; for all their written laws being contained in the *Alcoran*, which is but a ſhort book, they are ſo ambiguouſly expreſſed, and ſo loſely delivered, that the *Cadi*, as well as the *Baſhaw*, wreſts them as he pleaſes; and, judging without appeal, both theſe greedy and rapacious

officers turn juſtice into oppreſſion, and make it a ſtale to their avarice.

Such is the ſpirit and effects of lawleſs power, lodged in one man; every officer and creature of his will have it; and, by ſetting up one tyrant, a thouſand are ſet up. As this power is never to be got or preſerved, but by violence and oppreſſion; all men, who have any ſhare in executing, and miniſtring, and defending the ſame, muſt be oppreſſors too. As no man is an oppreſſor for the mere pleaſure and ſecurity of another, but only for his own ſake and gratification; ſo all the ſervants of tyranny do, in their maſter's name, but rob and ſpoil for themſelves; and every ſervant is a maſter. All over the *Ottoman* empire, there is a great *Turk* in every town, and he at *Conſtantinople* is perhaps the idleſt and moſt harmleſs of them all; and the exerciſe of the *Turkiſh* government is nothing elſe but a daily and general plunder, a contention between the governors, who ſhall ſpoil beſt and get moſt. Nor, let them plunder and butcher as they will, is there any redreſs to the oppreſſed and expiring people; for though the imperial oppreſſor often forces his miniſterial oppreſſors to diſgorge, and ſpoils the ſpoiler of his booty, and his life, where he dares; yet, there being no reſtitution made, the condition of the oppreſſed is not mended: it is mock-juſtice, and worſe than none; every act of power, every degree of office there, is robbery and violence, and every officer, the leaſt and loweſt, is an irreſiſtable tyrant.

Single and abſolute monarchy therefore, or the ruling all by the will of one, is nonſenſe and a contradiction; it is rather a multiplication of monarchs, and in fact the worſt ſort of *Oligarchy*. Now ſuppoſe we were to obey blindly the will of the prince; are we alſo to obey blindly the will of his eunuchs, miſtreſſes, and janizaries, who oppreſs without his knowledge, or againſt his will? Sure the inſtruments and delegates of tyranny are not alſo the Lord's anointed. How

therefore ſhall we know their mind from his, which perhaps contradicts theirs? Or how ſhall we know whether he wills any thing at all, and whether they do not will for him? This is almoſt always the caſe; and then here is a monarchy of miniſters; and paraſites, pathics, buffoons, women, and butchers, rule for him, and over him.

Is this government too by divine right? If it be, let us rail no longer at anarchy; which, being the abſence of all government, though it leaves every man to do what he liſts, yet likewiſe leaves every man a right to defend himſelf: beſides, this ſort of anarchy, where every one is abſolutely free, will quickly ſettle into order, and indeed cannot ſubſiſt long. But ſingle monarchy, which is a long gradation of tyrants, where many on one ſide do what they will againſt the moſt on the other ſide; where cruelty and luſt revel without controul; where wanton and inhuman power has no limits, and heavy and ſorrowful oppreſſion no remedy nor end; where the innocent and harmleſs ſuffer moſt, and the worſt and vileſt thrive beſt, and where none are ſecure; where wickedneſs ſupports power, and property is the ſpoil of armies: I ſay, this abſolute monarchy is worſe than abſolute anarchy, by not being ſo general. It is a partial anarchy, with worſe effects, and no remedy.

All this ſtill further proves, that men and ſocietes have no poſſible human ſecurity but certain and expreſs laws, ſetting expreſs bounds to the power of their magiſtrates, aſcertaining the meaſure of power as well as ſubjection, and reſtraining alike the exorbitances of both prince and people. It is eternally true, that ſuch as is the nature of the government, ſuch will be the nature of the people; and that as they are happy or miſerable, ſo they will be good or bad, as their government and governors are good or bad; and that their whole integrity and virtue, or all their corruption and baſeneſs, does ariſe from that ſingle ſource.

" Princes, *ſays* Machiavel, do, but with little rea-
" ſon, and an ill grace, complain of the tranſgreſſions
" and faults of their ſubjects; ſince by the negligence
" and debauched example of their prince alone, the
" people are, and muſt be, debauched: and, if the
" people of our times are infamous for thefts, and
" robberies, and plunderings, and preying upon one
" another, and the like enormities, it is all owing to
" the exorbitances and rapaciouſneſs of their govern-
" ors. ——*Romania* was a place full of all diſſolute-
" neſs and iniquity, every day, and every trivial oc-
" caſion, producing notorious murders and rapines:
" which evils were not derived ſo much from any
" depravity in the nature of the people (as ſome
" would falſely ſuggeſt) as from the vile corruption
" of their princes: for, being poor themſelves, and
" yet ambitious to live in ſplendor, luxury, and mag-
" nificence (*the true cauſes of their poverty!*) they
" were forced upon execrable courſes for money,
" and indeed refuſed none that could ſupply them.

" To paſs by their many other ſpunging projects:
" one of their deteſtable ſchemes was to make laws
" againſt ſuch and ſuch things, and, after theſe laws
" were publiſhed, they themſelves would be the firſt
" to break them, and to encourage others to do the
" ſame: nor was any man ever rebuked or puniſhed
" for his un-obſervance, till they ſaw enough envolv-
" ed in the ſame penalty and premunire; and then,
" forſooth, the laws were to be executed with all
" ſtrictneſs and ſeverity, not out of any zeal for juſ-
" tice, but from a ravenous appetite to be fingering
" the fines. From whence it followed, that, by
" grievous mulcts and expilations, the people, being
" impoveriſhed, were conſtrained to uſe the ſame
" violences upon thoſe, who were leſs potent than
" they themſelves were. By which means, the
" people were not corrected for doing evil, but in-
" ſtructed how to do it. And all theſe miſchiefs

" proceeded ſolely from the baſeneſs and iniquity of " their princes."

Thus it is that ſuch courts, being continually in a conſpiracy againſt the property and felicity of their people, and preying continually upon them by vile means and pretences, teach their people to conſpire againſt honeſty, and to prey upon one another; nay, by robbing them, they make it neceſſary for them to rob. Thus readily, neceſſarily, and naturally, is the ſpirit of the governors transfuſed into the governed, who are ever taught civil corruption by their ſuperiors, before they practiſe it themſelves.

Father *le Compte*, giving an account of the government of *China*, and ſhewing the wiſe proviſion made by the laws to check the great power of the emperor, ſays,---" Nor is intereſt a leſs motive than reputati- " on to the emperor, to be guided by the ancient cuſ- " toms, and to adhere to the laws, which are framed " ſo much for his advantage, that he cannot violate " them, without obvious prejudice to his own autho- " rity, nor alter them, without bringing his kingdom " into confuſion; for ſuch is the temper of the *Chi-* " *neſes*, that, when the emperor is governed by vio- " lence and paſſion, and grows negligent of his affairs, " the ſame perverſe ſpirit poſſeſſes his ſubjects: every " *Mandarin* thinks himſelf ſovereign of his province " or city: the chief miniſters ſell offices and places " to worthleſs wretches: the *Vice-roys* become ſo " many little tyrants: the governors obſerve no rule " of juſtice; and the people thus oppreſſed, are eaſily " ſtirred up to ſedition: rogues multiply, and commit " villanies in companies, and court all occaſions to " do miſchief, and to break the peace. Such begin- " ings have occaſioned fatal conſequences, and put " *China* under the command of new maſters; ſo that " the emperor's ſureſt way to preſerve his crown, is " to obſerve the laws, and give an entire obedience " to them."

An abſolute prince and his deputy-tyrants are only the inſtruments of one another. By their hands he executes his luſt, avarice, and rage; by his authority they execute their own. He is their dupe; they are his tools: however they may differ in particular views, they are always ſtrongly united in cruelty and oppreſſion. And therefore, whenever there is any contention amongſt them, it is only who ſhall be the uppermoſt tyrants; for tyranny is the aim, the darling, and the practiſe of all: and when the ſuperior and ſubordinate tyrants butcher one another, as they often do; the people, though they ſee the revenge, yet feel no relief. Whoever bears the iron rod, they feel its ſharpneſs and its weight: for almoſt every tyrant grows worſe and worſe; yet generally leaves a ſucceſſor worſe than himſelf. What unutterable and encreaſing woe muſt be the lot of their poor ſubjects under continual harrows of iron, made daily more poignant and heavy! Nor is the killing of a tyrant any cure, unleſs the tyranny be killed with him. The nature of his power breaths nothing but deſtruction, private ruin, and public deſolation; the common maxims of juſtice and mercy are not known to him, or known only for high-treaſon; the very contrary are conſtantly practiſed; and his miniſters, to be faithful ſervants, muſt be the worſt of men, and all of them tyrants like himſelf.

Theſe kings (of the *Eaſt*) ſays monſieur *Bernier*, ſee no man about them, but men of nothing; ſlaves, ignorants, brutes, and ſuch courtiers as are raiſed from the duſt to dignities; who, for want of good education, do almoſt always retain ſomewhat of their original, and of the temper of beggars enriched. They proud, inſufferable, cowardly, inſenſible of honour, perfidious, void of affection, and of all regard for their king and country.

Theſe kings, ſays he, muſt ruin all, to find means to defray thoſe prodigious expences, which they can-

not avoid, for the ſupport of their great court, which has no other ſource of ſubſiſtence, but their coffers and treaſures; and for maintaining conſtantly the vaſt number of forces neceſſary to keep the people in ſubjection, and to prevent their running away, and to force them to work, in order to draw from them the fruits of their work. For, the people, being kept continually under the dreadful yoke of oppreſſion, and made to labour through fear, for the benefit of their governors only, are perfectly wild and deſperate, and ready to do any act of deſpair. Captain *Perry* ſays the ſame of the *Muſcovites*; that, made deſperate by oppreſſion and want, they run eagerly into tumults, murders, and rebellions: and Dr. *Fletcher* ſays, that they are ſo enraged with hunger and cold, that they beg in a wild and deſperate tone, *Give me, and cut me; Help me, and kill me*, &c.

I would obſerve here, how much more eaſy, as well as glorious, it is to govern freemen than ſlaves. It is true, that freemen go ſometimes much farther in their oppoſition to unjuſt power, than ſlaves go or can go; becauſe they have more ſpirit, ſenſe, virtue, and force: but that they are with more difficulty governed, is abſolutely falſe. It is indeed difficult to oppreſs them, and their rebellion is generally no more than their diſtinguiſhing of goverment from oppreſſion; a diſtinction which their governors but too ſeldom make, and which ſlaves, born to oppreſſion, know not how to make. In truth, government is a thing not ſo much as known in the greateſt, by far the greateſt part of the earth. Government ſuppoſes, on one ſide, a juſt execution of rational ſtanding laws, made by the conſent of ſociety; and on the other ſide, a rational ſubjection to thoſe laws. But what has arbitrary will, wanton and outrageous luſt, cruelty and oppreſſion, to do with government, but to deſtroy it?

But to ſhew yet further the anarchy of abſolute monarchy, I ſhall inſert here what monſieur *Bernier* ſays

of the education of ſuch ſort of princes. He ſays, that one of the principal ſources of the miſery, of the miſgovernment, of the diſpeopling, and of the decay of the eaſtern empires, proceeds from hence, that the children of their kings are brought up only by women and eunuchs, who generally are no other than wretched ſlaves from *Ruſſia*, *Circaſſia*, *Gurgiſtan*, *Mengrelia*, and *Ethiopia*; creatures of mean and inſolent, ſervile and ignorant ſouls.

Theſe princes become kings, without inſtruction worthy of men, and without knowing what it is to be a king. They are amazed when they come out of the ſeraglio, as perſons coming out of another world, or out of ſome ſubterraneous cave, where they had ſpent their whole lives. They wonder at every thing which they meet, like ſo many ignorants. They either fear all and believe all, like children; or nothing at all, like idiots. They are commonly high and proud, and ſeemingly grave: but this their loftineſs and gravity is ſo flat, ſo diſtaſteful, and ſo unbecoming them, that it is viſibly nothing but brutality and barbarouſneſs, and the effect of ſome ill-ſtudied documents. Sometimes they run into ſome childiſh civilities, ſtill more unſavoury; or into ſuch cruelties as are blind and brutal; or into the vile and mean vice of drunkenneſs, or into a groſs and exceſſive luxury; and either ruin their bodies and underſtandings with their concubines, or abandon themſelves to the pleaſure of hunting, like ſome carnivorous animals, and prefer a pack of dogs before ſo many poor people, whom they force to follow them in the purſuit of their game, and ſuffer to periſh with hunger, heat, cold, and miſery.

In a word, they always run into one extreme or another, and are intirely irrational or extravagant, according as they are carried away by their temper, or by the firſt impreſſions made upon them. And thus remaining, almoſt all, in utter ignorance of their duty, and of the ſtate of their country, and of all pub-

lic concernments, they abandon the reins of the government to ſome *Viſier*, (in *Engliſh*, a firſt miniſter) who entertains them in their ignorance, and encourages them in their paſſions and follies; and their ignorance, paſſions, and follies, are the ſtrongeſt ſupports that theſe *Viſiers* can have to maintain their dominion over their maſters.

Theſe kings are alſo frequently given up entirely to theſe ſlaves, to their mothers, and to their own eunnchs, who often know nothing but to contrive plots of cruelty to ſtrangle and baniſh one another; ſometimes they murder the king himſelf: nor is any one elſe ſafe in life or property. Thus far *Bernier*.

Thus do theſe princes live ſhut up in brothels, ſtrangers and enemies to their people; and when an appetite for war is added to their ſpirit of cruelty and oppreſſion, all the advantage from it to their ſubjects is, that in the warlike havoc a quicker end is put to their miſeries, by ending their lives with a gun or a ſcimitar, inſtead of famine.

As to the redreſs of their grievances, and the doing juſtice upon the authors of them, it is abſolutely impracticable in any country which has no ſtates and repreſentatives; and certain and irretrievable miſery, as abſolute as its government, is entailed upon it to all generations, till there be an utter end either of the government or of the people. The governor of *Schiras* pays for his government, to the king of *Perſia*, vaſt ſums of ready money, with fine horſes, and all the fine things and rarities to be found within his province: beſides theſe exceſſive preſents to the king, he is obliged to make the like to all the great lords and favourites at court, who are never to be gained but by continual bribes; ſo that to defray this great and endleſs expence, the wretched people muſt ſuffer great and endleſs burdens and exactions, and the governor muſt be a tyrant to preſerve his government. Nor can they have any poſſible relief, though they

have ſometimes attempted to find it: but when two or three villages at a time have come to complain to the king, they have, after long waiting, been forced away without any redreſs, with empty purſes and hungry bellies, becauſe they who ſhould have given them admiſſion, were bribed to debar them: ſo that they muſt ſtupidly ſubmit to the barbarous extortions of a ravenous *Viſier*. This, ſays *Bernier*, is the policy practiſed by all the governors and *Kans* in the *Perſian* dominions: and he tells us, that one day, when *Sha Sefi* was hunting, (a prince whoſe juſtice and puniſhments were only acts of cruelty) a poor man, deputed by a neighbouring village to make ſome complaint to the king, appeared behind a rock with a paper in his hand: but while the poor wretch was declaring his errand, and praying for juſtice, his moſt gracious majeſty, without making any anſwer, drew his bow, and ſhooting two arrows into his body, inſtantly ſlew him.

Nor was this execrable royal act of his any more agreeable to the genius of that prince than to the genius of that ſort government, which is naturally barbarous and ſavage. An arbitrary prince is only the moſt exalted and ſucceſsful beaſt of prey in his own dominions, and all the many officers under him are but ſo many ſubordinate beaſts of prey, who hunt and rob and devour his people for him and themſelves; and he and his officers do but conſtitute a long link of armed tygers terrible to behold, who leap furiouſly upon every man and every thing that tempts their eye or their appetite.

So that under a tyrant, there is no end of tyrants: from him that ſways the ſcepter to him that carries a muſket, all are tyrants, and every one for himſelf as far as he dare.

If any thing concerning theſe unintermitting peſts of human race, could poſſibly raiſe in a human ſoul any other paſſion but grief and horror, it would create

mirth to hear mention made, as ſometimes in books of hiſtory and travels there is mention made of a tyrant's ſitting in his ſeat of juſtice, once in ſo many days, to hear equally all cauſes and perſons. What mockery! It is really a farce, but a melancholy one, to hear the word juſtice come out of the mouth of a tyrant; who, by being ſo, is a ſettled enemy to the common laws of juſtice and mercy, and common ſenſe; and to all that is good or lovely, or deſirable amongſt men. As well may he ſet apart one day in ſix to cure all the diſeaſes of his ſubjects, or to make their cloaths, and cook their victuals, if he leave them any to make and cook. As every ſubject in his dominions is oppreſſed, and he and his inſtruments are the oppreſſors, I know no way upon earth for him to do them any general juſtice, but to deſtroy himſelf and all his deputy tyrants.

G

I am, &c.

Saturday, April 21. 1722. N°. 73.

A diſplay of tyranny, its deſtructive nature, and tendency to diſpeople the earth.

SIR,

I Intend to finiſh, in this paper, what I have ſo largely handled in ſo many others, the ſubject of liberty and tyranny; a noble ſubject, ſuperior to all others, and to the greateſt genius, but fit for the conſideration of every genius, and of every rank of men. It concerns the whole earth, and children ought to be inſtructed in it as ſoon as they are capable of inſtruction. Why ſhould not the knowledge and love of God be joined to the knowledge and love of liberty, his beſt gift, which is the certain ſource of all the civil bleſſings of this life? And I have ſhewn that religion cannot ſubſiſt without it. And why ſhould not the dread and hatred of *Satan* be accompanied with the dread and hatred of tyrants, who are his inſtruments, and the inſtruments of all the civil miſeries in this life? I have often thought that the *Barbarians*, who worſhip the devil, muſt have borrowed their idea of him from the character and behaviour of their own princes. One might indeed defy any thing out of hell, or even in it, and all that are in it, to do half the miſchief upon this earth that tyrants do.

They reduce mankind to the condition of brutes, and make that reaſon, which God gave them, uſeleſs to them: they deprive them even of the bleſſings of nature, ſtarve them in the midſt of plenty, and fruſ-

trate the natural bounty of the earth to men; ſo that nature ſmiles in vain where tyranny frowns: the very hands of men, given them by nature for their ſupport, are turned by tyrants into the inſtruments of their miſery, by being employed in vile drudgeries or deſtructive wars, to gratify the luſt and vanity of their execrable lords, who ſuffer neither religion, nor virtue, nor knowledge, nor plenty, nor any kind of happineſs to dwell within the extent of their power.

Nothing that is good or deſirable can ſubſiſt under tyrants, nor within their reach; and they themſelves ſubſiſt upon nothing but what is deteſtable and wicked. They are ſupported by general ruin; they live by the deſtruction of mankind: and as fraud and villainy, and every ſpecies of violence and cruelty, are the props of their throne; ſo they meaſure their own happineſs, and ſecurity, and ſtrength, by the miſery and weakneſs of their people; and continued oppreſſion and rapine are their ſtudied and neceſſary arts of reigning, as is every art by which they can render their people poor, abject, and wretched; though by ſuch methods they do in effect render themſelves ſo, and conſequently become eaſy preys to the next invader. That wealth, which, diſperſed amongſt their ſubjects, and circulated in trade and commerce, would employ, increaſe, and enrich them, and return often again with intereſt into their coffers, is barbarouſly robbed from the people, and engroſſed by theſe their oppreſſors, and generally laid out by them to adorn their palaces, to cover their horſes or elephants, or to embelliſh their own perſons, and thoſe of their concubines and attendants, or elſe locked up in dark caverns far from human ſight and uſe.

Whilſt it is yet in the mine, it is within the reach of pickaxes and ſhovels; and by the labour and induſtry of men, may be made uſeful and beneficial to men: but in the den of a tyrant, it is more ſecurely, more irretrieveably buried and guarded from the uſe

of men. Here are literally *Pluto*'s braſs walls and adamantine gates; here are thouſands of real *Cerberus*'s, who never ſleep; all to encompaſs and ſecure this dead treaſure, and to reſtrain a general gift of God from the uſe of his creatures: from thence it is rarely fetched, even upon the greateſt emergencies, or for any purpoſes but ill ones, till at laſt it becomes the prize and booty of a conquering enemy. *Alexander* found more riches in the *Perſian* treaſures, than in the hands of freemen would have conquered the world; and 'tis thought that there are more at this day in that of the great *Mogul*, than would purchaſe the greateſt and wealthieſt kingdom in *Europe*; and it has been computed that there are thirty millions of wealth buried in the ſecret vaults of the *Turkiſh* ſeraglio, the plunder of the people, or of thoſe who plundered them; yet they are ſtill plundered and miſerably oppreſſed, to increaſe this dead, uſeleſs, and pernicious ſtore.

By theſe and the like inhuman means, the countries of tyrants are come to be in the condition which I have elſewhere deſcribed, deſolate and uncultivated, and proper receptacles for ſuch ſavage monſters and ravening beaſts of prey, who rather chooſe to live in barren fields, unhoſpitable deſarts, and in diſpeopled and empty towns, than amongſt freemen in happy climates, filled with rich and numerous cities, abounding in inhabitants, who are poſſeſſed of liberty, and will be bold to defend it.

Now where can all this diſmal ruin, this growing depopulation end? If a continued decay in the natural body certainly ends in the extinction of life; in what can a continued and haſty decay of mankind end, but in the extinction of men? ſo that if the world laſt many centuries more in its preſent waſting and mournful ſituation, there muſt be a diſſolution of human race, before the world is diſſolved.

Several new tyrannies have ſprung up, like ſo many new plagues, within the memory of man, and like them have laid waſte, but with a more regular and continued ruin, countries once ſtrong in liberty and people: and as tyranny, like every other full-grown miſchief, becomes more and more inſupportable every day, the condition of mankind under it muſt neceſſarily, and does actually, grow every day worſe and worſe, and they themſelves fewer. And even when their numbers and their ſubſtance are leſſened, or rather exhauſted, the demands of the tyrant upon them are not leſſened, nor his rapine abated, nor his expences and exactions reſtrained.

When a tyrant has reduced a million of people to half that number by his cruelty and extortions, he madly expects from the remaining half the ſame revenue and aſſiſtance of men, which he had from the whole; and like the reſt, they muſt periſh to make good his expectations; and he often encreaſes his troops as faſt as his people decreaſes. So that his expence is enlarged as there becomes leſs to ſupport it; but he will be ſupported, and his poor periſhing people muſt do it, though they deſtroy themſelves.

Such is the peſtilent, ſavage, and unſatiable nature of this ſort of monſter, whoſe figure, throne and authority is eſtabliſhed upon the ruins of reaſon, humanity, and nature: he takes all that his ſubjects have, and deſtroys them to get more.

A late great prince, when he had loſt and deſtroyed two millions of his people out of twelve, and reduced the whole to a degree of poverty and ſervitude ſcarce to be expreſſed, what impoſitions did he recal, what taxes aboliſh, what troops diſband, for their relief? Not one. On the contrary, the ſwellings of his inſolent heart continued, as did his mercileſs extortions upon his people, and his perfidious deſigns and encroachments upon his neighbours; and he lived and died the plague and curſe of *Chriſtendom*. Nor

can it be ſhewn, that other princes who govern by the ſame authority, that is, according to their own whims and caprice, leave their ſubjects more plenty or happineſs, or cheat or harraſs their neighbours leſs, according to the meaſure of their power. In truth, the whole tribe are perpetually taking advantages, and uſurping upon one another, and are conſtant goads and thorns in one another's ſides, and in the ſides of their people: nor can the ſubjects of a prince of this caſt have one tolerable reaſon under the ſun to defend him againſt another, but that he lives amongſt them, and ſpends with them part of their own plunder, and probably the other would not: as his whole reliance muſt be upon his ſoldiers, he muſt encreaſe them in proportion to his diſtruſt of his people; which is a confeſſion of mutual enmity: neither is it enough that his ſoldiers oppreſs and famiſh his people, for his ſake and their own, (for both he and they are ſupported by the ſpoils of the people) but he muſt keep them as conſtantly employed as he can; becauſe, if they be not employed in plundering, invading, and ſhedding of blood, they will grow unfit for ſuch beneficent and neceſſary work, and may probably degenerate into humanity and mercy; than which a more terrible change could not befal their royal maſter; ſo that in mere duty they muſt be conſtantly practiſing miſchief and rapine at home or abroad.

Thus do theſe general deſtroyers proceed to lay waſte the world: the beſt and moſt countries in it are already, many of them, almoſt deſolate, and ſome of them altogether, as I have ſhewn in many inſtances; and the deſolation gains ground daily: nor, when ſome countries are diſpeopled, are there ſufficient recruits, or indeed any, to be had from others as formerly. The north, formerly the hive of nations, is now as much diſpeopled as any of the ſouthern countries, which, ſome centuries ago, were peopled from it;

and both north and ſouth have been diſpeopled by tyranny. *Arabia*, which once over-run the world with multitudes, is now as deſolate as the reſt of the world which they over-run. The country of the *Chozari*, which was a vaſt empire, within theſe four hnndred years, is now quite uninhabited, tho' great part of it is a fertile and beautiful country; and in its laſt ſtrugle with *Tamerlane*, brought five hundred thouſand men into the field: ſuch a force of people were there ſo lately in a country where now there are none! I think *Rubriquis* ſays, that he travelled two months through it, and in all the time ſaw neither man nor beaſt, but many great ruinous towns and cities, particularly one which had eight hundred churches in it leſs than four hundred years ago, but now has not one inhabitant.

What can be more affecting than this inſtance! Not a ſingle ſoul to be met with in a vaſt and noble country, which a few centuries ago was a potent empire, and contained millions! In all probability, countries and empires, which now make a great noiſe and buſtle in the world, will be lying, two or three centuries hence, in the ſame woful and ſilent ſolitude, if they laſt ſo long; for depopulation makes everywhere, except in a few remaining free ſtates, a prodigious and flying progreſs; even in *Europe*, as I have before proved in many inſtances. And in ſome of thoſe free ſtates, the ſeeds of ſervitude, the true cauſe of depopulation, and of every miſery, ſeem to be ſown deep. Alas! power encroaches daily upon liberty, with a ſucceſs too evident; and the balance between them is almoſt loſt. Tyranny has engroſſed almoſt the whole earth, and ſtriking at mankind root and branch, makes the world a ſlaughter-houſe; and will certainly go on to deſtroy, till it is either deſtroyed itſelf, or, which is moſt likely, has left nothing elſe to deſtroy.

The bulk of the earth being evidently almoſt a deſart already, made ſo by tyrants; it is demonſtration that the whole muſt be ſo, and muſt ſoon be entirely ſo, if the growth of tyranny be not reſtrained; elſe if the general and wide waſte goes on, men will become too few for the management of ſocieties, and for cultivation and commerce; all which are ſupported by numbers; and then degenerating into abſolute ſavages, they will live ſtragling and naked in the woods and wilderneſſes, like wild beaſts, and be devoured by them; or, like them, devour one another, or periſh with hunger. And thus there will be an end of men; unleſs thoſe ſtates that are yet free, preſerve, in the midſt of this general waſte, their own liberties and people, and, like the antient *Egyptians* and *Greeks*, fill the world again, in proceſs of time, with colonies of freemen.

That there is ſuch a terrible waſte of people in the world, cannot be denied; and it is as evident, that tyrants are the conſtant, regular, and neceſſary cauſe of it. They are indeed ſo manifeſtly the authors of all that is ruinous and wicked, that if God almighty had left it to ſatan to invent an engine for the deſtroying of the world, and for defacing every thing beautiful, good, or deſirable in it, that miniſter of vengeance, and enemy to God and man, would doubtleſs have invented tyrants, who by their wonderful ſucceſs in ſuch miniſtration, have ever ſhewn, and do ſtill ſhew, their eminent fitneſs for it. They ſhew everywhere ſuch a conſtant and ſtrong antipathy to the happineſs of mankind, that if there be but one free city within their ken, they are reſtleſs in their deſigns and ſnares againſt it, and never defend it but againſt one another, and practiſe the vileſt and the meaneſt rogueries to become maſters of it. There are inſtances in this age of free cities falling into the claws of tyrants, and of the miſerable difference between their former opulency, and their preſent poorneſs: they

have never ſince put off their mourning, which grows daily more black and diſmal.

The breath of a tyrant blaſts and poiſons every thing, changes bleſſings and plenty into curſes and miſery, great cities into gloomy ſolitudes, and their rich citizens into beggars and vagabonds: I could name cities, which, while they governed themſelves, could maintain armies, and now enſlaved can ſcarce maintain the poor proud rogues who govern them. It is certain, that whatever country or place is ſubdued by a prince who governs by his will, is ruined by his government.

It is confeſſed, that the arbitrary princes in *Europe* have not yet, like thoſe in *Aſia*, declared themſelves maſters of the ſoil; and their people have a ſort of property. How long this will continue, I know not preciſely. This is certain, that the condition of their ſubjects, which was always bad, grows hourly worſe; and their nobility, which were once rich and powerful, are now reduced very low, and greatly impoveriſhed. Theſe, who were the ſupports of royalty, having created jealouſy as if they had eclipſed it, have felt the terrible effects of arbitrary power as well as others, though not ſo much. Beſides, when the common people, already wholly exhauſted, and ſtarving under oppreſſion, can ſupply the exorbitant demands of their prince no longer, the eſtates of the nobility will be the next reſource; and, like the maſtiff dog at the bee-hive, when he has ſucked up all the honey, he will ſwallow the comb: and then moſt of *Europe* will be in the condition of *Turky*, as many parts of it are at preſent not much better; and, like the great *Turk*, moſt of its princes will be ſole proprietors of the land, as they now make themſelves of its product, which very near anſwers the ſame end. When tenants, exhauſted by taxes, are unable to pay rent, the land yielding no profit, is as bad as none; and in ſome inſtances worſe than none, as

we are particularly told by the noble author of the *Account of Denmark*, where ſome landlords have beged the king upon their knees to eaſe them of their land, by taking it from them for good and all; for that it was taxed more than it was worth.

Moſt of the princes of *Europe* have been long introducing the *Turkiſh* government into *Europe*; and have ſucceeded ſo well, that I would rather live under the *Turk* than under many of them. They practiſe the cruelties and oppreſſions of the *Turks*, and want the tolerating ſpirit of the *Turk*; and if ſome unforeſeen check be not thrown in their way, the whole polity of ſavage *Turky* will be eſtabliſhed by them in all its parts and barbarity; as if the depopulation which is already ſo quick, and taking ſuch dreadful ſtrides, were ſtill too ſlow. It is nor enough for tyrants to have conſumed mankind ſo faſt, that out of twenty parts, they have within this two thouſand years deſtroyed perhaps nineteen, (for ſo much at leaſt I take to be the diſproportion) but freſh machines of cruelty are ſtill ſought after, beſides never laying aſide any of the old, till the deſtruction be fully compleated. They ſeem to think, that they ſhall have enemies as long as any men remain; which indeed is a reaſonable apprehenſion: but it is aſtoniſhing at firſt view, that mankind ſhould have ſo long borne theſe unrelenting ſlaughterers of mankind.------ But, alas! who knows not the force of corruption, deluſion, and ſtanding armies!

Oh liberty! Oh ſervitude! how amiable, how deteſtable, are the different ſounds! Liberty is ſalvation in politics, as ſlavery is reprobation; neither is there any other diſtinction but that of ſaint and devil, between the champions of the one and of the other.

And here I conclude this noble ſubject of liberty; having made ſome weak attempts to ſhew its glorious advantages, and to ſet off the oppoſite miſ-

chiefs of raging, relentleſs, and conſuming tyranny: ------ a taſk to which no human mind is equal. For neither the ſublimeſt wits of antiquity, nor the brighteſt genius's of late or modern time, aſſiſted with all the powers of rhetoric, and all the ſtimulations of poetic fire, with the warmeſt and boldeſt figures in language, ever did, or ever could, or ever can, deſcribe and heighten ſufficiently the beauty of the one, or the deformity of the other: language fails in it, and words are too weak.

Thoſe who do not groan under the yoke of heavy and pointed vaſſalage, cannot poſſibly have images equal to a calamity which they do not feel: and thoſe who feel it are ſtupified by it, and their minds depreſſed; nor can they have conceptions large, bright, and comprehenſive enough, to be fully ſenſible of their own wretched condition; and much leſs can they paint it in proper colours to others. We, who enjoy the precious, lovely, and invaluable bleſſing of liberty, know that nothing can be paid too dear to purchaſe and preſerve it. Without it the world is a wilderneſs, and life precarious and a burden: death is a tribute which we all owe to nature, and muſt pay; and it is infinitely preferable, in any ſhape, to an ignominious life: nor can we reſtore our beings back again into the hands of our great Creator, with more glory to him, more honour to ourſelves, or more advantage to mankind, than in defence of all that is valuable, religious, and praiſe-worthy upon earth, or includes whatever is ſo.

How execrable then and infamous are the wretches, who, for a few precarious, momentary, and perhaps imaginary advantages, would rob their country, their happy country, for ever, of every thing that can render human life deſirable; and for a little tinſel pageantry, and falſe and ſervile homage, unworthy of honeſt men, and hated by wiſe men, would involve

millions of their fellow-creatures in laſting miſery, bondage, and woe, and charge themſelves with their juſt hatred and bitter curſes! Such unnatural parricides, unworthy of the human ſhape and name, would fill up the meaſure of their barbarity, by entailing poverty, chains, and ſorrow, upon their own poſterity. And ofteu it has happened, that ſuch men have, unpitied, ſuffered in their own perſons, the ſad effects of thoſe cruel counſels and ſchemes, which they intended for the ruin of all but themſelves; and have juſtly fallen into that pit, which they had traiterouſly digged for others.

------Nec lex eſt juſtior ulla,
Quam necis artifices arte perire ſua.

G

I am, &c.

Saturday, April 28. 1722. N°. 74.

The vanity of conquerors, and the calamities attending conqueſts.

SIR,

THE condition of an abſolute prince is thought the higheſt lot of human life, in point of ſplendor, plenty, and power; and is perhaps the loweſt in point of happineſs. The greateſt appearances of pleaſure are no certain proofs of pleaſure; and he who can enjoy all things, has often the leaſt enjoyment: having little or nothing to expect, he is at a ſtand in life; than which there cannot be a greater unhappineſs. It is an agreable fallacy which men keep themſelves under, that while they find themſelves daily diſappointed in the enjoyments from which they expected moſt pleaſure, they ſtill preſs forward to more enjoyments, without expecting to be diſappointed in theſe, though they certainly will. Their happineſs conſiſts in being deceived without knowing it; and when they find that they are, they do not grow wiſer, but go on to promiſe themſelves ſatisfaction from things, which, upon a thouſand trials, they have found gave them none.

Our only laſting pleaſure therefore is expectation. And what have abſolute princes to expect; they who are in poſſeſſion of all things? Yet they cannot live without expectation: they grow weary of pleaſures within their power, and are therefore for ſtretching their power to procure more, or better;

which yet it will not procure. But thus their hopes beguile them.

Hence great and famous conquerors, never content with their preſent condition, come to be the inceſſant troublers of the world: and they who ſhould have protected it, and preſerved its peace, have often ſought their pleaſures in the tears, miſery, and ſorrows of millions; nay, often found their own grief, ruin, and ill fate in doing ſo. That this has been their character, is too univerſally true; and I believe it will be hard to ſhew one ſuch prince in an hundred, who never laid ſnares either againſt his own people, or his neighbours; and though he never did, yet it was their duty and near concern to be upon their guard againſt him. They might have depended upon it, as a propoſition that had infinite odds on its ſide, that he was not ſatisfied with its preſent condition, and that he would alter it, if he could at their expence. Either his power was not abſolute enough, or his dominions not wide enough; nor would they ever have been, whatever acceſſions of both accrued to him. There was ſtill ſome darling point to gain, dearer than any before gained, though they were all ſo before they were gained.

It is the hard fate of conquerors, that their only, or chiefeſt remaining pleaſure, is that of doing miſchief: but the fate of their ſubjects and neighbours is harder. They are often undone to furniſh out employment for their governors, who find their pleaſure in deſtroying their people, or in doing that which deſtroys them. To increaſe power is, no doubt, the maxim of theſe princes; but their practice generally contradicts it, while they leſſen their people and their wealth to enlarge their territory; every addition of this kind being an addition to their weakneſs: and therefore great empires, from the moment they are at their height, are in a continual decay; the decay and diſcouragement of the people being the unnatural

means of their firſt gowth; and indeed their increaſe contained in it, and carried along with it, certain ſeeds of decreaſe and deſolation.

It may ſeem a contradiction, to ſay, That the whole can be built upon the deſtruction of the parts: yet it is true of abſolute monarchy, which does ever ſubſiſt by ruining and deſtroying thoſe by whom it ſubſiſts; and the people, without whom it is nothing, muſt be undone to make it what it is. It is a power erected upon the ruin of its own ſtrength, which is the people; and when they are gone, the power muſt go, growing firſt impotent in proportion to their miſery and thinneſs: and that it does make them miſerable and thin, and muſt at laſt extinguiſh them, I have at large ſhewn in former letters; I think demonſtrated. It may bounce and terrify for a while, and extend its bounds; but even at the time when it looks biggeſt and ſtrongeſt, it is wearing out, and by its conqueſt does but dig its own grave the deeper, by conſuming its old people to acquire new, whom it alſo conſumes, and with whom it muſt alſo conſume; like a debauchee in private life, the faſter he lives, the leſs time he has to live.

The conqueſts of the *Spaniards* made a great noiſe in the world, and them very terrible for a time. But their gold and ſilver mountains of *Mexico* and *Peru*, though they be ſuch glorious prizes as never before fell to the lot of any conqeror, have not made that nation amends for the loſs and fewneſs of their people at home. Thoſe that remain there cannot be ſaid to be enriched by theſe vaſt acquiſitions, whatever ſome particulars may be, who by their inequality and inſolence oppreſs the whole. And for the *Turkiſh* empire, which frightened *Europe* and the world, and ſubdued great part of it, it is ſo wretchedly ſunk in its diſcipline and forces, and its provinces are ſo deſolate and poor, that, in all human probability, this generation will ſee it broken into

an hundred pieces. It has ſpun itſelf out, as the *Saracen* empire did before it, into a thread too long and too ſmall to bear its own great burden without breaking.

People are like wire: the more they are extended, the weaker they become; and the cloſer they are together, the richer they grow, and more potent. This is the language of common ſenſe and experience: but ambition ſpeaks another and a different language, for extenſive empire and uncontrouled dominion; and being too well heard, puts men upon ſacrificing their real ſtrength to that which is only imaginary. Hence they become really impotent in queſt of falſe power, and deſtroy men in groſs for the venal breath of a few flatterers, which they call glory. But horrid and deteſtable are the ways to ſuch glory, which incites them to ravage and plague, to fetter and kill human race, for the ſake of a pleaſant dream; to which too they ſacrifice all their waking quiet, and make themſelves and all others miſerable for this deluſive viſion of their own ſeparate happineſs, which, like a phantom, mocks their ſight, and flies from them the more they purſue it.

Beſides, whoſoever conſiders the many difficulties and dangers, the endleſs uncertainties and anxieties, and the general horror and hatred, inſeparable from ſuch purſuits, will ſee how poorly they reward him who makes them; having long ſtretched out his arms to embrace happineſs, he is at laſt forced to draw them back empty, or full of ſorrows. He who ſeeks felicity this way, hunts a ſhadow, which he will never overtake: and, in truth, what can ſuch a troubler of the earth expect, but the bitter averſion of his own people, whom he oppreſſes and exhauſts; and the curſes of mankind, whom he perſecutes and lays waſte? Conqueſt gives him no new ſecurity; but, far from it, multiplies thoſe who have a mind to deſtroy him, and arms more hands againſt him. They who

poſſeſs moſt, have more to fear; eſpecially when coming to their poſſeſſions by injuſtice, they muſt maintain them by violence. Hence the endleſs fears and inſecurity of conquerors and oppreſſors, and the many conſpiracies againſt them;

Sine cæde et ſanguine pauci ——

Such therefore is the bitter fruit, and ſuch often is the terrible and bloody end, of ſuch wild and pernicious purſuits. No wiſe man would, for the empire of the earth, live in perpetual or ſtrong apprehenſions of any kind; much leſs under a tormenting opinion, that whole nations deteſted him, and ſought his life for making them miſerable, as conquerors always do, and muſt conſequently be conſidered by them as their worſt enemies.

But the ſtrange madneſs of conqueſt appears from another conſideration, namely, that there is not a prince in the world, let his territory be ever ſo ſmall, but muſt find full employment to govern it, if he govern it as he ſhould do; and therefore there never was a great empire ſo well governed as private cities; and no city ſo well as private families. Where the governed are but few, or live in little compaſs, the eye of the magiſtrate is over them, and the eye of the law over him, where he is not above it: complaints can be eaſily examined, and violence and injuſtice be quickly overtaken, or readily prevented. But in wide and over-grown empires, eſpecially where all depends upon the will and care of one, let his heart be ever ſo upright, a thouſand evils and injuries will be done, which he can never hear of, nor they who ſuffer them have the means of repreſenting to him; and which probably are done or connived at by his own deputies, whom he employs to prevent or puniſh them.

All princes have indeed more buſineſs than they can well do; and when they look out for new buſineſs, they muſt neglect the old, and throw off neceſſary cares, to aſſume wanton ones inconſiſtent with the other. Harmleſs amuſements they ought to have; and whatever amuſements thoſe are, is all one to their people, provided the general ſecurity be conſulted, and property and peace be preſerved: but to embark in wars, and make conqueſts at the expence of the people, and not for the people, is a prepoſterous way of protecting them, and of fulfilling the duties of reigning. Such a war was that of *Troy;* where all the princes of *Greece*, leaving their ſeveral countries in a ſtate of anarchy, and drained of their braveſt men, beat their heads againſt ſtone walls for ten years together, becauſe theſe walls contained, as they were told, a *Greek* beauty who was a great ſtrumpet. And having ſacrificed their time, their navy, and the forces of their country, to this wiſe reſentment, at laſt, by a ſtratagem, they got their chaſte and important prize(*), and, for joy and anger, burnt the city, putting the king and all the inhabitants, who had done them no wrong, to the ſword.

Moſt of the wars in the world have been *Trojan* wars; but moſt particularly thoſe in the *Holy Land*, whither moſt of the princes in Chriſtendom made lunatic and ruinous expeditions, to reſcue from the *Saracens* a grave which could not be known from other graves. Great preparations were lately made for a *Trojan* war at *Aſtracan;* and in *Italy* a *Trojan* war is apprehended. We too, ſince the reigns of the *Plantagenets*, have had our *Trojan* wars; and our *Engliſh Ajaxes* and *Achilleſes* have fought many bloody battles, in which *England* had no other intereſt, but

(*) Herodotus *ſays, that* Helena, *during all that long war purpoſely made for her recovery, was not in* Troy, *but in* Egypt.

the inward ſatisfaction and glory of loſing its men and money.

Conqueſt, or fighting for territory, is, for the moſt part, the moſt ſhameleſs thing in the world. Government is either deſigned for the people's good, or elſe I know not what buſineſs it has in the world: and therefore in all conteſts among conquerors about territory, if natural juſtice and common ſenſe were to decide it, that prince ought to carry it, who can ſatisfy the people that he will uſe them beſt. And ſometimes they all vouchſafe to promiſe this, though very few of them perform it. But this conſideration, which ought to be the only one, and is perhaps uſed by them in their manifeſtoes, has not the leaſt weight with moſt of them. On the contrary, their chief argument to move people is often the moſt ridiculous, ſtupid, and abſurd of all others, and really concerns the people the leaſt of any other. As to the great point of uſing the people well, and promoting their proſperity, theſe are conſiderations ſo much below the thoughts of your conquerors, and ſo oppoſite to their practice, that if the people were to throw dice for one of them, they would do as wiſely as if they choſe him by deliberate voices, if they were at liberty to chooſe him, ſince there is rarely a better or a worſe amongſt them. And therefore the *Perſian* nobles did not amiſs, when they delegated the choice of ſuch a ſovereign to the horſes which they rode. If *Philip* II. of *Spain* had in the leaſt aimed at governing the ſeven provinces for their good, he would never have diſturbed their revolt; ſince he might ſee that they proſpered a thouſand times faſter without him than ever they could with him. But as this reaſonable and benificent thought had no authority with him, he exhauſted in vain the forces of that great monarchy, to reduce thoſe new ſtates under his tyranny, and to make them as wretched and deſolate as he made his other dominions.

G *I am, &c.*

Saturday, May 5. 1722. N°. 75.

Of the reſtraints which ought to be laid upon public rulers.

SIR,

AFTER all that has been ſaid of arbitrary power, and of its hideous nature and effects, it will fall properly in, to ſay ſomething here of the reſtraints which all wiſe and fortunate nations ought to put, and have ever put, upon their magiſtrates. This is what I promiſed nine months ago to do; and this is what I propoſe to do in this letter and the following.

No wiſe nation in the world ever truſted to the ſole management, mere mercy, and abſolute diſcretion of its own magiſtrates, when it could help doing it; and no ſeries of magiſtrates ever had abſolute power over any nation, but they turned the ſame to its ruin, and their own wild gratifications and ill-judged profit. As long as the paſſions of men govern them, they will always govern by their paſſions, and their paſſions will always increaſe with their power. And therefore, whenever a whole people, or any part of them, croſs the paſſions of any man that governs them, he will turn his paſſions againſt a whole people, or any number of them that offend him, and will deſtroy a whole people, rather than ſtifle his paſſions. This is evident in ten thouſand inſtances; and the public will ever, and certainly, be ſacrificed to private luſt, when private luſt governs the public. Nothing but fear and ſelfiſh conſiderations can keep men within any

reaſonable bounds; and nothing but the abſence of fear can ſet men at defiance with ſociety, and prompt them to oppreſs it. It was therefore well judged of the *Spartan Ephori*, when they erected an altar to *fear*, as the moſt proper divinity to reſtrain the wild ambition of men, and to keep their kings within the confines of their duty.

A nation has but two ſorts of uſurpation to fear; one from their neighbours, and another from their own magiſtrates: nor is a foreign uſurpation more formidable than a domeſtic, which is the moſt dangerous of the two, by being hardeſt to remove; and generally ſtealing upon the people by degrees, is fixed before it is ſcarce felt or apprehended: like wild beaſts in a wood, beſet with toils as yet unſeen by them, they think themſelves free; but ſtriving to eſcape, find themſelves caught in the chains, which had long been preparing for them, and ſtealing upon them. Beſides, for one people undone by foreign invaders, ten have been undone by their own native rogues, who were intruſted to defend them; but inſtead of it, either betrayed them to theſe invaders, or ſeized traiterouſly for themſelves thoſe rights which they were ſworn to preſerve for others; and then, by oppreſſion and cruelty, and the other conſequences of their treachery, reduced them to an utter diſability of defending themſelves againſt any invaſion whatſoever.

What has made *Italy* and *Aſia* deſarts, and their remaining inhabitants ſtarving and contemptible cowards? Not the inundation of barbarous nations; though that inundation was owing to the weakneſs of the inhabitants, weakened and undone by their baſe and tyrannical governors: but they have been made deſarts by the continued depredations of their execrable princes, who have acted as if they had been ſcythes in the hand of *Satan* to mow down the race of men. There is a certain old *Italian* tyrant, now living, who, tho' he has by ſtudied rapine converted into a wilderneſs

a country which nature has made a paradiſe, yet is not weary nor aſhamed of his rapine, but goes on to ſuck and ſqueeze the remaining blood of his ghoſtly ſubjects; and next to his viſiting ſeven alters a day, (a way which he has of compounding with God for being a peſtilent tyrant to his creatures) I ſay, his only employment, beſides this his devout and impudent mockery of God, is to ſit contriving with his faithful miniſtry, which of his ſubjects may probably be worth a hundred pounds, and how to cheat him or rob him of that hundred pounds.

This ſame grand prince has now ſcarce any other buſineſs for his ſoldiers, but that of employing them directly againſt his own people: nor are they fit for any other employment; for one *Engliſh* regiment would beat ſeven of his. So that his paltry forces, many of them, are placed upon his frontiers, not to defend him from an invaſion, a taſk which they are not equal to, but to keep his wretched ſubjects from running away from famine and his government.----A relief which is however barbarouſly denied them by this old polite tyrant! They muſt ſtay and periſh under him; nor will he ſuffer them to ſeek elſewhere that ſupport of life, of which his diabolical government deprives them at home; as if when he had robbed them of their labour and their life, he alſo wanted their ſkins.

There is not upon earth a nation, which having had unaccountable magiſtrates, has not felt them to have been crying and comſuming miſchiefs. In truth, where they are moſt limited, it has been often as much as a whole people could do to reſtrain them to their truſt, and to keep them from violence; and ſuch frequently has been their propenſity to be lawleſs, that nothing but violence, and ſometimes nothing but a violent death, could cure them of their violence. This evil has its root in human nature; men will never think they have enough, whilſt they can take

more; nor be content with a part, when they can ſeize the whole. We are, indeed, told of ſome abſolute princes, who have been very good men and no oppreſſors. But the nature of their power rendered their good qualities almoſt uſeleſs, and gave to others an opportunity of doing in their name, and by their authority, miſchiefs which perhaps they themſelves abhorred. Beſides, in any ſeries of arbitrary princes upon earth, ſcarce out of ten can one be named who was tolerable, and who either did not himſelf prove an inhuman tyrant, or ſuffered his miniſters to be ſo: and when an abſolute prince has had great parts, they generally went to his grave with him, and ſcarce ever proved hereditary. In truth, the children of great princes have almoſt always proved very unlike them.

I own, the firſt of the line has ſometimes acted plauſibly, and gained, by doing ſo, dangerous credit and popularity. But if he were an angel, he is never to be forgiven, becauſe it is out of his power what his ſucceſſor ſhall prove. The crocodile's egg does no miſchief whilſt it continues an egg; but out of it is hatched a crocodile, and by it the curſed race of deſtroyers is continued. *D. Heinſius* ſays very juſtly, *Nec unquam ſervitus, ne ſpecioſa quidem, legit quibus ſerviat, ſed accipit.* "The moſt plauſible ſlavery is "attended with this eternal misfortune, that it has "no choice of a maſter, but muſt accept of a maſ-"ter, ſuch as chance ſends." *Veſpaſian* left to the *Romans* for their prince the beneficent *Titus*; but he alſo left them the raging and bloody *Domitian*.

If *Julius Cæſar* and *Auguſtus* had been really gods, as their flatterers made them; yet their leaving behind them ſuch a race of ſucceſſors (who proved a race of dæmons) entitles them to the characters of deteſtable tyrants to all eternity. *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Claudius*, and *Nero*, were the precious and bloody bleſſings which theſe beneficent princes left!----- Names univerſally abhorred, whilſt thoſe of *Cæſar* and *Auguſtus* are generally adored: and yet to *Cæſar* and *Auguſtus* were

mankind indebted for theſe peſts of mankind: nor were they ſo great peſts as were *Cæſar* and *Auguſtus*, who did much more miſchief, and deſtroyed the world more than either *Nero* or *Caligula*, beſides leaving them to deſtroy it ſtill further.

People rarely think of this, but it is literally true. What! will ſome ſay, the generous *Cæſar* and the mild *Auguſtus* do more miſchief than the wild *Caligula* and the ſavage *Nero!* Yes, fifty to one: *Nero* deſtroyed his twenties, *Cæſar* and *Auguſtus* their twenty thouſands; and for *Nero*, we may thank *Julius* and *Auguſtus*. *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Claudius*, and *Nero*, took *Rome* chiefly for the ſcene of their cruelty, and deſtroyed many great and good men, ſome out of wantonneſs, and more out of jealouſy: but *Cæſar* and *Auguſtus* made *Rome* and the world their ſlaughter-houſe, and deſtroyed more great and good men by far than the other four, as butchering monſters as they were: and as to public rapine and general depopulation, they exceeded them ſtill further. Indeed, as to heroic and diffuſive miſchief and villainy, the difference between them was as great as between *Jack Straw* and a late *grand monarque*. The truth is, *Cæſar* and *Auguſtus* had art and great qualities, which are far from excuſing the evils which they did; and their ſucceſſors, having all their ambition, but wanting their great qualities and diſcretion, took the direct road to hatred.

An unreſtrained power in one man, or in a few, over all, is ſuch an extravagant deviation from reaſon and nature, that neither *Briareus* with his many hands, nor the *Hydra* with its numerous heads, nor the *Centaurs*, half man and half beaſt, were things more unſhapen, monſtrous, and frightful: nor would theſe fictions appear more fabulous and improbable, than ſuch power would be to a free people, who never had heard of it before. What could ſeem to common ſenſe a wilder *chimera*, than that one man, not

created with features and endowments different from other men, ſhould have a laſting right from his blood, or his pride, or his madneſs, to domineer over all men, and to rule, kill, ſtarve, famiſh, baniſh, and impriſon, as many as he pleaſed?

This power is indeed ſo monſtrous, that it turns men that have it into monſters; and therefore the moſt amiable and unexceptionable man upon earth is not to be truſted with it. Men change with their ſtations, and power of any ſort rarely alters them for the better; but, on the contrary, has often turned a very good man into a very bad. This ſhews that men forbear evil, chiefly to avoid the ill conſequences of it to themſelves, and for want of opportunity and protection; and finding both in power, they prove, by making uſe of them, that their virtue was only ſelf-love, and fear of puniſhment. Thus men of the beſt and brighteſt characters have often done moſt miſchief, and by well ſerving their country, have been enabled to deſtroy it: and they were good and evil from one and the ſame motive; a paſſion for themſelves, and their own ſecurity or glory.

Thus the houſe of the *Medicis*, by being very good commonwealths-men, and by ſerving and obliging almoſt every family in *Florence*, gained credit enough by this their generous behaviour, to enſlave that great and powerful city. *Idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, quod pars ſervitutis erat.* *Pericles* adminiſtered the government of *Athens* with great ſufficiency; but he broke down the fences of its liberty, and ruled arbitrarily all his days. *Agathocles* fought ſucceſsfully for the city of *Syracuſe*, and as ſucceſsfully againſt it; and having defended the citizens againſt their enemies, he afterwards ſhewed himſelf their greateſt, by killing in one great maſſacre all the chief and beſt of them, and by crowning himſelf tyrant over all the reſt. *Marius* and *Sylla*, *Pompey* and *Caſar*, were great and excellent commanders, and conquered many great kings and nations: but they made

all the fruits of their victories their own; and from being very good ſoldiers, made themſelves moſt pernicious and arbitrary magiſtrates.

Now all theſe great men derived, from the good which they did, a capacity to do much more evil: ſo that as a power to do great good, does naturally include in it an opportunity of doing much evil; ſo thoſe who are in the poſſeſſion of power, as all magiſtrates are, ought above all other men to be narrowly watched, and checked with reſtraints ſtronger than their temptations to break them; and every crime of theirs ought to be more penal, as it is evidently more pernicious, than the ſame crime in any other ſort of men. For, beſides that *quales in republica principes eſſent, tales reliquos ſolere eſſe cives*; that is, that people are generally virtuous or corrupt as their magiſtrates are; there is ſomething exceeding ſolemn and important in the nature of this great truſt; and accordingly as it is obſerved or betrayed, a country is happy or miſerable: and when any one breach of it paſſes once off with impunity, another will ſoon follow it; and in time it will be conſidered no longer as a truſt, but an eſtate.

So dangerous a thing is an ill precedent, which is often an inlet to an endleſs train of miſchiefs; and ſo depraved is the nature of man, that we juſtify ourſelves in wickedneſs by examples that cannot be juſtified. An action at firſt reckoned diſhoneſt, by being practiſed once or twice, becomes unblameable; and that which was at firſt accounted an extortion, grows by uſe to be thought but a perquiſite. Thus evil is mitigated, nay, cancelled, by repetition, which is a real aggravation of evil; and there are certain rogueries in office, which being long practiſed, and by many, are at laſt reckoned as ſacred as the truſt againſt which they are committed: ------- A ſufficient reaſon for providing, by great and certain penalties, that none be committed.

I am, &c.

Saturday, May 12. 1722. N°. 76.

The ſame ſubject continued.

SIR,

HOW cautiouſly and partially men in power are to be truſted, and how much to be reſtrained, appears from hence, that almoſt every civil evil begins from courts, and the redreſs of every civil evil from an oppoſition to the pretenſions and exceſſes of courts. This is ſo univerſally true, that no nation ever continued happy, whoſe chief magiſtrate was its abſolute maſter; and no nation miſerable, whoſe ſupreme power was properly checked and divided. Nations are then free, when their magiſtrates are their ſervants; and then ſlaves, when their magiſtrates are their maſters: the commonwealth does not belong to them, but they belong to the commonwealth. *Tacitus* ſays with great truth, *Nec unquam ſatis fide potentia ubi nimis eſt:* "Power without controul is never to be truſted." Every nation has moſt to fear from its own magiſtrates; becauſe almoſt all nations have ſuffered moſt from their own magiſtrates.

Cicero, mentioning the condition of *Cilicia*, of which he was proconſul, in a letter to *Appius Pulcher*, ſays, that he was "moved by pity, as well as juſtice, to "relieve from their miſeries the undone provincial "cities; undone chiefly by their own magiſtrates." It ſeems *Cicero* was that ſort of whimſical man, that he had really at heart to do good to the people whom he governed:----- An odd and impracticable character; which, had he lived ſince, would have rendered

him utterly unfit for any manner of preferment. He did not ſo much as know that he was to make the moſt of his place and his power, let what would become of the people.---A leſſon which other governors have amply learned.

Ariſtotle makes it the great argument and proof of liberty, that they who command do alſo obey; and indeed all legal and juſt power being but a truſt, whoever executes the ſame, does an act of obedience, as well as command: and every truſt is beſt executed, where thoſe who have it are anſwerable for it, elſe it never will be executed; but, where it is great and public, is much more likely to be abuſed, violated, and turned to the deſtruction of thoſe, who, for their own preſervation, gave it. Nor is a people to be told, that ſuch as want to be truſted with extraordinary power of any kind, have always been enemies to arbitrary power; for ſo are all men when they have it not, and expect no advantage from it. Who was a greater patriot than Sir *Thomas Wentworth?* And who was a more arbitrary miniſter than *Thomas Wentworth*, earl of *Strafford?* All men are for confining power when it is over them; and for extending it when they are in it. *Oliver Cromwell* was once heartily in the priciples of liberty, and afterwards more heartily in thoſe of tyranny: and I could name two great parties in *England*, who, when they were out of power, ſeemed to place the ſum of public ſpirit, in intrenching upon the royal authority; and when they were in power, to know no other law but the prerogative royal. So unlike is the ſame man to himſelf in different ſituations; and yet ſtill very conſiſtent with the genius of human nature!

Men ſometimes do actually good, in order to do evil. *Sejanus, incipiente adhuc poteſtate, bonis conſiliis noteſcere volebat:* "*Sejanus*, in the beginning of his "adminiſtration, would found the reputation of a "good miniſter in laudable meaſures." But there

never proved a worſe miniſter than *Sejanus*. *Solyman*, the *Turkiſh* emperor, uſed to ſay, that a prince, to be well ſerved by any miniſter, muſt never uſe any miniſter above once: and this ſaying is thus far true generally, that men, the longer they grow in power, the worſe they grow. I think it is *Tacitus* who ſays, *Superbire homines etiam annua deſignatione; quid ſi honorem per quinquennium agitent?* "If an annual elec-"tion to power make men inſolent; what muſt be "their pitch of inſolence, if they hold it five or ſe-"ven years?" *Ariſtotle* finds great fault with the ſenate of *Sparta*, for being perpetual; and I think he ſays, that an unchanged or an hereditary ſenate falls into dotage.

Many of the eccleſiaſtics have been for truſting their favourite princes (and no other) with unlimited power over others: but in every thing that regarded themſelves and their intereſt, they have never failed to ſtipulate for the ſtricteſt limitations up all princes, even upon thoſe whom over the reſt of the world they wiſhed arbitrary, and endeavoured by every means to make ſo. Nor did ever any man give up the freedom of his country, but he meant to preſerve his own; and hoped to continue a freeman, as a reward of his helping to make other people ſlaves; and no man ever ſet up a tyrant, but in hopes of going ſhares in his tyranny: and upon theſe terms and expections alone it is, that any body of men, or indeed any army, is brought to aid and eſtabliſh any uſurper. Paſſive obedience was always intended for other people than thoſe who preached it. Intereſt cannot lye; though he does, who ſays that he will ſubmit to ſervitude, when he can avoid it.

Who would eſtabliſh a bank in an arbitrary country, or truſt his money conſtantly there? In *Denmark*, the miniſters and minions of the prince think their money ſafeſt out of his dominions, and generally tranſmit the ſame to *Hamburgh*, and other free cities, where

the magiſtrates have no divine right to lay violent hands upon what is none of theirs. Even what we gain by rapine in a land of oppreſſion, we are willing to ſave by the juſt laws of liberty, in a country of liberty. In *England* itſelf, and in our own free conſtitution; if the bank of *England* were put under the abſolute direction and power of the court, I doubt ſtock would ſoon grow very cheap, and ſellers multiply very faſt. Or if the government of the bank, which is purely republican, were improved into monarchical; I fancy our higheſt monarchy-men would rail at the change, and haſten to ſell out, notwithſtanding their inviolable attachment to the divine right of monarchy: ------- Unleſs perhaps they think that abſolute monarchy does beſt protect their power, but a free ſtate their money. I am indeed of opinion, that upon ſuch a change, the bank would be broke, and ſhut up in three days.

All this ſhews, that even men who are againſt liberty in general, contend for it in particulars, and in all particulars which affect themſelves. Even *Lauderdale*, a *Tyrconnel*, or a *Jefferies*, who were all for making the crown abſolute, as long as they could be, as they were, the abſolute miniſters of oppreſſion under it, would none of them, I dare ſay, have encouraged the maxim of the prince's rewarding his miniſters and faithful oppreſſors with the bow ſtring; as well as they themſelves were entitled to that reward, and as much as the *Turkiſh* genius of government did in other inſtances ſuit their own!

When we hear any ſort of men complain, as ſome ſort of men do frequently complain, That the crown wants power; we ſhould aſk them, Whether they mean over themſelves? And if they anſwer, *No*; as certainly they will, if they ſpeak truth; we may further aſk them, Why ſhould they judge for themſelves any more than others; or claim to themſelves a liberty and an exemption which they will not allow

to others? The truth is, they who complain thus, only want to increaſe the power of the crown, becauſe by it their own would be increaſed, and other advantages acquired.

The fox in the fable, wanting to rob a henrooſt, or do ſome ſuch prank, humbly beſought admittance and houſe room only for his head; but when he got in his head, his whole body preſently followed: and courts, more crafty, as well as more craving, than that deſigning animal, have ſcarce ever gained an inch of power, but they have ſtretched it to an ell; and when they have got in but a finger, their whole train has followed. *Piſiſtratus*, having procured from the city of *Athens* fifty fellows armed only with cudgels, for the ſecurity of his perſon from falſe and lying dangers, improved them into an army, and by it enſlaved that free ſtate. And I have read ſomewhere, of the ſtates of a country, who having wildly granted to their prince a power of raiſing money by his own authority, in caſes of great neceſſity; every caſe, ever afterwards, was a caſe of great neceſſity; and his neceſſities multiplied ſo faſt, that the whole wealth of the country was ſwallowed up to ſupply them: as it always will be in every country, where thoſe who aſk are ſuffered to judge what ought to be given.----A practiſe contrary to common ſenſe, and which renders liberty and property perfectly precarious; and where it is continued, will end in taking without aſking.

I have heard of a court ſomewhere abroad, which having aſked upon a particular occaſion four hundred thouſand pounds of the ſtates, found ways and means of ſtretching that ſum to two millions. It was obſerved of the ſame court, that it had the art of raiſing mole-hills into mountains, and of ſinking mountains into mole-hills; of diſbanding armies without breaking them; of increaſing debts by the means of paying them; of being engaged in an expenſive war

during a profound peace; of gaining for the country, at a vaſt charge, advantages which the country never reaped, nor ſaw; of employing money obviouſly againſt the intereſt of that nation, and yet getting the nation to pay it; of purchaſing other countries at the expence of their own, and againſt its intereſt; of procuring from the country at one time a great ſum, without telling why it was wanted, but promiſing to tell, and yet never telling; and, in fine, after many other the like feats, of obtaining by an arret of ſecurity, remiſſion for all their paſt faults, without owning any, and yet going on to commit more: for as *Tully* well obſerves, *Qui ſemel verecundiæ fines tranſierit, eum bene et naviter oportet eſſe impudentem.*

Cicer. epiſt. ad Lucceium, Quinti fil.

But theſe things concern not us; and I only bring them for examples, like other old ſtories of *Greece* and *Rome*. I hope that we ſhall never fall into the like misfortunes and miſmanagements ourſelves.

G

I am, &c.

Saturday, May 19. 1722. N°. 77.

Of ſuperſtitious fears, and their cauſes natural and accidental.

SIR,

AS my deſign in theſe letters is to endeavour to free and manumit mankind from the many impoſitions, frauds, and deluſions, which interrupt their happineſs; ſo I ſhall, in this, and ſome of the ſucceeding ones, attempt to remove the popular impreſſions and fears of ſpirits, apparitions, and witches; which more or leſs afflict and terrify the greateſt part of the world: and conſequently it will conduce much to their eaſe and felicity, if I can lay theſe phantoms.

There is a ſtrange propenſity in human nature to prodigy, and whatever elſe cauſes ſurprize and aſtoniſhment, and to admire what we do not underſtand. We have immediate reſource to miracle, which ſolves all our doubts, and gratifies our pride, by accounting for our ignorance. We are not affected by things which we frequently ſee; or if we can trace but one link of the infinite chain of cauſes, our admiration ceaſes; though we are then as far from our journey's end, as when we ſet out: for all the works of providence are miraculous to us, who cannot do them ourſelves, or know how he, who is the author of them, does them. And in this ſenſe every thing is a miracle to us; though we ought to be no more ſurpriſed at ſeeing a blazing ſtar, which makes its revolution but once in five hundred years, than in ſeeing the ſun every day.

For many ages, the phænomena of meteors, eclipſes, and comets, ſeemed unaccountable; and the cauſes of thunder and lightning were unknown to the world; as they are to moſt people in it at this day. Great guns were eſteemed, by the *Americans*, to be angry deities; ſhips, floating monſters; the ſun to be the god of the world; watches to be living animals; paper and ink to be ſpirits, which conveyed mens thoughts from one to another: and a dancing mare was lately burnt for a witch in the inquiſition of *Portugal*.

All nature is in perpetual rotation; and in the great variety of actions which it produces, ſome muſt appear very extraordinary and unaccountable to us, by all the powers of matter and motion which fall within our narrow obſervations; and yet may, and undoubtedly have as certain and regular cauſes and effects, as the moſt obvious mechanic operations. We ſee into the bottom and internal frame and conſtitution of no one thing in the world, and probably never can do ſo, whilſt we continue in theſe frail bodies. We ſee not into the principles and contexture of animal or vegetable beings; and conſequently cannot know what nature can ſpontaneouſly produce, or how ſhe works. We ſee only the outſide and film of things; and no more of them than what is neceſſary to the preſervation or convenience of ourſelves, and not the thouſandth part of what is ſo. Almighty God hath hid all the reſt from our eyes; to baffle our fooliſh curioſity, to raiſe our admiration of his power, and to excite our homage and adoration to him, the great author of all things.

Nature (as is ſaid in print elſewhere) works by infinite ways; which are impenetrable to our vain and fruitleſs inquiries. *The loadſtone draws iron to it; gold, quickſilver. The ſenſitive plant ſhrinks from the touch. Some ſorts of vegetables attract one another, and twine together; others avoid one another, and grow farther apart.*

The treading upon the torpedo, affects, and gives raging pains to our whole bodies. The bite of a mad dog cauſes madneſs. Turkey-cocks and pheaſants fly at red. A rattle-ſnake, by a ſort of magical power in his eyes, will force a ſquirrel to run into his mouth. Muſic will cure the bite of a tarantula. The frights and longings of women with child, will ſtamp impreſſions upon the babes within them. People, in their ſleep, will walk ſecurely over precipices and ridges of houſes, where they durſt not venture whilſt awake. Lightning will melt a ſword without hurting the ſcabbard. And there are very many other ſurpriſing inſtances of the powers of matter and motion, which we every day ſee and feel; and, without doubt, there are infinite others which we know nothing of.

If ſome men could follow ſcents, like dogs, or ſee in the dark, like cats, or have the ſame preſages and prognoſtics of fair weather or tempeſts, which other animals ſeem to have; how many things would they know and do, unaccountable to the reſt of mankind? If almighty God had thought fit to have beſtowed upon any man one or more ſenſes above the reſt of the ſpecies, many of his actions muſt have appeared miraculous to them.

But if theſe minute and petty works of nature cauſe ſo much our ſurprize and aſtoniſhment, how ought we to admire and adore the author of all nature, in the greater works of his creation! The earth itſelf is but a muſtard-ſeed to the viſible world; and doubtleſs that is infinitely leſs in compariſon of the inviſible one. It is very likely, that its many fellow-planets, which move about the ſun, as we do, are filled with inhabitants, and ſome of them probably with more valuable ones than ourſelves: and 'tis next to certain, that the numerous fixed ſtars, nightly ſeen by us, and the more numerous ones frequently diſcovered by new and better glaſſes, are ſo many different ſuns, and poſſibly with each a different chorus or ſyſtem of

worlds moving about them, and receiving vital warmth and nouriſhment from their beams; for 'tis impoſſible to believe, that the all-wiſe diſpoſer of all things ſhould place ſo many orbs, many thouſand times greater than this earth, in the vaſt abyſs of ſpace, far out of our ſight, and of no uſe to us, unleſs to ſerve ſuitable purpoſes of his providence.

We are not, nor can we be, ſure that there are no other beings who are inhabitants of the air or æther, with bodies ſubtle enough to be adapted to, and nouriſhed by, theſe thin elements; and perhaps with ſenſes and faculties ſuperior to us: for the works of almighty God are as infinite as is his power to do them. And 'tis paying greater difference to him, and having higher conceptions of his omnipotence, to ſuppoſe that he ſaw all things which have been, are, or ever ſhall be, at one view, and formed the whole ſyſtem of nature with ſuch exquiſite contrivance and infinite wiſdom, as by its own energy and intrinſic powers, to produce all the effects and operations which we daily ſee, feel, and admire; than to believe him to be often interpoſing to alter and amend his own work, which was undoubtedly perfect at firſt; though in the purſuit of his eternal decrees, and in the courſe, progreſs, and unbroken chain of his original ſyſtem, he ſeems to us ſometimes to act occaſionally; when, in compliance to our weak comprehenſions, and in condeſcenſion to our low capacities, he ſpeaks and appears to act after the manner of men. We have not faculties to ſee or know things as they are in themſelves, but only in ſuch lights as our creator pleaſes to repreſent them in to us: he has given us talents ſuited to our wants, and to underſtand his will, and obey it; and here is our *ne plus ultra*, the fartheſt we can go. We may be very ſure that we are not obliged to know what is beyond our power to know; but all ſuch things are as non-entities to us.

Whenſoever therefore we hear of, or ſee any ſurprizing appearances or events in nature, which we cannot trace and connect to their immediate cauſes; we are not to call in ſupernatural powers, and intereſt heaven or hell in the ſolution, to ſave our credit, and cover our own folly, when there are ſo very few things in the world which we know any thing of, and of thoſe few we know but very little. We are not to meaſure the works of God by our ſcanty capacities; and to believe that he miraculouſly interpoſes in the courſe of human affairs, but only when he pleaſes to intimate to us that he does, or intends to do ſo; much leſs ought we to introduce dæmons into his ſyſtem of the univerſe, unleſs as objects or inſtruments and executioners of his vengeance; but not to intrude into his government of the world, to trepan and miſlead his creatures and to thwart and oppoſe himſelf, and every now and anon to cut the chain, ſtop the wheels, and interrupt the courſe of his providence.

We are very ſure that God can do, and impower any other beings to do, every thing which he would have done; but we are not obliged, by any precept, moral or divine, to believe every thing which weak, crazed, or deſigning men tell us in his name; and the diſbelieving their fooliſh and fantaſtical ſtories, is not queſtioning the power of God, but the veracity or judgment of the perſons who tell them: for ſure there can be no occaſion of recurring to ſupernatural cauſes, to account for what may be very eaſily accounted for by our ignorance of natural ones, by the fraud or folly of others, or by the deception of ourſelves. There can be no wonder at all in a man's telling a lye, or in his being deceived.

Which of our ſenſes does not often deceive us? A tangling, or ſtrong preſſure of the eyes, cauſes all things to appear on fire; that of the ears, makes us hear noiſes; ſtraight things, in the water, appear

crooked: bodies, by reflexion or refraction, appear otherwiſe, and in other places, than they are in nature. All things appear yellow to men in the jaundice: to thoſe in calentures, the ſea appears like a green meadow; and, if not reſtrained, they will leap into it: melancholy and enthuſiaſtic perſons fancy themſelves to be glaſs bottles, knives, and tankards; madmen often believe themſelves Gods or princes, and almoſt always ſee ſpirits; and a reverend divine, ſome time ſince, thought himſelf big with child, and could not be perſuaded to the contrary, till a man midwife pretended to deliver him of a falſe conception.

In fevers, and malignant diſtempers, people ſee viſions and apparitions of angels, devils, dead men, or whatever elſe their imaginations render moſt agreeable or terrible to them; and in dreams, all men ſee, or fancy that they ſee, ſuch falſe appearances. Their imaginations, in ſleep, are often ſo lively and vigorous, that they can ſcarcely be perſuaded of their miſtake when they awake out of it, and would not be ſo, if they did not find themſelves in bed; and therefore, if a credulous, fearful, or melancholy man, ſhould careleſly nod himſelf to ſleep in his cloſet or his garden, and receive a vigorous repreſentation of an angel, dæmon, or dead man, ſpeaking to him, or delivering a meſſage, and after wake on a ſudden without obſerving his own ſleeping (as often happens) I cannot ſee how he ſhould diſtinguiſh this appearing phantom from a real viſion or revelation, and I ſhould be glad to have a rule to do it by.

The frame and contexture of our bodies betrays us to theſe deluſions. For, as all objects and images from without are let in upon the mind by the windows or conduits of the outward ſenſes, and the mind afterwards ranges, methodizes, operates, and reaſons upon them; ſo it can only work upon ſuch materials as it receives: and conſequently, when the organs of

ſenſation are wrong framed in their original contexture, or depraved afterwards by ſickneſs or accidents, the mind muſt be miſled too, and often miſtake appearances for real beings: when the ſpies, ſcouts, and out-guards, are ſeized, corrupted, or deceived, the intelligence will be fallacious, or none at all.

It is evident, in a thouſand inſtances, that the mind and body mutually act and operate upon one another; both grow and increaſe by age and exerciſe, both are impaired and enervated by diſtempers and accidents, and all the noble faculties of the former are often deſtroyed and extinguiſhed by accidental injuries done to the latter, and by other fortuitous events and occaſional ſtrokes of fortune. Common experience ſhews us, that if men are born without one or more of their ſenſes, ſo many conduits of knowledge are ſtopt: if a child comes into the world without the faculties of ſeeing or hearing, he can have no underſtanding at all, unleſs he afterwards acquires them; and if he loſes them again, all further progreſs is at an end: the vigour and capacity of our mind depend very much, if not altogether, upon the organization of our bodies; and are altered, improved, and increaſed, by proper diet, action, or education; and oppreſſed, leſſened, and ſometimes quite loſt, by drunkenneſs, gluttony, lazineſs, or misfortunes. I have often almoſt fancied, that men may be dieted into opinions; as experience ſhews us, they may be educated into the moſt abſurd ones by cuſtom, converſation, and habit.

Every paſſion or affection of the mind produces viſibly a ſuitable and correſpondent diſpoſition of the muſcles and lineaments of the face, and conſequently muſt affect and alter the whole mechaniſm of the body; and by like reaſon every thought or motion of the mind muſt do the ſame in a leſſer degree (though not equally ſubject to common obſervation) by forcing or

directing the blood, juices, or animal ſpirits, into peculiar tubes, conduits, or veſſels: and when by frequent uſe thoſe channels and paſſages become habitual to them, they will often flow thither of their own accord, or are eaſily driven thither; and ſo, by working backwards, will cauſe thoſe paſſions and perceptions which at firſt cauſed them, and in conſequence the ſame impreſſions and diſpoſitions of the organs of ſenſe.

If this obſervation be true, it will account for our deluſions in dreams, when exterior objects are ſhut out, which muſt otherwiſe controul and overpower the weaker and more faint operations of the internal machine; and this too will account for the many panic and unreaſonable fears and prejudices which we are ſubject to from education, cuſtom, and conſtitution, as well as for the difficulty, if not impoſſibility, of our ſhaking off and conquering any other habits of mind or body acquired by yearly and continued practice.

I ſhall in my next apply theſe general principles to the ſyſtem of ſpirits; and ſhew, that philoſophy and religion both contradict the commonly received opinions of them.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, May 26. 1722. N°. 78.

The common notion of Spirits, their power and feats, expoſed.

SIR,

AS I have ſhewn at large, in my laſt letter, that, in very many inſtances, our ſenſes are ſubject and liable to be deceived in objects evidently material; ſo in this I ſhall endeavour as fully to ſhew, that we can have no poſſible ideas of any other. When we call God a ſpirit, we do not pretend to define his nature, or the modus of his exiſtence, but to expreſs the high conception which we have of his omnipotence, by ſuppoſing him moſt unlike to ourſelves, and infinitely ſuperior to every thing which we ſee and know; and then we are loſt and buried in the abyſs of our own ignorance: but we can have no other poſſible conception of what we mean by the word *ſpirit*, when applied to him.

We cannot have even the moſt abſtracted images of things, without the ideas of extenſion and ſolidity; which are the mediums of conceiving all things that we can conceive at all. As the organs of our ſenſes are all material, ſo they are formed only to receive material objects; and but a ſmall part of thoſe which are ſo. The ear cannot hear, the hands feal, the palate taſte, the noſe ſmell, or the eye ſee, bodies, but of certain magnitudes, dimenſions, and ſolidity; and theſe vary too in different men, and in the ſame men at different times, and at different ages. There are millions of inſects that cannot be ſeen without glaſſes;

and probably infinite others, which cannot be ſeen with them: the ſubtle effluvia, or other minute cauſes of peſtilential diſtempers, are not within the reach and obſervation of any of our ſenſes. We cannot ſee wind and common air, much leſs pure æther, which are all too thin and too ſubtle bodies for the fabric of the eye; and how ſhould we ſee ſpirits, which we are told have no bodies at all, and in the dark too, when the contexture of the eye will not afford us the uſe of that organ?

I cannot conceive why the dreams of the old Heathen philoſophers ſhould be adopted into the Chriſtian ſyſtem; or from what principles of reaſon or religion we ſhould be told that the ſoul is *totum in toto*, and *totum in qualibet parte*; that is, that all of it is diffuſed through the whole body, and yet all of it is in every part of the body: that ſpirits take up no place; and that ten thouſand of them may ſtand upon the point of a needle, and yet leave room for a million times as many more; that they may move from place to place, and not paſs through the intermediate ſpace; and that they are impenetrable themſelves, and yet can penetrate every thing elſe. Is not this fine gibberiſh, and pretty divinity? And yet it is eſteemed by ſome a ſort of Atheiſm to diſbelieve it; but neither philoſophy nor ſcripture tell us any ſuch matter. It is true indeed, we are told, that ſpirits have neither fleſh nor bones; no more have wind, air, or æther, and thouſands of other things, which yet are bodies: but we are no-where told, as I remember, that ſpirits have no extenſion or ſolidity: and if we were told ſo, we could underſtand no more by it, than that they were beings of which we neither had, nor could have, any other than negative ideas.

I think therefore, that I may venture to aſſert, that either God hath created no beings independent of matter, or that ſuch cannot be objects of our ſenſes: but if there be any ſuch, they are of a nature ſo different

from us, and ſo incomprehenſible by the faculties which he has given us, that we can form no propoſitions about them; and conſequently are not obliged to believe or diſbelieve any thing concerning them, till he pleaſes further to inform us.

But there are an humble ſort of philoſophers, who want the ſagacity to conceive how any ſubſtance can exiſt without extenſion and ſolidity; and conſequently are modeſt enough to confeſs, that they do not underſtand the diſtinction between material and immaterial ſubſtances; and that they cannot, with their moſt refined imaginations, have any notion of a middle ſtate of things, between extended beings and no beings at all; between real eſſences and ſhadows, phantoms or images of diſordered brains; or that any thing can exiſt in the univerſe, and at the ſame time in no part of it. And yet theſe gentlemen will not give up the general ſyſtem of ſpirits, but ſuppoſe them to be beings of ſubtle æreal contexture, that in their own nature are not objects of our ſenſes; but have powers, by aſſuming more denſe bodies, to make themſelves ſo, and have capacities to do many things unaccountable to us, and beyond the limits and reach of our apprehenſions. All which I think no man will affirm to be impoſſible; but I think any man may ſafely affirm, that ſuch agents are not permitted to moleſt human affairs, and ſeduce or miſlead men, by doing ſupernatural actions, or what muſt appear to us to be ſo.

A contrary ſuppoſition muſt deſtroy the very uſe of miracles: for if other beings, either by the energy of their own nature, or the will and permiſſion of God, can do miracles, or actions which we cannot diſtinguiſh from miracles; then nothing can be proved by them, and we ſhall loſe the beſt evidence of the truth of our holy religion. For if ſigns and wonders may be promiſcuouſly ſhewn and performed by the beſt of all beings and by the worſt, they may be

done and uſed to promote error, impoſture, and wickedneſs, as well as virtue and true religion; nor can I find out any criterion, or ſufficient mark, whereby we can diſtinguiſh which are done by the preſerver, and which by the profeſſed enemy, of mankind. To ſay that the truth of the miracle ſhall be tried by the doctrine which it is brought to propagate, or the precepts which it commands, is to invert the very uſe and end of miracles, which is, to give credit and authority to the doer, who is always ſuppoſed to act by God's power, in order to declare his will; and conſequently, if the wonders which he does are to be tried by the doctrine which he teaches, there would be no uſe of any wonders at all, to prove not only what proves itſelf, but what is to prove the truth of the miracle, which is to prove the truth of the doctrine.

We are very ſure, that the great creator of heaven and earth, and the ſole author of all our happineſs, does not leave us in theſe uncertainties, to be toſſed and tumbled in the thick miſt and dark chaos of ignorance and deceit. How can we know the truth of any revelation, without knowing the revealer himſelf to be true? We muſt be firſt certain, that a good and beneficent being ſpeaks to us, before we can believe any thing which he tells us. Whenever therefore almighty God, by means becoming his infinite wiſdom, and from cauſes impenetrable to us, communicates his intentions by appearances and repreſentations to our ſenſes, or by any other ways out of the ordinary courſe of his providence, he always gives us ſure marks whereby we can diſtinguiſh his works from deluſion and impoſture, which often ape truth itſelf, and and miſlead ignorant and unwary men. We are told in holy writ, that *young men ſhall ſee viſions, and old men dream dreams;* which frequently happens; and that *falſe prophets ſhall ariſe and do wonders, which ſhall deceive almoſt the elect;* but we are bid to diſbelieve them; which, if they worked true miracles,

we could not do, without rejecting all miracles. For how can we believe any thing to be miraculous, and at the ſame time diſbelieve another thing to be ſo, without being able to ſhew any difference between them? And therefore we may acquieſce in an aſſurance that ſuch pretenders muſt be cheats, and their actions impoſtures and deceits upon our ſenſes.

Whenever God works wonders, or produces thoſe events which ſhall appear as ſuch to us, he always does them for wiſe reaſons, either to warn and inform men, to make them examples of his juſtice, or to communicate his will, and teach us ſome doctrine; and he takes the moſt proper and effectual means to attain his ends, and coerce our belief, by making ſuch applications to our outward ſenſes, and ſuch impreſſions upon our underſtandings, as we muſt ſubmit to and acquieſce in, unleſs we reſolve to give up all certainty; or elſe by predictions which are juſtified by the event, and which are undoubtedly miracles. He does them in the moſt open manner before crowds at once; but our modern miracle-mongers do them all in ſecret, in corners, and in the dark; and their ſpirits and apparitions are ſeen only by melancholy, enthuſiaſtic, and dreaming old men and women, or by crazy young ones, whoſe heads are intoxicated and prepared for theſe ſtories long before; and they are generally ſeen but by one at once, who is always in a fright when he does ſee them; or elſe they are the tricks and juggles of Heathen and Popiſh prieſts, or pretended conjurers, to pick mens pockets, and promote ſome knaviſh and ſelfiſh deſign. They are never done before a houſe of lords or commons, or in a prince's court, or in the ſtreets before multitudes of people, or in the ſight of ſeveral men at the ſame time, of clear and unprejudiced underſtandings, or of unqueſtionable integrity.

When our Saviour appeared to all his diſciples together, he appealed to their ſenſes, and bid them not

be afraid, but to put their hands into his ſide, and believe themſelves: he made his aſcenſion before five hundred people at once: his miracle of the loaves and fiſhes was before five thouſand: his turning water into wine was at a public wedding; and the reſt were of the ſame kind: he went through *Judea* from place to place, publicly doing miracles, confirming and convincing all, who were not wilfully blind, of the truth of his miſſion; and teaching a doctrine of infinite advantage to mankind: whereas our preſent workers or ſeers of miracles never tell us any thing worth knowing; and we have no other evidence that they are ſeen or done, but the veracity of thoſe who tell them, who may be deceived themſelves, or invent lies to deceive others. The proof ought always to be equal to the importance of the thing to be believed: for, when it is more likely that a man ſhould tell a lye, or be deceived, than that a ſtrange phænomenon ſhould be true, methinks there ſhould be no difficulty to [determine] on which ſide of the queſtion we ſhould give our aſſent; though in fact moſt men are ſo prepared by education to believe theſe ſtories, that they will believe the relation of them in theſe caſes, when they will believe the relaters in nothing elſe.

If one or two men affirm that they ſaw another leap twenty yards at one leap, no one will doubt but they are lyars; but if they teſtify that they ſaw a goblin, with ſaucer eyes and cloven feet, in a church-yard, leap over the tower; all the town is in a fright, and few of them will venture to walk abroad in a dark night. Sometimes theſe phantoms appear to one who is in company with others, and no one can ſee them but himſelf, and yet all the reſt are terrified at his relation, without reaſoning that they have the ſame or better faculties of ſeeing than he has; and therefore that his organs muſt either be indiſpoſed, or that he deſigns to impoſe upon them: but it

paſſes for a miracle; and then all doubts are ſolved, and all enquiries at an end. All men believe moſt of thoſe ſtories to be falſe; and yet almoſt all believe ſome of them to be true, upon no better evidence than they reject the reſt. The next ſtory of an old woman inhabiting a cat, or flying in the air upon a broomſtick, ſets them a ſtaring, and puts their incredultity to a nonplus. We often hear of a ſpirit appearing to diſcover a ſilver ſpoon, a purſe of hidden money, or perhaps a private murder; but are never told of a tyrant, who by private murders has ſlaughtered thouſands, and by public butcheries deſtroyed millions, ever dragged out of his court by good or evil ſpirits, as a terror to ſuch monſters: ſuch an inſtance would convince all mankind; and if almighty God thought fit to work by ſuch engines, and intended that we ſhould believe in them, or any of them, it is impoſſible to believe but that he would take the propereſt methods to gain our aſſent.

From what I have ſaid, and much more which might be ſaid, I think I may with great aſſurance conclude, that theſe capricious and fantaſtical beings are not ſuffered to interfere and mingle with human affairs, only to miſlead men, and interrupt them in the purſuit of their duty; nor can I ſee any foundation, in nature, reaſon, or ſcripture, to believe that there are any ſuch as they are uſually repreſented to us; which neither agree and keep up to the characters, dignity, and excellence of good angels, or the ſagacity, office, and uſe of bad ones. Where are we commanded to believe that the devil plays hide and ſeek here on earth; that he is permitted to run up and down and divert himſelf, by ſeducing ignorant men and women; killing pigs, or making them miſcarry; entering into cats, and making noiſes, and playing monkey-tricks in church-yards and empty houſes, or any where elſe here on earth, but in empty heads?

We know that he was caſt headlong from heaven, is chained faſt in the regions of the damned, and kept by the power of the almighty from doing miſchief to his creatures; and to ſay the contrary ſeems to me the higheſt blaſphemy againſt heaven itſelf: for when we every day ſee and feel the many deluſions to which human condition is ſubject, how we are the properties of impoſtors, the ſlaves to tyrants, and perpetual dupes of one another, and indeed are ſubject to daily and endleſs frauds and impoſitions; how ſhall we be a match for the moſt ſubtle and moſt ſagacious being out of heaven? And is it poſſible to believe, that the good, merciful, and all-wiſe God ſhould deſert, leave, and betray us to ſo unequal a combat, without giving to us ſuitable precautions, capacities, and powers to defend ourſelves?

I ſhall conclude by obſerving, that the heathen poets firſt invented theſe ſtories, and the heathen prieſts ſtole them from them; as badgers dig holes for themſelves, and afterwards are ſtunk out of them by foxes.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, June 2. 1722. N°. 79.

A further detection of the vulgar abſurdities about ghoſts and witches.

SIR,

I Have endeavoured, in my laſt, to ſhew, that no ſuch beings as ſpirits and dæmons are permitted by the good God to mingle with, and perplex, human affairs; and if my reaſoning be good, the whole ſyſtem of conjurers and witches falls to the ground: for I think it is agreed by all, if they have any powers ſupernatural, they receive them from evil ſpirits; and if theſe have no ſuch powers themſelves, they can tranſmit them to none elſe.

But, methinks, the advocates for ſatan's empire here on earth are not very conſiſtent with themſelves; and in the works which they attribute to him, do not credit enough to his abilities and power.

They make this prince a mighty emperor:
But his demands do ſpeak him proud and poor.

They give him a power to do miracles; make him prince of the air, lord of the hidden minerals; wiſe, rich, and powerful, as well as falſe, treacherous, and wicked; and are fooliſh and preſumptuous enough to bring him upon the ſtage as a rival for empire with the almighty; but at the ſame time put a fool's coat and cap upon him. His ſkill has hitherto gone no farther than to cram pins down childrens throats, and

throw them into fits; to turn wort, kill pigs; to ſell winds (dog cheap too), to put out candles, or to make half-blind people ſee two at once; to help hares to run away from the dogs; to make noiſes, or to diſcourage his faithful votaries at *Newgate*, by interloping upon their trade of diſcovering ſtolen goods; and ſuch like important feats of dæmonſhip. And, what is yet worſe, I cannot find in theſe laſt eighteen hundred years, that with all his cunning he has invented one new trick, but goes on in the ſame dull road; for there is ſcarce a ſtory told of a ſpirit, or a witch, who has played pranks in the next pariſh, but we have the ſame ſtory or one very like it in *Cicero's* tract *de divinatione*.

He always plays at ſmall games, and lives moſtly upon neck-beef. His intrigues are all with old women, whoſe teats he ſucks (which, by the way, ſhews but a ſcurvy taſte); and when he has gained his ends of them, feeds them only with bread and water, and gives them a groat in their pockets to buy tobacco; which, in my mind, is very ungallant, not to ſay niggardly and ungenerous, in ſo great a potentate, who has all the riches of the hidden world within his dominions. I cannot find, in all my reading, that he has expended as much in five hundred years laſt paſt as would have carried one election.

Methinks he might have learned a little more wit from his faithful emiſſaries here on earth, who throw and ſcatter about money, as if there was never to be an end of it; and get him more votories in a week, than he can purchaſe for himſelf in a century, and put him to not a penny of charge neither; for they buy people with their own money: but to keep ſuch a coil and clutter about an old woman, and then leave her to be hanged, that he may get her in his clutches a month ſooner, is very ungrateful; and, as I conceive, wholly unſuitable to a perſon of his rank and figure.

I ſhould have imagined, that it would have been more agreeable to the wiſdom and cunning always attributed to him, in imitation of his betters, to have opened his purſe ſtrings, and have purchaſed people of more importance, and who could do him more real ſervice. I fancy that I know ſome of them, who would be ready to take his money, if they knew where he was to be ſpoken with; and who are men of nice honour, and would not betray or break their word with him, whatever they may do with their countrymen.

Beſides, I conceive it very impolitic in one of his ſagacity, and in one who has ſo many able miniſters in his own dominions and elſewhere, to act ſo incautious a part. It is very well known, that a plot diſcovered, or a rebellion quelled, gives new credit and reputation to the conquerors, who always make uſe of them to ſettle their own empire, effectually to ſubdue their enemies, to leſſen their powers, and to force them for the moſt part to change ſides; and, in fact, one witch hanged or drowned, makes old *Beelzebub* a great many adverſaries, and frightens thouſands from having any more to do with him.

For theſe reaſons, I doubt, he is ſhrewdly belyed by thoſe from whom he might expect better uſage; and that all the ſtories commonly told about, and believed concerning him, are invented and credited by ſuch only as have much leſs wit, or not much more honeſty, than himſelf. To enter into a detail of them is endleſs, as well as unneceſſary to my purpoſe; it having been unqueſtionably ſhewn already by the worthy Dr. *Hutchiſon* †, from very many inſtances, that theſe ſtories are fictions, cheats, or deluſions, and that the belief of them is neither conſiſtent with reaſon nor religion. But I ſhall add ſome more obſervations of my own, to what he hath with great piety and judgment publiſhed upon this ſubject; and

† *Biſhop of Down and Conner in Ireland.*

ſhall begin with tracing the genealogy of theſe phantoms.

The firſt inventors of them, as far as we know any thing of the matter, were the *Egyptians*; who believed, that the ſpirits of the deceaſed always attended their bodies where-ever they were depoſited; and therefore embalmed them with rich gums and ſpices, to preſerve their figure entire, and entomed them in ſtately mauſoleums, with coſtly apartments for their ſouls to ſolace in: which opinion gave occaſion to their building the expenſive and uſeleſs pyramids, to receive ſouls of a higher degree. From *Egypt* theſe airy beings were tranſplanted into *Greece*, and thence to *Rome*; and the *Greek* and *Roman* poets embelliſhed their fictions with them, and the prieſts made their advantages of them; and both prieſts and poets added many more inventions of their own: they filled their woods, groves, rivers, rocks, houſes, and the air itſelf, with romantic deities: they had their demigods, ſatyrs, dryads, hemi-dryads, penates, lares, fauns, nymphs, *&c.* And when the general belief of the exiſtence of ſuch beings was well eſtabliſhed, without doubt they were often ſeen and talked with.

For fear does things ſo like a witch,
'Tis hard to find out which is which.

They animated almoſt every thing in nature; and attributed even the paſſions and qualities of the mind to peculiar deities, who preſided over them, or directed and cauſed them: *Mars* inſpired courage and magnanimity; *Venus*, love; *Mercury*, cunning; and *Apollo* and his muſes, wiſdom and poetic raptures, *&c.* A good and evil genius attended every man, and his virtues and vices were eſteemed to be ſpirits: a wicked man had an evil ſpirit; a virtuous man, a good one; a wrangler had a ſpirit of contradiction; people who could not ſpeak had a dumb ſpirit; a malicious

man, a ſpirit of envy; and one who wanted veracity, a ſpirit of lying; and ſo on. Diſtempers too which were uncommon, and could not eaſily be accounted for, as apoplexies, epilepſies, and other fits and trances, were imputed to ſpirits and dæmons; and at laſt theſe deluſions, which were only the ſallies of poets, or the inventions of prieſts, became the real opinions and religion of the common people, who are always ready to lick up the froth of their betters.

When the Heathens came into Chriſtianity, they brought in theſe phantoms with them, and accounted for oracular predictions, and the other cheats and juggles of their former prieſts, by the powers of theſe dæmons; and the Popiſh prieſts have ſince improved upon their Pagan predeceſſors, and made their fictions turn to a much better account than putting them in verſe. The Heathen Dryads and Nymphs were changed into Fairies; good and evil genii into conjurers and black and white witches; and ſaints are made to ſupply the offices of demi-gods: and by this lucky turn they made a very good penny of their charms, exorciſms, beads, relics, and holy water; and were paid for many maſſes, to invoke their ſaints; in whom, it ſeems, they had a very good intereſt.

There was ſcarce a church-yard, an old or empty houſe, which was not peſtered with theſe airy inhabitants; nor a man who had murdered himſelf, or who was murdered by another, or had forgot ſomething in his life-time, who did not appear to tell his own ſtory; nor could be perſuaded to quit his new abode, till the holy man had laid him in the *Red Sea*; who without doubt, was very well paid for his ſkill and pains. We may be ſure ſo gainful a trade was duly cheriſhed and cultivated by conſtant juggles and impoſtures, and all advantages were taken of ſurprizing and unuſual phænomena of nature. By the help of glaſſes, unuſual voices and noiſes, phoſphorus, magic lanthorns, feats of *Legerdemain*, and col-

luſion and confederacy, theſe prejudices were artfully kept up, and weak and enthuſiaſtic people were made to believe, ſometimes to ſee, and afterwards to publiſh to others their viſions, or whatever ever elſe their deceivers had occaſion for; whoſe power at the ſame time was ſo great, that the few intelligent men who ſaw and deteſted theſe impieties, durſt not contend with the prejudices of the people, abetted by the rage of the Popiſh prieſts.

Many of our firſt reformers were but weak men, and I doubt ſome of them were not very honeſt ones; and therefore generally fell into theſe ſtories: however, they loſt a great deal of ground in queen *Eliſabeth*'s reign; but were returned upon us with a full ſwing by her ſucceſſor, who brought from *Scotland* with him whole legions of theſe ſubterranean inhabitants; who, methinks, ſhould more properly have come from a warmer climate. That bright, ſagacious, and royal author wrote and publiſhed a very learned book of dæmonology, which effectually confuted all diſbelievers; for ſure no man, who hoped for any preferment, eccleſiaſtical or civil, would have the ill manners to diſpute his majeſty's great judgment and royal authority. When *Nero* proclaimed himſelf the beſt poet in his dominions by ſound of trumpet, no man durſt contend for the laurel with one who had fifty legions at his command. So an act of parliament was paſſed for hanging of witches; and his majeſty himſelf was graciouſly pleaſed to inform his judges by what marks they might be known; and many of them were hanged accordingly: but, as ill luck would have it, they multiplied like the blood of the martyrs; and the more they hanged, the more were left behind, during his whole reign.

In king *Charles* the firſt's time they began to decreaſe again, by letting them alone; till, at the end of the civil war, a new ſet of ſaints got into the ſaddle; and then again a freſh perſecution began againſt

old women, who were hanged plentifully at every aſſizes.

Some only for not being drown'd,
Others for ſitting above ground
Whole days and nights upon their breeches,
And feeling pain, were hang'd for witches.

There were profeſſed witch-finders, who knew them at firſt ſight; ſo that there was ſcarce a poor, withered, old wretch, with a mole or a wart in any part of her body, but was in danger of her life.

When king *Charles* II. returned, and the nobility, clergy, and gentry reſumed their proper ſeats, old women began again to live and die in quiet; and, during that prince's long reign, there were but few inſtances of witches hanged; and, conſidering the prepoſſeſſions of the people, occaſioned by ſo many late murders, under the pretences of zeal, it is not to be wondered at if there were a few: but ſince the *revolution* there has not, as I remember, been one witch hanged; nor do I think that one lawyer in *England* would condemn one, or any ſpecial jury of gentlemen find her guilty; though we are often told, and, if we may judge by other effects, have reaſon to believe, that *Satan* is as buſy now as he has been in the memory of man.

But in a neighbouring country witches are almoſt as plentiful as ever; for as ſoon as the ſucceſſors of the aforeſaid holy men came into play again, and ruled the earth, they turned as they uſually do upon their old benefactor, and hanged immediately a dozen or two of his accomplices; and did the ſame ſoon after in *New-England*, of which ſome were poor *Quakers* (whom they could not be permitted to hang merely for want of orthodoxy) and it is thought there was not an old woman in *Fairyland*; (who was unfit

for uſe) but would have undergone the ſame fate, if the government had not interpoſed.

Notwithſtanding this, I do not find that the devil has in the leaſt changed his meaſures, or is more afraid of the ſaints than he uſed to be; but is conſtantly working under their noſes, and every now and anon kidnapping ſome of their flocks; but it is always of ſuch as can pay no tythes: for it is agreed by all, that a little money in their pockets will keep him out: but what ſeems very remarkable is, that at the ſame time that he makes ſo bold with theſe holy men, who have power to caſt him out, he keeps a reſpectful diſtance from men of carnal ſenſe, and plain natural underſtandings; and moſt of all from thoſe incredulous perſons, who cannot be perſuaded to believe that the merciful God will permit him to outwit and deſtroy ignorant and unwary Chriſtians, whom the Saviour of the world died to redeem from his power.

This is ſo true, that thoſe ſtories are believed thro' the world, in exact proportion to the ignorance of the people, and the integrity of their clergy, and the influence which they have over their flocks. In Popiſh countries there is a ſpirit or witch in every pariſh, in defiance of holy water, and of conſtant *pater noſters*; and there are more of them in ignorant Popiſh countries than in knowing ones, in poor than in rich ones; and they appear oftner in arbitrary governments than in free ſtates. The king of *Spain*'s and pope's dominions have more of them than *France* and the *German* principalities, where prieſtcraft does not ride ſo triumphant; and theſe have more than *Venice*, *Genoa*, and the Popiſh hans towns.

The ſame is equally true of proteſtant countries: *Muſcovy*, *Sweden*, *Denmark*, and *Lapland*, have more of them than *Scotland* and *Ireland*; and *Scotland* and *Ireland* more than *England*, where no clergymen of any credit abet theſe frauds; and conſequently the

devil's empire here is almoſt at an end, how conſiderable ſoever it has been formerly: and in *Holland* he has nothing at all to do; though that country lies ſo near his other territories, that I wonder he ſhould not ſometimes ſhorten his journey, or at leaſt now and then take it in his way, though only to try what may be done among the *Hogan Mogans*.

From all that has been ſaid I think I may reaſonably conclude, that he is kept at home by the will of the Almighty, ſuffering the puniſhment due to his rebellion; and has no power over others, till, for their diſobedience to the commands of heaven, they are delivered into his cuſtody to be tormented, and made juſt objects of divine vengeance: and I ſhall take the liberty further to add, that true religion is ſo well ſupported by reaſon and revelation, that there is no neceſſity of telling lies in its defence, and puting it upon the ſame bottom with the Heathen ſuperſtitions, and the Popiſh forgeries and impoſtures; which, when diſcovered, will make twenty infidels for one true believer that is made by ſuch methods.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, June 9. 1722. N°. 80.

That the two great parties in England *do not differ ſo much as they think in principles of politics.*

SIR,

Machiavel tells us, that it is rare to find out a man perfectly good or perfectly bad: men generally ſwim between the two extremes; and ſcarce any man is as good as he himſelf, his friends, or his party, make him; or as bad as he is repreſented by his perſonal or party enemies. Aſk a *Whig* the character of a neighbouring *Tory*, and he repreſents him as a *Jacobite*, an enemy to public liberty, and a perſecutor; and, on the other ſide, if you enquire the other's character from his *Tory* godfather out of baptiſm, he ſhall paſs for a commonwealth's man, an enemy to all ſorts of monarchy, and an encourager of all kinds of licentiouſneſs and faction: whereas an indifferent man, converſing with each of them, ſhall find both aim at the ſame thing, and their oppoſition to proceed only from their not converſing together, from an intention to thwart one another, or from the intrigues of thoſe who reap advantage by ſetting them together by the ears. 'Tis too great a compliment to pay to our adverſaries, to ſuppoſe them to act upon a miſtaken principle againſt their real intereſt; and it is certainly the intereſt of every man to be free from oppreſſion; and he will join in meaſures to be ſo, if he be not terrified by the fear of greater oppreſſion. It is undoubtedly true, that there are many *Jacobites* in *England*; but it is thinking better of at preſent; and if not the beſt which can be formed

them than they deſerve, to believe that they will be ſo againſt their own intereſts: and therefore, excepting the very few who can hope to receive the advantages of ſuch a revolution, the reſt may be converted, by ſhewing them that they can find better protection and ſecurity from the preſent eſtabliſhment, than by hazarding their lives and eſtates, and their country's happineſs, in bringing their deſigns to paſs. The only dangerous *Jacobites* that I ever feared, were thoſe who took the ſame methods to keep out the ſon as turned out the father.

Whilſt men enjoy protection, plenty, and happineſs, they will always deſire to continue them, and never look after revolutions; but when they loſe, or fancy that they loſe thoſe advantages, which they ever will think they have a right to enjoy, they will endeavour to change their condition, though in the attempt they often change it for the worſe. Whoever therefore would endeavour to preſerve a preſent eſtabliſhment, muſt make the people eaſy and contented under it, and to find their own account in the continuance of it. The inſtruments of tyranny (of which I hope we ſhall never have any amongſt us) are never to be depended upon in any exigency; they will always be able to ſhift for themſelves, and know how to make an intereſt with a new government, by betraying the old; which was the caſe of the late king *James*, and will ever be the caſe of others in the like circumſtances.

Every man therefore, who is ſincerely and heartily attached to the intereſt of his preſent majeſty, will endeavour to cheriſh, cultivate, and make a proper uſe of his excellent diſpoſitions to protect and make his people happy, and to preſerve our conſtitution in church and ſtate upon its true and ſolid baſis. Old land marks are never to be removed, without producing conteſts and law-ſuits, which for the moſt part ruin both parties. We have an excellent conſtitution

in an *Utopian* commonwealth, yet I doubt the beſt that we are capable of receiving. The preſent diſtribution of property renders us incapable of changing it for the better; and probably any attempt to change it for the better, would conclude in an abſolute monarchy. There are ſo many intereſts engaged to ſupport it, that whoever gets power enough to deſtroy theſe intereſts, will have power enough to ſet up himſelf; as *Oliver Cromwell* did, and every one elſe will do, in the ſame circumſtances; or at leaſt, no wiſe man will truſt to his moderation.

No man of ſenſe and fortune will venture the happineſs which he is in full poſſeſſion of, for imaginary viſions; and throw the dice for his own eſtate: ſuch deſperate gameſters carry their whole about them; and their future expectations depend upon confuſion, and the miſery of others: but ſuch as have much to fear, and little to hope for, will acquieſce in their preſent condition. This being the true circumſtance of the nobility, clergy, gentry, rich merchants, and the body of the people, I hope they will concur in ſuch meaſures as will moſt effectually preſerve our preſent eſtabliſhment, and ſupport the juſt rights of the crown, and the liberties of the people, oppoſe all uſurpations on either ſide, and endeavour, in the moſt exemplary manner, to puniſh all who ſhall dare to interpoſe between the king and the ſubject, and ſpoil that harmony which alone can make them both happy.

This is the intereſt of all parties, and of every man in them (except a very few, who make their market of the others differences), and I could never yet ſee a juſt bone of contention between them. It can be of no conſequence to either party, if they are governed well, whether a man of one denomination or another governs them; and if they are oppreſſed, it is no conſolation, that it is done by one whom they formerly called a friend; whereas if they would agree

together, no one durſt oppreſs them. Thoſe who are called *whigs*, have no intention to injure the legal eſtabliſhment of the church; and ſeven years experience, when they have had the whole power in their hands, may convince any one that they did not intend it; and the *tories* tell us, that they deſire no more than that eſtabliſhment, and have no thoughts of breaking in upon the act of toleration, which is the right of all mankind. The *whigs* can have no motive to do the one, nor the *tories* the other, when party oppoſition is laid aſide: for how is a *whig* injured by another's receiving advantages which he has no right to, and receives no prejudice by, but may receive benefit from, by providing for his children, relations, or friends? And how is a *tory* injured in a quiet neighbour's worſhipping God in his own way, any more than if he did not worſhip him at all; which is the caſe of thouſands who are unmoleſted? The diſtinctions about government are at an end: moſt of the *tories* are aſhamed of their old arbitrary principles, and many of the modern *whigs* ought to be aſhamed of taking them up; and indeed they have no right to reproach one another with either practices or principles: for both have ſhewn their wrong ends in their turns; and they have brought matters at laſt to that paſs, that whilſt they have been throwing the dice for victory, ſharpers have been drawing the ſtakes.

Indeed, I cannot ſee what we differ about: we fight at blindman's-buff, and fall upon our friends, as well as enemies. All the grounds of diſtinction are now at an end, and the honeſt and wiſe men of all parties mean the ſame thing, and ought to lay aſide and forget the old names, and become one party for liberty, before that name is forgotten too. It is yet in our power to ſave ourſelves. We are ſure we have a prince, who has every diſpoſition to help us, if we lend our own aſſiſtance, and ſhew him the means of

doing it; and we are anſwerable to God, our country, and ourſelves, if we do not uſe our own endeavours. The means are eaſy, obvious, and legal; and the motives as ſtrong as ever did, or ever can, happen in any circumſtance of human affairs. It is no leſs than the ſafety and preſervation of the beſt king, and the beſt conſtitution upon earth, and indeed of almoſt the only people amongſt whom there are any remains of liberty, knowledge, or true religion; all which depend upon the ſteady, loyal, and uniform proceedings of the next parliament.

For my own part, I have no quarrel to names or perſons, and would join in any juſt meaſures, or with any party, to ſave the kingdom; and will oppoſe, to the utmoſt of my power, all who will not; and I believe that there are thouſands of the ſame ſentiments; and methinks great men ſhould accept ſo favourable a diſpoſition to forget the miſchiefs which ambition, covetouſneſs, or inadvertency have brought upon us. We will not look with eagle's eyes into paſt faults, provided a proper atonement is made by future ſervices; nor envy particular mens growing rich, if they will let the public thrive with them; and it is certainly ſafer, and more creditable, to do ſo by the conſent of their countrymen, than by conſtant ſtruggles, broils, and contention, to overcome popular oppoſition; which muſt get the better at laſt, or their country, and probably they themſelves, muſt be buried in it.

England is yet in a condition to make the fortunes of a few men, if they are not in too much haſte to make them; and will conſent, or connive at their doing ſo, if they deſerve well in other reſpects. There are many uſeleſs, and yet profitable, employments in *England*, and few men are concerned how they are diſpoſed of; whether to lords valets, or whether they are the perquiſites of foreign or domeſtic favourites, provided the offices which regard the adminiſtration of juſtice, of the ſtate, church, or revenue, be pro-

perly beſtowed. Thoſe who have the fortune to get into the higheſt ſtations, will expect to raiſe ſuitable eſtates, eſpecially when they have in a great meaſure the means in their hands of making them, and the power of carving for themſelves; and all but rivals will compound for their doing it by ſuch ways as are conſiſtent with the public benefit, or ſuch as the public does not ſuffer much by; and I doubt the legal advantages belonging to few offices in *England* will anſwer the expectations of men in the firſt ſtation.

It is often urged, That princes muſt be ſerved upon their own terms, and their ſervants muſt ſometimes comply againſt their inclinations, to prevent greater miſchiefs; which I believe is rarely the caſe. I confeſs, princes ought and muſt be always treated with tenderneſs and delicacy, and regard muſt be had to their opinions or prejudices; but it is ſo much their intereſt to be honoured and beloved by their people (who from a thouſand motives will be always ready to make them perſonally eaſy, and to gratify even their wanton deſires, when they are not abſolutely deſtructive to themſelves), that there is much leſs addreſs and management neceſſary to ſhew them their real intereſt, and bring them into it, than to engage them in deſigns which will ever produce diſaffection and danger; and it is certainly the intereſt of their miniſters and ſervants, rather to ſet themſelves at the head of public benevolences, and receive the thanks and applauſe due to ſuch benefits, than to have them extorted from them always with general curſes and deteſtation, and often with perſonal hazard.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, June 16. 1722. No. 81.

The eſtabliſhed church of England *in no danger from diſſenters.*

SIR,

I Have in my laſt letter ſaid, that no wiſe man will remove ancient land-marks; and for the imaginary proſpect of enjoying ſomething which he does not enjoy, and has a mind to enjoy, run the hazard of loſing what he is already in poſſeſſion of. Thoſe who have nothing to loſe, can loſe nothing by their feats of knight-errantry; but thoſe that have, are ſeldom gainers by them. I conſidered this ſubject in that paper as it regarded the ſtate; and I ſhall do it here with relation to our church differences. The conſtitution of our church is excellently well adapted to our civil government. The biſhops anſwer to the lords, and the inferior clergy to the commons in the ſtate; and all are ſubject to the legiſlative power mediately, and immediately to the crown. The king has the power of creating the chief eccleſiaſtical officers, as he has of creating the civil; and they both receive their beings and exiſtence from him; and conſequently they muſt ever be in the intereſt of monarchy; and the monarch muſt ever be in the intereſt of an eſtabliſhment from which he derives ſo much power. The nobility and gentry too, whoſe birth, character; and fortunes always give them the means of eaſy acceſs to the throne, muſt be equally in the ſame intereſt: for, as no man can ſuffer by another's enjoying poſſeſſions which he has no right or pretence

to; ſo they will ſhare largely in theſe poſſeſſions, by having more frequent and better opportunities than their fellow-ſubjects, of preferring their children, relations, friends, and dependents; not to mention what preſentations they have in their own power. Indeed, every man, of any condition, has an intereſt in them, as he has a chance of ſharing preferments himſelf, or getting them for his family: and therefore it is wild to fear that any intereſt in *England* can ſhake an eſtabliſhment which ſo many intereſts muſt concur to ſupport; unleſs thoſe who are in poſſeſſion of its advantages ſhould, by endeavouring to take away from others their rights, force them to make reprizals, and to do what, I dare ſay, no man in *England* now intends, and but few deſire.

I have wondered, therefore, to hear ſome men of good underſtanding and unqueſtionable integrity apprehend any danger to the legal conſtitution of the church, and cannot gueſs from what quarter they can fear it. The *independents*, *anabaptiſts*, and *quakers*, are no candidates for eccleſiaſtical power, but are by principle againſt all church eſtabliſhments amongſt themſelves. The *quakers* have no clergy at all; and the two former allow their miniſters no ſuperiority above the reſt of their congregations; and it is certain, that all of them have much more favourable opinions of the national clergy than of the *presbyterians* (the only rivals for church-power), from whom they apprehend, and have always found, much worſe uſage than from the church. They deſire nothing but liberty of conſcience, and do not envy others preferments which they cannot enjoy themſelves. It is true, the *presbyterians* are candidates for church-dominion; and without doubt their prieſts have hawk's eyes at the church preferments, and wiſh often for them, if wiſhes would get them; but what facility, or, indeed, poſſibility, have they of obtaining them? They are an inconſiderable body as to their number; and

as to their figure, leſs; and as they grow rich, and leave eſtates behind them, their ſons (for the moſt part) deſert their congregations and intereſt: beſides, they are divided now into two parties, *viz.* the *ſubſcribers*, and *nonſubſcribers;* the latter of which, much the moſt conſiderable for fortune and underſtanding, are come, for the moſt part, into the principles of general liberty and independency, nor will ever truſt their clergy with the power which they pretend to, and which they claim from ſcripture; and by degrees many of theſe, in all probability, will come into the church.

No prince can ever be in the intereſt of *presbytery*; and I believe that there never was one in the world who was a true *presbyterian:* for, as that government is purely *democratical*, ſo it is calculated only for a popular ſtate; and, in fact, ſubſiſts no-where elſe in the world, unleſs in *Scotland*, where there have been frequent ſtruggles between the crown and them. King *James* the firſt was ſo plagued with them, that he was viſibly partial to the *Papiſts* againſt them: *Charles* the firſt, by violence, deſtroyed their eſtabliſhment; and king *Charles* the ſecond, though called in by them, and ſupported by them againſt his parliament, yet immediately turned upon them: for, though they would have been glad to have had a king modelled to ſerve their purpoſes, yet that king had more wit than to have them. For the ſame reaſons, the nobility and gentry of few countries, who by their births, fortunes, and near acceſs to the throne, claim and enjoy a diſtinction above the inferior rank of mankind, can never be heartily in the intereſt of that ſort of government; and it is certain, that many of the nobility and gentry in *Scotland* have never been favourable to it. And this is the true, perhaps the chief, reaſon why ſo many of them now are *Jacobites*.

The *presbyterian* clergy claim a right, from ſcripture, to be independent of the civil power in all things

which relate to ſpirituals, of which they pretend to be judges; and, in fact, their ſynods in *Scotland*, whatever they do now, formerly did not allow the crown power to adjourn or diſſolve them, though they were forced to ſubmit to it; and I am told, at preſent, they always adjourn by their own authority, though they take eſpecial care it ſhall be to the ſame time that the crown appoints; which ſtill keeps up their claim againſt a proper occaſion. I do not avouch the truth of this, and hope that it is not true. Now it is certain, that the nobility and gentry of *England*, who have actually the power of governing their clergy, will never be governed by them, whatever viſions weak men of any denomination may flatter themſelves with; nor will ever ſubmit to the *presbyterian* diſcipline, and to let monks and cynics govern their families, turn the heads of their wives, children, and ſervants, and controul their own actions. Nor will the other, ſectaries, as has been ſaid, who are already poſſeſſed of a free liberty of conſcience, endeavour to put power in the hands of thoſe who will be ſure to take it away; as they did in *New-England*, though they went there to get it for themſelves. So that the danger of ſettling *presbytery* in *England* is a mere chimera; and when, by the chance of a long civil war, they were actually got in poſſeſſion of a power, which during the continuance of it they diſclaimed, they could not hold it even for a few years.

The only ball of contention which ſeems to be now amongſt churchmen, is the ſacramental teſt, which excludes diſſenters from offices; which they think they have a right to in common with their fellow-ſubjects, having done nothing to forfeit it: but this ſeems to me to be a diſpute only about a non-entity: for it is certain, that not one diſſenter in *England* would be in any office of value, if that law was repealed, more than there are now; for they always qualify themſelves, if they can get good places, and take advan-

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which relate to ſpirituals, of which they pretend to be judges; and, in fact, their ſynods in *Scotland*, whatever they do now, formerly did not allow the crown power to adjourn or diſſolve them, though they were forced to ſubmit to it; and I am told, at preſent, they always adjourn by their own authority, though they take eſpecial care it ſhall be to the ſame time that the crown appoints; which ſtill keeps up their claim againſt a proper occaſion. I do not avouch the truth of this, and hope that it is not true. Now it is certain, that the nobility and gentry of *England*, who have actually the power of governing their clergy, will never be governed by them, whatever viſions weak men of any denomination may flatter themſelves with; nor will ever ſubmit to the *presbyterian* diſcipline, and to let monks and cynics govern their families, turn the heads of their wives, children, and ſervants, and controul their own actions. Nor will the other, ſectaries, as has been ſaid, who are already poſſeſſed of a free liberty of conſcience, endeavour to put power in the hands of thoſe who will be ſure to take it away; as they did in *New-England*, though they went there to get it for themſelves. So that the danger of ſettling *presbytery* in *England* is a mere chimera; and when, by the chance of a long civil war, they were actually got in poſſeſſion of a power, which during the continuance of it they diſclaimed, they could not hold it even for a few years.

The only ball of contention which ſeems to be now amongſt churchmen, is the ſacramental teſt, which excludes diſſenters from offices; which they think they have a right to in common with their fellow-ſubjects, having done nothing to forfeit it: but this ſeems to me to be a diſpute only about a non-entity: for it is certain, that not one diſſenter in *England* would be in any office of value, if that law was repealed, more than there are now; for they always qualify themſelves, if they can get good places, and take advan-

tage of the law to keep themſelves out of chargeable ones: ſo that the churchmen alone ſuffer by that ſtatute. The king, by act of parliament, as well as intereſt and education, will be of the eſtabliſhed church; and the nobility are all, or almoſt all, ſo too, and no doubt but they will give the preference in all preferments to thoſe of their own opinions: nor can it ever happen but that men, who can have qualifications to fill any conſiderable employments, will have wit enough to find out that there is no religious difference between the church and *presbyterian* eſtabliſhments, except in the intereſts of their clergy; which no wiſe man will think conſiderable enough to differ about, and to ſeparate upon that ſcore from the national diſcipline, very few excepted, who will find their account in ſetting themſelves at the head of a faction, and ſelling it. So that this queſtion appears to me only to be a party puncto, and ſcarce worth aſking on the one ſide, or denying on the other. Thoſe among the *whigs*, who moſt deſire it, would not have the appearance of perſecution ſtand in a law, when in effect there is no real perſecution; and it is certainly the intereſt of the clergy to gratify and oblige their diſſenting brethren in what coſts them nothing: for one act of kindneſs will make more converts in a year, than they can make by preaching at them in twenty; however, till they ſee the advantage in doing it themſelves, I think that no prudent man will give them any cauſe of jealouſy, by doing it againſt their conſent.

This being, as I conceive, the true ſtate of our church differences, I ſhall conclude this letter, by application to our national clergy. It is not to be wondered at, that ſo many of their predeceſſors regretted the diminution which they ſuffered of their former revenues and grandeur at the *reformation*; and that they often looked back with wiſhing eyes, and could not eaſily loſe ſight of ſo agreeable a proſpect, without

weighing enough the impoſſibility of recovering their loſt power from the crown, and their lands from the nobility and gentry, who had got poſſeſſion of them: indeed it would have been a wonder if they had done otherwiſe. But now almoſt two hundred years experience may convince them of the impoſſibility of ſucceeding in ſuch a deſign. They have once loſt all, by endeavouring to recover a part; and lately had like to have loſt their poſſeſſions and religion too, by attempting to give the crown a power, which they intended ſhould be employed for their own benefit, but was actually uſed againſt them; and I hope they are now pretty generally of opinion, that it is their intereſt to ſtand to their preſent eſtabliſhment, and be contented with the ſame ſecurity for their own poſſeſſions as the reſt of their fellow-ſubjects have, and to join with them in the defence of liberty, and the laws of the land.

I ſee, with a great deal of pleaſure, many of them falling into theſe opinions; and hope, that it will ſoon be the opinion of the greateſt part of them; and then I dare boldly affirm, that all religious diſtinctions will ſoon be at an end, which are now kept up more by party animoſities, than any eſſential difference of opinion: for men will always fly from the ſentiments of thoſe whoſe perſons they hate, and whoſe oppreſſion they fear; and ſuch as are little concerned about metaphyſical, and, as they think, uſeleſs, notions in divinity, will ſupport any party againſt thoſe who would oppreſs all; and therefore the moſt laudable, and indeed only way of the clergy's being ſafe themſelves, is to make other people ſafe; and then they will have the good wiſhes, the reſpect, and protection of every honeſt man in *England*; and multitudes of the diſſenters, who will not be frightened or bullied out of their opinions, will inſenſibly quit them of their own accord, if it be only to ſave the charge of paying ſeparate miniſters, and to be in the faſhion, when

they can once give themſelves leave to conſider cool that they differ about nothing, or nothing that is eſſential to religion, or their own intereſts. The heat of the ſun made the traveller immediately quit his cloak when the bluſtering of the north wind had made him wrap it cloſer about him.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, June 23. 1722. N°. 82.

The folly and characters of ſuch as would overturn the preſent eſtabliſhment.

SIR,

IT gives equal occaſion of mirth and concern to wiſe men, to ſee ſo many of the other ſort, perſons of ſeeming reverence, and with grave faces, exerting themſelves with warmth and zeal for opinions and parties, with each a ſeparate train or chorus of leſſer and ſubordinate planets attending their motions, and dancing after them. Whoever views theſe ſolemn ſpectres at a diſtance, will ſee nothing but conſcience, contempt of worldly honours and preferments, and minds ſuperior to all temptations; whereas all this grimace, to a nice obſerver, will appear only to be a project for picking pockets, and getting away other people's money, which, in reality, at preſent makes, and ever did make, moſt of the ſquabbles which at any time have diſturbed the world. This I may poſſibly hereafter ſhew to be true, in moſt of the conſpicuous inſtances of public and private life; but at preſent I ſhall confine myſelf to thoſe gentlemen who deal in *revolutions*.

There are a conſiderable number of politicians in all governments, who are always enemies to the preſent eſtabliſhment; not becauſe it is an ill one, or becauſe thoſe who adminiſter it betray their truſt (which is a juſt and reaſonable ground of complaint), but becauſe they themſelves are not in it: if they are ſo, all is well; but if they cannot be accepted upon their own terms, or are afterwards turned out for miſbehaviour, then upon a ſudden there is no faith in man, fundamentals are ſtruck at, no honeſt man can ſerve, and keep his integrity, and there is no remedy but a total change; and if that happen, and they can get into power, nothing is mended but their own faces and their fortunes. Without doubt, every man has a right to liberty, and to come at it by all ways which do not bring a greater inconvenience with it than the benefit propoſed promiſes advantage; and all juſt attempts of that kind are commendable: but I ſpeak now of a ſort of cattle, who think of nothing but their fodder, who do not care who feeds them, or who is their maſter, provided they have a belly full; nor whether it be lawful paſture, or treſpaſs and encroachment upon the neighbouring ſoil.

I am ſo unfortunate as always to think, that a man who is a knave in his private dealings, will never be a ſaint in politics; and whoever does not do reaſonable and juſt things in reſpect to his neighbours, relations, and acquaintance, which he knows, will have little real concern for the titles of princes whom he knows not. Indeed it ſeems to me, that there cannot be a greater ridicule in nature, than for any man to pretend to be concerned for the perſonal intereſt of another, whom he is not acquainted with, has no means of being acquainted with, and probably would not be acquainted with upon equal terms, unleſs he can hope to find a farther account in it, in going ſnacks with him.

It is certain, that every man's intereſt is involv
in the ſecurity and happineſs of a good prince, fr
whom he receives protection and liberty; but for
who has no concern for public or private juſtice, w
does not care what becomes of his neighbour's rig
and poſſeſſions, who would make no difficulty
cheating any prince whom he ſerved, or oppreſſ
thoſe in his power; I ſay, for ſuch a one to ſet
for loyalty, and the right line, and to hazard his
and family, for conſcience ſake, is ſuch a farce, t
if mens thoughts were not ſo wholly taken up w
their own cheating, that they minded not other p
ples, no one could be deceived by ſuch falſe appe
ances.

I muſt beg leave, therefore, of theſe gentlemen
take it for granted, that all this zeal is for themſelv
and only a ſtruggle for money and employments, t
to get that by a revolution, which they want me
or means to get without it; and I will here ende
vour to ſhew them, that they are taking abundan
of pains, and running much hazard, to attain wh
they will never catch. But I would not be underſto
here to apply myſelf to thoſe men who are in deſp
rate circumſtances, and whoſe condition may be be
tered, and cannot be made worſe, by confuſion; n
to the poor viſionaries and enthuſiaſts, who are th
cats-feet to the former, and are by nature prepare
to be dupes and tools of ambition and deſign; but t
the very few amongſt them who are tolerably eaſy i
their own affairs, and do not want common unde
ſtanding; and to theſe I may ſafely ſay, that the
paſſions and prejudices hurry them away from the
real intereſts, to purſue ſhadows and imaginations, an
to make thoſe whoſe greatneſs they envy, yet muc
greater.

A prince long kept out of what he calls his domi
nions, will, upon a reſtoration, always bring bac
with him a junćto of upſtart mamamouches, with

e train of half-ſtarved beggars dangling after them,
through neceſſity have followed his fortunes, flat-
d his vices, and will expect to have his ear, and
diſpoſal of his favours. This ragged crew, who
e been long the outcaſts of fortune, know, for the
t part, nothing of government, or the maxims ne-
ry to preſerve it, unleſs to talk about the divine
t of their maſter, and the injury done to ſo good
ince; but with arbitrary principles picked up in
r travels, minds ſoured with wants and diſappoint-
nts, hungry bellies, and ravenous and polluted
ws, finding themſelves at once metamorphoſed from
k miniſters and magiſtrates to real ones, glutted
h ſudden plenty, and rioting in profuſion, which
y before enjoyed only in imagination, will become
courſe proud, inſolent, and rapacious, and think
nothing but to redeem the time which they have
, to raiſe haſty fortunes, and will endeavour to get
m as they can; and conſequently will ſell their
ſter to thoſe who can or will give moſt for him,
ich will be ever thoſe who have got moſt by keep-
him out.

The court language will be immediately changed:
will be ſaid, that the prince muſt ſubmit to the ne-
ſity of his affairs; that his enemies muſt be brought
o his intereſt, who may be otherwiſe able to per-
x his new government; and beſides, having by
g experience been uſed to employments, and the
nagement of the public revenue, muſt be continu-
till others are equally qualified to ſupply their of-
es; that his majeſty has a grateful memory of the
thful ſervices of his true friends; that he will
ovide for them all by degrees, as faſt as the others
n be turned out; but they muſt have a little pati-
ce, and not be too importunate: and ſo, after two
three years daily attendance, with old coats new
biſhed, ſome good words, now and then a good
ner, and the honour of whiſpering and joking with

his lordſhip, they will find themſelves juſt wher
ſet out, only with leſs money in their pockets
ſee their enemies in poſſeſſion of all the employm
find out at laſt, that courts and courtiers are
become new malecontents, and form themſelve
a faction againſt the government which they v
ed their lives to bring about.

This was the caſe upon the reſtoration of
Charles II. when the *Round-heads* had all the o
having got money enough, whilſt they were in p
to buy them; and the poor ſtarved *Cavaliers*,
had nothing but a good conſcience and paſt ſe
to plead, were laughed at, and could hardly g
mittance into the anti-chamber. The deſcende
theſe are the modern *Whigs*; and of the othe
the moſt part, the preſent *Tories*. Nor can it h
otherwiſe in the nature of things: for thoſe who
no merit to offer but their money, will always
enough of it; and thoſe who want it, will a
take it. Beſides, ſuch as are conſcious of their
demerit to their prince, will uſe double diligenc
pleaſe him, and to wipe off paſt ſcores; whereas
who pretend that they have ſacrificed all for
will eſteem his favours received only as payme
juſt debts; and their expectations are ſeldom to b
tisfied, or they to be perſuaded that their ſervice
enough conſidered. And it muſt proceed from a
ſummate ignorance in human nature, not to k
that almoſt all men, and eſpecially princes and g
men, would rather engage new debtors to themſe
than pay off old debts to other people; would ſo
er create freſh dependents, by conferring favours w
will be eſteemed obligations, than ſatisfy the clam
and importunities of ſuch pretended creditors and d
who will never be ſatisfied.

Beſides, princes, for the moſt part, think all
can be done for them is no more than duty;
will throw off old ſervants, who can do them

good, as eaſily as old ſhoes; grow weary of long-winded tales about paſt ſervices, and will themſelves at liberty to purſue their preſent in-, and employ ſuch who are moſt capable of ſerv-hem for the preſent, as thoſe undoubtedly are have eſtabliſhed intereſts, moſt experience in af- and money always at hand to back their pre-ns.

ſides, when matters in any country are prepar- a revolution, the poor ſtarved followers, or tented well-wiſhers to an abdicated prince, never have the merit and honour of making it; an never, or very rarely, have power enough o ſo: for thoſe who enjoy the advantages of government in poſſeſſion, who are deep in its cils, command its fleets and armies, and perhaps made it odious by their wicked counſels and ac-, are always the firſt to veer about, and make intereſt with the new government, by being in-mental to bring it in: they have it often in their r to do it, and great ſums of money always at mand to buy their peace, and very frequently to their employments; and ſo to go on where they off: for a poor wandering prince, eager to get own (which he will conceit to be his own), will into any meaſures, or join with any perſons, to in it; and for the moſt part be ready to drop his ſſitous followers, as eaſily as they would drop him, ey found it equally their intereſt.

Of this ſort we have pregnant inſtances in the tri-viri of *Rome*; of general *Monk*, and others former-mongſt ourſelves; and of a very great lord in the r end of king *James*'s time: but why ſhould I e particular inſtances, when every revolution which oſt ever happened in the world, furniſhes us with merous ones, and will ever do ſo to the end of the rld; unleſs the power by which the revolution is de is ſo great, and ſo much in the prince's diſpoſ-

al, that he is under no neceſſity of keeping meaſure with any perſon or party, but is wholly at liberty t follow his inclinations, and gratify his revenge an paſſions; or is ſo entirely an inſtrument of the pow er which he makes uſe of, or rather which makes u of him, that he muſt do whatever they would hav him do; as was the caſe in a good meaſure of *Mariu* and *Sylla*, but I think cannot be the circumſtance o any perſon now living; and I hope that few of tho who wiſh for a revolution would accept it upon tho terms.

The ſtarved crew, who deal in revolutions, are ſe dom conjurers in politics: for no man of fortune, o a grain of underſtanding, would venture a ſingle ha of his head for the intereſt of another, educated i pride and ingratitude, and very probably one too o whom he knows nothing, and who knows nothing o him, nor will have the leaſt regard to his hazard an ſervices. Beſides, is not ſuch an one a worthy her and his particular intereſt a worthy cauſe for a ma of common ſenſe, and tolerable fortune, to ventur his life and eſtate for, by involving his country too i a civil war?

But there is another reaſon ſtill behind, which fear theſe doughty politicians never think of; name ly, that they are doing the work which they preten to oppoſe; which has ſometimes inclined me to be lieve, that they have been employed and hired to ac as they do. It is certain, that their ill-digeſted libels without the leaſt notions of the principles of govern ment, or ſhewing the leaſt diſpoſition to mend it; thei ſtupid cant of a right in princes independent of th happineſs of the ſociety; their ill-mannered reflexion upon the perſon of the ſovereign, whom moſt of them have ſworn to; and their conſtant invectives and re proaches upon all men, who are honeſter and wiſe than themſelves, do more miſchief to this country

than their united force, counſels, and underſtanding, could do good, if they were inclinable to do it.

Weak men, who know or ſuſpect their deſigns, will take no meaſures with them for a common good; and thoſe who laugh at their follies, and are not afraid of being over-reached and outwitted by them, are ever reproached with their ſilly deſigns. In fine, they are the only ſupport of thoſe whom they pretend moſt to abhor; and I believe I may venture to ſay, are the only friends in the kingdom which ſome perſons of figure lately had, without intending to be ſo.

In my next letter I will endeavour to ſhew, that it is impoſſible to bring their wild projects to bear; not with any hopes of making many of them wiſer, but to convince better people, that they ought not to be bullied by the ſound of *Jacobitiſm*, and ſo diverted from concurring in the neceſſary meaſures to ſerve their king, their country, and themſelves, by bugbears and phantoms: for I dare venture to aſſert, that there is no poſſibility of reſtoring the pretender to *England*, but by taking ſuch meaſures to keep him out, as will be more terrible to the people than letting him in, if ſuch can poſſibly be; and I am ſure that every honeſt man ought to do all in his power to prevent any attempts of that kind, which we are certain will receive no countenance from his majeſty, and, I hope, from none of his preſent miniſtry.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, June 30. 1722. N°. 83.

The vain hopes of the Pretender *and his party.*

SIR,

I Have promiſed in my laſt to ſhew, that the pre tender's game is altogether deſperate in *England* unleſs thoſe whoſe duty and intereſt in the higheſt man ner oblige them to keep him out, pave the wa for his return: and this I ſhall do, by ſhewing, tha there is no intereſt within the kingdom, or out o it, capable of bringing about ſuch a revolution, an willing to do it. Indeed, ſuch a convulſion woul ſhake the very foundations of the earth, and turn a nature topſy-turvy. God knows, one *revolution* is e nough for one age. I do not deny, but ſuch an even might have been brought about, if favoured by th crown, by the miniſters and officers in power unde it, and abetted by a great neighbouring potentate Which caſe many people (I hope falſly) think wa ours in a late reign; and even then the ſucceſs woul not have been certain; and if it had ſucceeded, I dare venture to be poſitive, that thoſe who had been moſ forward to have brought him in, would have been a mongſt the firſt to have turned him out again.

I think no man is now to learn, that conſcience and the opinion of right have little or nothing to do in revolutions, but the reſentments of men, and the gratifying the views and expectations of private per ſons, or of aggregate bodies; and no formidable ſet of men could have found their account amongſt us, in continuing him upon the throne, upon the terms

he muſt have ſat there. He is certainly a very weak man, a great bigot, and of a ſaturnine and moroſe temper; and the near proſpect of the poſſeſſion of three crowns could not make him temporize with his then intereſt, nor diſguiſe his religion to thoſe who were contented to be deceived, that they might deceive others. And therefore it is impoſſible to believe, that a prince ſo qualified, provoked by his expulſion, acquainted perſonally with few or none amongſt us, and educated in the religion and maxims of *France* and *Rome*, reſtored by their means, and ſupported by them, would act afterwards upon other maxims than what he had before imbibed, and what would be conſtantly inculcated into him by his foreign tutors abroad, and his prieſts at home.

Such conduct would quickly have made thoſe who moſt eſpouſed his intereſt at firſt, ſoon turn upon him, as they did before upon his father; and ſo many intereſts in *Europe* were concerned to ſeparate *England* from a dependence upon *France*, that they would never have wanted a ſtrenuous aſſiſtance, as his father found to his coſt, when all the popiſh princes, except *France*, preferred the intereſts of their ſtates before the intereſts of their religion, as *France* itſelf would have done upon the like motives. I hope I ſhall be forgiven by the gentlemen of this caſt of loyalty, if I ſay, that they have ſufficiently ſhewn to the world, that they will eſpouſe the intereſt of no prince any longer than he ſerves theirs; and I conceive it impoſſible to ſuppoſe a circumſtance which that prince could be in, to anſwer both their views, conſidering his prejudices and dependences.

But whatever might have been practicable then, the caſe is far otherwiſe now. We have a king upon the throne, who will not be ſung out of his dominions, as the late king *James* was: he will have ſome troops at home, who will certainly ſtand by him: he has great dominions of his own abroad, and is ſure of the

ſupport of powerful neighbours: his ſtrength, a
that of his allies, at ſea, is ſo great, that no invaſ
can be made upon him, but by ſtealth; and that m
be always a very inconſiderable one, and cannot
ſupported but by accidents. Very many, and I ho
by far the greateſt part of the nobility, gentry, a
people, are devoted to his perſon and title, and wou
be glad to ſerve him upon the bottom of liberty a
his true intereſt: the dignified clergy ſhew their lo
alty in the manner which is moſt acceptable to hi
and every month adds to their number by new cre
tions; and we may reaſonably hope, that the reſt w
not be long left behind.

All who are concerned in the public funds, whi
contain a fourth or fifth part of the wealth of th
kingdom, muſt ſupport an eſtabliſhment which ſu
ports them, and which, if loſt, they are undone an
loſt with it; and every man, who has property, or th
means of acquiring property, and has an uncommo
underſtanding, and a love for himſelf and liberty
muſt know, that ſo many intereſts, and ſo ſupporte
cannot be ſhaken but by a long civil war, and b
making *England* the ſtage and field for all the nati
ons in *Europe* to fight out their quarrels in; and tha
ſuch a war muſt end in making us the prize of th
victor, and ſubject us either to a foreign power or
domeſtic tyrant, if we have not the happineſs to b
reſtored to our preſent eſtabliſhment again; and the
we ſhall have had a civil war for nothing.

If we did not ſee, by daily experience, that there
is not an opinion in philoſophy, religion, or politics,
ſo abſurd, but it finds out heads wrong enough turn-
ed to embrace it; I ſhould not think it poſſible, that
any perſon, who is not a profeſſed or concealed papiſt,
could wiſh for ſuch a revolution, or any one elſe fear
it, and much leſs that they ſhould fear it from abroad.

It is certain, that the emperor has ſo many perſo-
nal as well as political ties and motives to engage

in the king's intereſts, ariſing from obligations ived, from more expected, and as it is ſaid con- ted for in regard to his *Italian* dominions, from r mutual dependences upon one another in *Ger- y*, and above all, from the intereſts of their ſeve- dominions, that it is politically impoſſible but that muſt do all in his power to ſupport him in his one: for when two nations are ſo ſituated, that y have nothing to fear from one another, and have ommon intereſt to watch and oppoſe a third pow- formidable to both, they muſt be natural allies hout the help of treaties; and whatever little oc- ional or perſonal differences may happen between princes who govern them, yet whilſt the inter- of their dominions are friendly, they will never g continue enemies; and though they do ſo, yet l always help one another upon any emergency. I think I may ſafely ſay, that the king has much hope, and nothing to fear, from the leſſer princes *Germany*, in reſpect to his *Engliſh* dominions; for ny of them can and will help him, and none of em can do him any harm.

The ſafety and preſervation of *Holland* is ſo entire- dependent and wrapt up in our preſent eſtabliſh- ent, that they muſt venture all to defend it. We obliged, by intereſt as well as treaties, to ſupport em againſt every power that is capable much to fend them; and their intereſt is, to keep us in a ſi- ation and condition to do ſo: and though, without ubt, they emulate and fear the great naval power *England*, and our poſſeſſion of *Gibraltar*; and would eaſe themſelves, and laugh in their ſleeves, to ſee s increaſe our burdens, and enervate our ſtate, by ry and romantic expeditions to do their buſineſs, hilſt they ly ſtill, eaſe their ſubjects, and pay off eir debts; yet they will never ſuffer *England* to fall nder the dependence of *France*, *Spain*, or *Rome*; tho' ey very well know how to make mercantile ad-

vantages of the weakneſs of thoſe whom they have to do with.

The crowns of *Sweden* and *Denmark* can never have a joint intereſt to inſult us; and at preſent neither of them have ſo: for it is ſaid, that we are engaged by alliances to ſupport them againſt one another, and every one elſe who has power enough much to annoy them; nor can they be ſure that ever *England* again will find its glory and advantage in the heroic gallantry of engaging in the ſquabbles of the north when *France* and *Holland* (vaſtly more concerned in the event) find theirs in lying ſtill, and letting them agree as they fall out.

The *Czar* can have no motives, from the intereſt of his dominions, to quarrel with a people from whom his ſubjects enjoy an advantageous trade, and with a power too which he cannot hurt, and which can hurt him: we are no rivals for adjacent territories; and he cannot rival us in maritime power and trade; and both of us can find our account in friendſhip, and neither in enmity. His encroachments in the *Baltic* have hitherto done us no miſchief; but, on the contrary, have opened a new market for naval ſtores, and rendered our ſupplies from *Sweden* and *Denmark* leſs precarious: indeed his conquering either of thoſe crowns would be very miſchievous, but much more ſo to other nations than to us, who may be eaſily ſupplied with naval ſtores from our own plantations; and therefore if his neighbouring or diſtant trading nations apprehend ſuch an event, they will certainly join together to oppoſe it, and implore our aſſiſtance upon our own terms; though undoubtedly they will be much better pleaſed, if we do it for them without aſking theirs.

If, therefore, any ſubjects of ours have given him juſt cauſe of offence, and made him a perſonal enemy to our country, we ought to deliver them up, or puniſh them at home; and if any nation in alliance

ith us, and in emnity with him, can find their in-
reſt in quarrelling with him, let them quarrel by
emſelves, and make up their ſquabbles as they can, or
t the aſſiſtance of thoſe who have political motives
oppoſe his progreſs, and put a ſtop to his growing
ower: I doubt we ſhall have enough to do to defend
urſelves; and therefore I hope we ſhall not un-
ourſelves yet further to conquer for others, and
inſtances too which in times to come may prove
tal to ourſelves.

The ſtates of *Italy* are intereſted to preſerve the
val power and greatneſs of *England*, if we purſue
e meaſures which are moſt advantageous to our-
lves; namely, to meddle no farther with their af-
irs, than to carry on an advantageous trade with
em; and, by friendly offices, proper negociations,
d perhaps ſometimes by the ſhew of force, to pro-
ct them againſt the greater powers which threaten
em. It is certainly their intereſt, that we ſhould
eep poſſeſſion of *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon*, if we make
right and honeſt uſe of them; for we have nothing
deſire from them, but what it is their intereſt to give,
or they to fear from us, whilſt we act as *Engliſh-
en;* but if we ſhould ever ſacrifice our own intereſts
ſuch as are not our own, we muſt thank ourſelves
we make enemies of thoſe who would be glad to
e our friends.

It is certainly the intereſt of the kingdom of *France*,
have an impotent adminiſtration, and a diſtracted
tate of affairs in *England*, and a prince at the head of
em, that either from weakneſs cannot, or from o-
er motives and dependences will not, obſtruct the
nion of the *Spaniſh* monarchy to their own, which
would ſoon give them the poſſeſſion of it as effectu-
lly as if they had conquered it; but the intereſt of
e regent, who governs *France*, is far otherwiſe: the
ppearing proſpect, and probable chance of that
rown's deſcending to him, or his poſterity, will en-

gage him to ſupport a power which can alone ſupport him, and which has every motive to do ſo. In ſuch a circumſtance of affairs, no intereſt in *France*, except his immediate dependents, can abet his perſonal pretenſions againſt the intereſts of all *France*; and therefore he muſt depend upon foreign alliances; and *England* alone can be ſafely relied upon, who have no claim to any part of his dominions, or intereſt and deſire to ſeize them; which cannot be ſaid of the emperor, or any other potentate, who has power and motives enough to aſſiſt him.

I have wondered therefore at the weakneſs of many among ourſelves, who can be ſo often elated or terrified with the deſigns of the regent, who can never conſpire againſt us, without conſpiring againſt himſelf; and no provocation even on our part could make him undermine and betray, in ſo tender an inſtance, his own intereſt. I doubt not but he wiſhes *Gibraltar* out of our hands; and if negociations or big words can prevail upon us to part with it, I preſume they are eaſily to be obtained, but he will never join with *Spain* to force it: this danger therefore is a mere bugbear, made uſe of to delude the *Jacobites*, and intimidate honeſter men, and, by making the firſt plot, or prate and bounce, to govern the others.

So that, the pope excepted, who can do us no harm by his own force, the king of *Spain* alone is the power in *Europe* that can be concerned to favour the pretender's intereſt; nor could he find his account in it, unleſs to open his way to the crown of *France*, in caſe of the young king's death.

The divine right of monarchy in the right line is ſo well eſtabliſhed in arbitrary countries, that I dare ſay that prince would be ſorry to depend upon a forced renunciation and the power of *Spain*, to defend himſelf againſt his nephew, if other powers were not at hand to aſſiſt him; and no power in *Europe* can do it effectually but *England*: and whilſt there is a king

at the head of it, who will purſue his own and his people's true intereſt in protecting him, and preſerving the friendſhip which for more than an age has been propitious to both kingdoms, and has the means, by the poſſeſſion of *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon*, of reſenting any injury done on his part; it is wild to think, that at great hazard and expence he would attempt to bring about a revolution which may engage us in a long civil war, and diſenable us to give him the protection he can receive no where elſe.

If, therefore, he is favourable to the pretender's intereſt, it muſt be owing to perſonal reſentments, or his views towards the crown of *France*. I hope that we ſhall give him no more cauſe for the firſt; and as to the latter, he has the intereſts of the regent, of all *Germany*, *Italy*, the ſtates of *Holland*, and indeed of all *Europe*, againſt him, as well as the united intereſt of his own ſubjects, who will not be contented to be a province to *France*; and I may venture to aſſert, that whilſt we keep the poſſeſſion of *Gibraltar*, and make a proper uſe of it, he can neither effect the one or the other; namely, he can never make himſelf king of *France*, nor the pretender king of *England*.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, July 7. 1722. N°. 84.

Property the first principle of power.---The errors our princes who attended not to this.

SIR,

THE ſubjects which men underſtand leaſt are g nerally what they talk of moſt, and none much as of government; which almoſt every m thinks he has talents to direct, and, like *Sancha Pa cha*, believes he can make a very good viceroy: thinks nothing is neceſſary, but to get at the hel where his buſineſs is, to command, and that of othe to obey; and then, as the aforeſaid *Sancha* (vicero like) ſays, *Who but I?* But to govern a ſtate well, the moſt difficult ſcience in the world; and few m who have ever been in the poſſeſſion of power, h known what to do with it, or ever underſtood t principles upon which all power is founded; a their miſtakes have made endleſs havoc amongſt m kind.

Government is political, as a human body is na ral mechaniſm: both have proper ſprings, whe and a peculiar organization, to qualify them for ſu able motions, and can have no other than that or nization enables them to perform; and when th ſprings or principles are deſtroyed by acident or v lence, or are worn out by time, they muſt ſuffer natural or political demiſe, and be buried, or ſmell above ground; and though neither of them ou to be murdered, yet, when they are dead, they ou to be interred.

Now it is moſt certain, that the firſt principle of all power is property; and every man will have his ſhare of it in proportion as he enjoys property, and makes uſe of that property, where violence does not interpoſe. Men will ever govern or influence thoſe whom they employ, feed, and clothe, and who cannot get the ſame neceſſary means of ſubſiſtence upon as advantageous terms elſewhere. This is natural power, and will govern and conſtitute the political, and certainly draw the latter after it, if force be abſent; and force cannot ſubſiſt long without altering property; ſo that both muſt unite together, firſt or laſt, and property will either get the power, or power will ſeize the property in its own defence: for, it is fooliſh to think, that men of fortunes will be governed by thoſe who have none, and be plundered to make ſuch whom they deſpiſe, and have every day new reaſons to hate, rich and inſolent: and, on the other hand, men will contentedly ſubmit to be governed by thoſe who have large poſſeſſions, and from whom they receive protection and ſupport, whilſt they will yet always emulate their equals. Though the people of *Rome* exacted a law from the ſenate, that commoners might be admitted into the chief offices of the ſtate jointly with the nobles; yet all the addreſs and power of the tribunes could not for a long time make them chooſe one of their own body into thoſe offices, till commons had got eſtates equal to the nobility; and then the balance of property turning to the people, they carried all before them.

The only true deſpotic governments now in the world, are thoſe where the whole property is in the prince; as in the eaſtern monarchies, that of *Morocco*, &c. where every man enjoying what he has by the bounty of his ſovereign, has no motive or means to contend with him, but looks upon him as his benefactor; and ſuch as have no property, do not think themſelves to be injured: but when men are in poſſeſſion of

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any thing which they call their own, and think they have a right to enjoy it, they will ever contend for it, when they have the means to do ſo, and will always take advantage of every exigence in their prince's affairs to attain that right. Other princes, who have a mind to be as arbitrary as the former, and who want either the capacity or the power to acquire his natural dominion, ſeize by violence the productions of their ſubjects eſtates and induſtry; which is a conſtant ſtate of force on one ſide, and oppreſſion on the other: it perpetually provokes the people, and yet leaves them often the means of revenging the injuſtice done them, and muſt end in reſtoring the old government, or in ſetting up ſome new form by the extinction of the preſent uſurpation; whereas in ſtates truly deſpotic, tho' the monarchs be often deſtroyed, yet the monarchy is preſerved intire, there being no intereſt in the ſtate capable of ſhaking it.

But both theſe ſovereignties have one miſchief in common, and inſeparable from them; *viz.* as they ever ſubſiſt by ſtanding armies, ſo they muſt ever be ſubject to the caprices and diſguſts of the military men, who often depoſe and murder their ſovereigns; but in the latter much oftener than in the former: for whilſt the people have the name, and, as they think, a right to property, they will always have ſome power, and will expect to be conſidered by their princes, and the ſoldiers will expect to have leave to oppreſs them, which will make continual ſtruggles; and the prince, finding himſelf obliged to take part with one of them, often falls in the ſtruggle; which was the caſe of the *Roman* emperors, moſt of whom were ſlaughtered either by the people, or their own ſoldiers: whereas in a natural abſolute government, there is no danger, but from the latter alone; and if he can pleaſe them, all is well, and he is ſafe.

But neither of theſe ought to be called by the name of government: both indeed are only violence and ra-

pine, and the ſubjection of many millions of miſerable wretches to the wild and wanton will of often the worſt man among them: they deface human nature, and render the bountiful gifts of indulgent providence uſeleſs to the world; and the beſt which can be ſaid of them is, that they make the grand tyrant and his inferior oppreſſors as miſerable and unſafe as the poor wretches whom they oppreſs; nor ſhould I have mentioned them as governments, but to make what I have further to ſay the better underſtood.

All other dominions are either limited monarchies, ſimple ariſtocracies, democracies, or mixtures of them; and the actions and operations in thoſe governments, or the continuance of thoſe governments, depend upon the diſtribution and alteration of the balance of property; and the not obſerving the variation and the frequent changes of the *primum mobile*, cauſes all the combuſtions that we ſee and feel in ſtates. Men who fancy themſelves in the ſame ſituation, as to outward appearance, ſtare about them, and wonder what is become of the power which their predeceſſors enjoyed, without being able to judge how they loſt it by the floating of property: they think they have a right to enjoy the ſame ſtill; and ſo, in ſpite of nature, uſe fraud and violence to attain what they cannot hold, if it were attained: however, they will ſtruggle for it; and this ſtruggle produces contentions and civil wars, which moſt commonly end in the deſtruction of one of the parties, and ſometimes of both.

Now it ſeems to me, that the great ſecret in politics is, nicely to watch and obſerve this fluctuation and change of natural power, and to adjuſt the political to it by prudent precautions and timely remedies, and not put nature to the expence of throws and convulſions to do her own work: I do not mean by altering the form of government, which is rarely to be done without violence and danger; and there-

fore ought not to be attempted when any thing elſe can be done, but by gentle and inſenſible methods. Suppoſe, for example, a limited monarchy, which cannot ſubſiſt without a nobility: if the nobles have not power enough to balance the great weight of the people, and ſupport the crown and themſelves, it is neceſſary to take ſome of the richeſt of the commoners into that order; if they have more power than is conſiſtent with the dependence upon their monarch, it is right to create no more, but to let thoſe already created expire and waſte by degrees, till they become a proper balance: if the people by trade and induſtry grow ſo faſt, that neither the crown nor nobles, nor both together, can keep pace with them; then there is no way left, but either, by uſing violence to hazard, by an unequal conteſt, what the two latter are already in poſſeſſion of, or, by uſing moderation and a beneficent conduct, to let the former enjoy all they can hope to get by a ſtruggle, and voluntarily to give up all odious powers of doing miſchief, tho' miſcalled prerogative; which muſt ever be underſtood to be a power of doing good, when ordinary proviſions fail and are inſufficient.

Harry VII. dreading the ſtrengh of the nobles, who had always plagued, and ſometimes deſtroyed his predeceſſors, found means to make them alienate a great part of their eſtates, which threw a proportionable power into the commons; and his ſon, by ſeizing the revenues of the eccleſiaſtics, (who uſually caballed with them) and diſperſing thoſe eſtates amongſt the people, made that balance much heavier: which queen *Elizabeth* wiſely obſerving, (though ſhe loved power as well as any that went before her) yet careſſed them with ſo much dexterity, that ſhe preſerved not only the crown upon her head, but wore it in its full luſtre; and, by encouraging trade, and letting nature take its courſe, ſtill encreaſed the people's wealth and power: which her ſucceſſor early

ſaw, and often lamented; but wanting her moderation, abilities, and experience, did not know how to temporize with an evil which he could not help, but took a prepoſterous way to cure it; and endeavoured, by the aſſiſtance of the governing clergy (who hoped by his means to recover what they loſt by the *reformation*) to regain a power, by pulpit haranguing and diſtinctions, which he durſt not contend for with the ſword; and ſo his reign was a perpetual ſtruggle between himſelf and his parliaments: when they were quiet, he bounced; and when he had thoroughly provoked them, he drew back, and gave good words again: but by ſuch conduct he ſowed the ſeeds of that fatal and bloody civil war which ſprang up in the reign of his ſon, and ended in the diſſolution of the monarchy, and ſoon after of all liberty; for the general of the conquering army ſet up himſelf (as all others will ever do in the ſame circumſtance): but the property remaining where it was, this new tyranny was violent, and againſt nature, and could not hold long, and all parties united againſt it; and ſo the nation was reſtored to its ancient form of government.

King *Charles* the ſecond came in with all the exterior advantages requiſite to enſlave a people: the nation was become weary of the ſound of liberty, having ſuffered ſo much in their ſtruggle for it, and loſt all that they ſtruggled for: the clergy were provoked by the loſs of their dignities and revenues; the nobility and gentry were univerſally diſtaſted and alienated by ſequeſtrations, and by being ſo long deprived of the offices and diſtinctions which they claimed by their birth; and the body of the people had been harraſſed and exhauſted by a long civil war, and were weary of being toſſed and tumbled once in a month out of one government into another; and all were prepared to accept and fall into any meaſures which might ſatiate their revenge upon thoſe who had

oppreſſed them, and to root out the very principles of liberty, the abuſe of which had brought ſuch miſchiefs upon them.

That prince got a parliament to his mind (as all princes will do upon a revolution, when parties run high, and will do any thing to mortify their opponents) and kept it in conſtant penſion; but property remaining in the people, it inſenſibly gained ground, and prevailed at laſt: the people grew univerſally diſaffected, and looked upon the parliament as a cabal of perjured hirelings, and no longer their repreſentatives; and the nation was worked up into ſuch a ferment, that their betrayers would not or durſt not ſerve the court, nor the court keep them any longer. That prince had wit enough to drive things no farther than they would go, and knew when it was time to give back; but his brother, with leſs underſtanding, and a much worſe religion than his predeceſſor openly profeſſed, hoped to accompliſh what he had attempted, or deſpaired of bringing about; and how he ſucceeded we all know. I gladly throw a veil over what has happened ſince; and hope I ſhall hereafter have no reaſon to repent it.

I ſhall only obſerve, before I conclude this letter, that there is no need of the caballing of different intereſts, the uniting in joint councils, and concerting regular meaſures, to bring about ſome of the greateſt events in human affairs; and conſequently in great public exigencies, oppreſſors will find no ſecurity in the appearing oppoſition of parties, who, like a pair of ſheers, will cut only what is between them, when they ſeem moſt to threaten one another. When nature has prepared the way, all things will tend to their proper center; and though men for ſome time will dally and play with their leſſer intereſts, yet at laſt they will mechanically fall into their great ones, and often without intending or knowing it: men will always

feel their ſtrength, when they cannot reaſon upon it, or are afraid to do ſo. I could name a party that for above thirty years together have acted in the intereſts of liberty, and for the greateſt part of the time could not bear the ſound of liberty, till at laſt great numbers of them were caught by the principles which they moſt deteſted; which I intend as a ſeaſonable caution to all thoſe who have the honour to ſit at the helm of ſtates, or to adviſe princes, who may at any time hereafter want ſuch a *Memento*.

I ſhall, in my next letter, endeavour to ſhew, upon the principles here laid down, that *England* at preſent is not capable of any other form of government that what it enjoys, and has a right to enjoy; and that another neighbouring ſtate will, with very great difficulty, preſerve the conſtitution which they now are in poſſeſſion of.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, July 14. 1722. N°. 85.

Britain *incapable of any government but a limited monarchy; with the defects of a neighbouring republic.*

SIR,

TACITUS obſerved of the *Romans* in his time, *Nec totam libertatem nec totam ſervitutem pati poſſe;* that they could neither bear full liberty, nor perfect ſlavery. This is certainly the caſe of *England* at preſent, if by liberty be underſtood what I preſume he meant by it, a republican form of government. But I conceive that liberty may be better preſerved by a well poiſed monarchy, than by any popular government that I know now in the world, whatever forms may exiſt in imagination. However, whether this be true or not, it is certainly true that no man in his wits will loſe the benefit of a very good preſent eſtabliſhment, and run infinite hazards, to try to get one a little better, if he could have any proſpect of attaining it: and I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, that the effecting ſuch a project is impoſſible; and that during the preſent diſtribution of property, we can preſerve liberty by no other eſtabliſhment than what we have; and in the attempt to alter it, muſt run great hazard of loſing what we are in poſſeſſion of, or perhaps of falling into an abſolute monarchy; or at beſt muſt return to the ſame form again, as we have done once already by ſuch feats of gallantry.

It proceeds from a conſummate ignorance in politics, to think that a number of men agreeing toge-

ther can make and hold a common-wealth, before nature has prepared the way; for ſhe alone muſt do it. An equality of eſtate will give an equality of power; and an equality of power is a commonwealth, or democracy: an *Agrarian* law, or ſomething equivalent to it, muſt make or find a ſuitable diſpoſition of property; and when that comes to be the caſe, there is no hindering a popular form of government, unleſs ſudden violence takes away all liberty, and, to preſerve itſelf, alters the diſtribution of property again. I hope that no one amongſt us has a head ſo wrong turned, as to imagine that any man, or number of men, in the preſent ſituation of affairs, can ever get power enough to turn all the poſſeſſions of *England* topſy-turvy, and throw them into average, eſpecially any who can have a will and intereſt in doing it; and without all this it is impoſſible to ſettle a commonwealth here; and I dare ſay, that few deſire it, but ſuch as having no eſtates of their own, or means and merit to acquire them, would be glad to ſhare in thoſe of other people.

Now it is certain, that the diſtribution of property in *England* is adapted to our preſent eſtabliſhment. The nobility and gentry have great poſſeſſions; and the former have great privileges and diſtinctions by the conſtitution, and the latter have them in fact, though poſitive laws give but few of them: for their birth and fortunes procure them eaſy admittance into the legiſlature; and their near approach to the throne gives them pretences to honourable and profitable employments, which create a dependence from the inferior part of mankind; and the nature of many of their eſtates, and particularly of their mannors, adds to that dependence Now, all theſe muſt ever be in the intereſt of monarchy, whilſt they are in their own intereſt; ſince monarchy ſupports and keeps up this diſtinction, and ſubſiſts by it: for it is ſenſeleſs to imagine, that men who have great poſſeſſions, will e-

ver put themſelves upon a level with thoſe who have none, or with ſuch as depend upon them for ſubſiſtence or protection, whom they will always think they have a right to govern or influence, and will be ever able to govern, whilſt they keep their poſſeſſions, and a monarchical form of government, and therefore will always endeavour to keep it.

All the biſhops, dignitaries, or governing clergy, all who have good preferments in the church, or hope to get them, are in the intereſt of monarchy, for the reaſons which I gave in a former letter, and for ſome others which I chooſe not to give now. They know very well too, that a popular government would take away all poſſeſſions which it ſhould think fit to call ſuperfluous, would level all the reſt, and be apt to reaſon, that Chriſtianity would fare never the worſe, if its profeſſors were leſs politicians, of which they ſee before their eyes a pregnant and very affecting inſtance in *Holland*. All great and excluſive companies are in the intereſt of monarchy (whatever weak people have alledged to the contrary); for they can much eaſier preſerve their ſeparate and unwarrantable privileges by applications to the vices and paſſions of a court, than by convincing a popular aſſembly; and for the ſame reaſon, all officers who have great ſalaries and exorbitant fees muſt ever be ſure friends to monarchy. Rich merchants, and indeed all rich men, will be equally in the ſame intereſt, and be willing to enjoy themſelves, and leave to their poſterity all the advantages and diſtinctions which always attend large fortunes in monarchies.

After theſe (many of whom are men of virtue and probity, and deſire only to enjoy the rights which they are born to, or have acquired) there follows a long train of debauchees, and riotous livers, lewd women, gameſters, and ſharpers; with ſuch who get by oppreſſion and unequal laws, or the non-execution of good ones: all theſe are ever for monarchy and the

right line, as expecting much fairer quarter from the corruption of courtiers, than they can ever hope to meet with in popular ſtates, who always deſtroy and exterminate ſuch vermin, of which ſort (I thank God) we have none amongſt us at preſent; but who knows how ſoon we may?

Now, without entering into the queſtion, Which is the beſt government in theory, a limited monarchy, or a democratical form of government? I think I may ſafely affirm, that it is impoſſible to contend againſt all theſe intereſts, and the crown too, which is almoſt a match for them all together; ſo that the phantom of a commonwealth muſt vaniſh, and never appear again but in diſordered brains. If this be the true circumſtance of *England* at preſent, as I conceive it indiſputably is, we have nothing left to do, or indeed which we can do, but to make the beſt of our own conſtitution, which, if duly adminiſtered, provides excellently well for general liberty; and to ſecure the poſſeſſion of property, and to uſe our beſt endeavours to make it anſwer the other purpoſes of private virtue, as far as the nature of it is capable of producing that end.

I have purpoſely declined the ſpeaking of ariſtocracies, becauſe there can be no imaginary danger of eſtabliſhing ſuch a government here; for the nobility have neither property nor credit enough to ſucceed in ſuch an act of knight-errantry, or will to attempt it; and the gentry will ever oppoſe them, unleſs their intereſts be alſo taken into the project; and both together are not able to contend with the crown and the body of the people, the latter of which will ever be in the intereſts of equality.

And now having mentioned ariſtocracies, I ſhall make ſome obſervations upon a neighbouring ſtate, which is vulgarly miſtaken for a commonwealth, and is ſo in nature, according to the balance of property there; but is politically an union of ſeveral little ariſtocracies, in many reſpects like ſome ſtates of *Italy* in

the firſt time of the *Romans*, but contrived with much worſe policy. As it was jumbled together in confuſion, ſo it ſeems to me to ſubſiſt by chance, or rather by the conſtant dread of the two great ſucceſſive powers of *Europe*, *viz.* that of *Spain* formerly, and *France* ſince; for the natural power being in the people, and the political in the magiſtrates, it has all the cauſes of diſſolution in its contexture. Every town is governed and ſubject to a little ariſtocracy within itſelf, who have no foundation of ſuitable property to entitle them to their dominion; and each of thoſe is independent of its provincial ſtate, and indeed of the ſtates general, nor have any check upon their own actions, but the tumult and inſurrections of the people, who have the real and natural power: and indeed, to do the magiſtrates right, they judge ſo well of their own weakneſs and the power of the people, that they ſeldom or never give them juſt cauſe of provocation; but by frugality, public œconomy, wiſe and timely compliances, impartial juſtice, and not raiſing great eſtates to themſelves at the other's expence, they make their ſubjects eaſy, and find their own account in the ſubmiſſion of thoſe whom they want power to govern by the force of authority; and probably will continue to make them ſo, whilſt they keep to the ſame maxims and their preſent conduct. But this is no ſteady and durable dominion; nor, unleſs mankind are formed there with other appetites and paſſions than in all other parts of the world, can the ſame prudence be always obſerved; which ſeems to me to be owing only to their neceſſities, and that virtue, moderation, and frugality, which is conſpicuous in the firſt riſe of ſtates, and is not yet quite ſpent there, but cannot laſt much longer: for when they ceaſe to be kept together by the conſtant dread of over-grown neighbours, they will certainly think themſelves at liberty to play their own games at home. Thoſe who are in poſſeſſion of power will know what it is good for; and thoſe who

have great riches will fall into luxury, then into extravagance, at laſt into neceſſity; and others will vie with them, and follow their example.

When their magiſtrates have impaired their eſtates, or fancy that they want greater, they will plunder the public; and others of equal condition will emulate them, and begin to aſk what right the other have to the ſole enjoyment of privileges and employments, which they think themſelves in all reſpects equally entitled to, and will not be content to be always ſubjects to thoſe who are no better than they are; and the people will be impatient in continuing to pay large taxes to ſuch who pocket them, and will endeavour to right themſelves, and have power enough to do ſo. Theſe oppoſite intereſts muſt raiſe convulſions in the body politic, and produce all the miſchiefs which have happened in other ſtates upon the like occaſions. Thoſe who have power, will endeavour to keep it; thoſe who ſuffer under it, will endeavour to take it away; and the event will be in the will of heaven alone, but in all likelihood will be ſome other form of government.

I take my account of the conſtitution of this ſtate from others, who poſſibly may not be well informed of it, and I hope are not ſo: for I ſhould be very ſorry to ſee the moſt virtuous and flouriſhing ſtate which ever yet appeared in the world, periſh of an internal diſtemper; a ſtate which, ever ſince its inſtitution, has been the champion of public liberty, and has defended itſelf, and in a great meaſure its neighbours, from the two greateſt tyrannies which ever threatened *Europe* and the Chriſtian religion.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, July 21. 1722. N°. 86.

The terrible conſequences of a war to England, *and reaſons againſt engaging in one.*

SIR,

I Propoſe in this letter to ſhew, and I hope to do it unanſwerably, that nothing can be a greater diſſervice to his majeſty's intereſt, more fatal to his miniſtry, or more deſtructive to his people, than to engage them in a new war, if there be but a bare poſſibility of preventing it, let the pretences be what they will. A new fire ſeems to be now kindling in *Italy*, which in all likelihood will blaze out far and wide; and, without doubt, many princes will warm their hands at it, whilſt their ſubjects will be burnt to death: but I hope we ſhall have wit enough to keep out of its reach, and not be ſcorched with its flames; but, like ſome of our wiſer neighbours, lie ſtill, and know how to make our markets of the follies and misfortunes of others. We have been heroes long enough, and paid the price of our gallantry and credulity. We are got near ſixty millions in debt, and have nothing for it but *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon;* and it is ſaid, that ſome of our allies have had the preſumption to expect theſe from us too; and I am ſure, if they ſhould be loſt, or given away, we have nothing left wherewith to compenſate any power which we ſhall vanquiſh hereafter.

I hope no man will be wild enough to make any propoſition for a new war to us; nor can I gueſs at any one argument for it, but what I hope will be call-

ed treaſon to his ſovereign and his country. Old threadbare reaſons will hold no longer: people will not always deceive themſelves, nor be deceived by others. We ſhall not bear being told again, *That* England *need but ſend a meſſage, or a bucket full of water, and the fire will be extinguiſhed.* That argument has already coſt us the terror and expence of providing againſt two invaſions, or intended invaſions; has loſt or ſpoiled ſeveral great fleets, deſtroyed numbers of our merchant ſhips, encreaſed our national debts many millions, perhaps brought upon us that noble project to pay them off, and created the general want of trade, and, I doubt, that great diſaffection which is ſo often complained of; and all the reward which we have met with, has been a ſtruggle to keep what we were in poſſeſſion of before, what was yielded to us by treaties, and what there was no pretence for demanding, if we had thought it our intereſt to have lain ſtill.

I hope we ſhall never engage in a new war, before we have conſidered all the conſequences which will neceſſarily or probably happen from ſuch an engagement, and have thought how we ſhall get out of it, as well as how to get into it. The firſt ſtep draws in all the reſt; and when we are in, we muſt go through. We may begin with thouſands, but muſt go on with millions. A meſſage will produce a quarrel, but fleets and armies muſt end it.

We well know, and have long felt, the moderation of our allies. We can no ſooner engage in their ſquabbles, but they become our own; and then we muſt pay them for doing their own buſineſs, and largely too, or elſe they threaten to leave the war upon us; and when it is ended thro' our means, always divide the ſpoil amongſt themſelves, and endeavour to make us pay likewiſe for the peace. I would be glad to know what any of them have ever done for us, or would ſuffer us to do for ourſelves, in return for all that we

have done for them; or what courteſy they have ever ſhewn to us *Engliſhmen*, as *Engliſhmen:* I hope therefore, that we too ſhall at laſt, in our turn, conſider only our own intereſts, and what is beſt for ourſelves; and not ruin ourſelves yet further, and let others have the whole advantage. But if we had no occaſion given us for theſe complaints, we have another and ſhorter anſwer to give to our good allies; namely, That by helping them ſo long, we are rendered incapable of helping them any longer; and that all treaties muſt ceaſe and become void, when it is impoſſible to perform them without utter ruin to one of the parties, and without deſtroying all the ends for which theſe treaties were made.

Let us take a ſhort proſpect of the journey which we are to go, and conſider what will be the reſult of ſuch an undertaking. All naval armaments muſt be made at our charge, and employed at a great diſtance from home, to the ruin of our ſhips and our ſeamen, and the obſtruction of our commerce: armies muſt be be ſent abroad, or money, in the name of ſubſidies, found out to pay thoſe which are there already: more armies muſt be kept at home to oppoſe invaſions, and keep the people quiet: great land-taxes muſt be raiſed, our public funds be every year increaſed, the people frightened with perpetual alarms, which will ſink the price of the old ſtocks, and conſequently ſet an exorbitant price upon the raiſing of new ones: we ſhall loſe a beneficial trade to *Spain* and the *Mediterranean;* and probably *Portugal* will take that opportunity to execute what they lately attempted. The *Czar* too may think it a favourable one to acknowledge ſome paſt obligations; and other nations may judge it a proper time to bite the ſtone that was thrown at them; and then we ſhall have little or no trade at all, all our commodities and manufactures will lie upon our hands, and the people be ſtarved, or

ſubſiſt by ways which no honeſt man can wiſh, and all men ought to dread.

If *France* engage on the different ſide, we muſt have her too for our enemy; if on the ſame ſide, there can be no need of our aſſiſtance. But if ſhe think it her intereſt to lie ſtill, ſhe, who is the next neighbour to both the combatants, and is vaſtly more concerned in the event; what have we to do with them at this diſtance, we who are no wiſe concerned whether the emperor or *Spain* uſes the *Italians* worſt, or who has the provinces contended for? When *Spain* had them, we ſuffered nothing by it; nor do I hear what we have got by the emperor's being in poſſeſſion of them. I purpoſely avoid ſaying any thing of the ſtates-general, becauſe they will certainly have wit enough to hug themſelves in the folly of others, and profit by it.

And what ſhall we get by ſuch feats of knight-errantry, but the diſintereſted glory of ſerving others to our own diſadvantage, and the character of pious Chriſtians, in treating thoſe kindly who deſpitefully uſe us? Oh, but ſome tell us, that we are bound by treaties to preſerve the neutrality of *Italy*. Whether this be true, or the contrary be true, I know not: but if it be true, I doubt not but we ſhall be told how *England* came to be a party to ſuch a treaty; what were the motives for making it; what equivalent we had for it; what intereſt of ours was ſerved by it; or what other country, which we were concerned to preſerve, was to reap the advantage of it. And we ought to enquire too, how treaties, made for our benefit, have been kept by our allies; becauſe we are told (I hope falſly) that one of them had once in his cuſtody the pretender to the king's throne, with ſeveral other traitors to the government; and yet, inſtead of delivering them up, ſet them at liberty: and lately one of them refuſed, or declined, to deliver up a much greater traitor, when earneſtly requeſted by

the parliament, and, without doubt, importunately preſſed by the king's miniſters.

I do not find that we have any thing to fear from the king of *Spain*, if we do not give him provocation; for the ſecretary of ſtate aſſured the lord mayor, in his letter ſince printed, That no foreign potentate abetted, or gave any countenance to, the laſt intended inſurrection; and if he would not aſſiſt a conſpiracy, actually, and, as we are told, deeply laid, there can be no reaſon to believe that he will form a new one againſt a ſtate that intends him no harm, and can do him a great deal of good; and ſurely it is not our intereſt at this time of day to provoke him to do it in his own defence. If he and the emperor have a mind to make a feaſt in *Italy*, let them bid whom they pleaſe to the banquet, which without doubt will be a long one, and many neighbouring princes will be gorged at it; but for us, we have no buſineſs there, unleſs to be caterers, to ſupply the greateſt part of the proviſion, and to pay the reckoning for the reſt. I once knew a wager of forty to one ſtaked down to be ſpent. But inſtead of engaging our country in ſuch expenſive and wild whims, I hope we ſhall catch at ſo favourable an opportunity, when thoſe who can moſt moleſt us are together by the ears, to do our own buſineſs, pay off our debts, ſettle our trade, and reform all the abuſes of which we ſo juſtly complain.

But if ſuch a war were ever ſo neceſſary, how ſhall it be ſupported? We find by woful experience, that three ſhillings in the pound has not maintained the current expence of the government, but we have run ſtill in debt. The money given for the civil liſt has not defrayed that charge, but new and large ſums have been given to pay off the arrears; which, it is ſaid, are not yet paid off. New ſalaries and new penſions have been found neceſſary to ſatisfy the clamours of thoſe who will never be ſatisfied; and the greater oc-

caſions which the courtiers have, and the greater neceſſities which they are in, the more will ſtill be found neceſſary: for it is now news for artful men to engage their ſuperiors in difficulties, and then to be paid largely for helping them out of them again. The cuſtoms and exciſe are anticipated and mortgaged almoſt beyond redemption: the ſalt, leather, windows, and almoſt every thing elſe that can be taxed, is already taxed, and ſome of them ſo high, as to leſſen the produce, and they are appropriated to pay off debts due to private men.

What new ſources will be found out to maintain a foreign war, and a much larger expence in our own country, which will be neceſſary to defend us againſt enemies abroad, whom we ſhall provoke, and againſt diſcontented people at home, who, it is to be feared, may ſay that they are oppreſſed and ſtarved? One additional ſhilling in the pound upon land, if the parliament can be perſuaded to give, and the people be eaſy in paying it, will be but as a drop of water thrown into the ocean, whatever may be pretended at firſt; and then for all the remainder we muſt run in debt, if we can get any one to truſt us; and, where ſhall we raiſe new funds? Here I doubt our publicans and inventors of new grievances will be at their wits end: it is certain that the greater the difficulty is in raiſing them, the greater muſt be the price for raiſing them; and the preſent ſtocks will be leſs valuable in proportion as new demands make more neceſſary.

But ſuppoſe, that, to the infinite diſſatisfaction of the people, and the utter ruin and deſtruction of all trade, the little which is not already taxed could be taxed, and turned into funds, to create new markets for ſtock jobbers, and enough could be raiſed to maintain a war two or three years; what ſhall we do next? It is moſt ſure, that the difficulty of obtaining a peace will grow in exact proportion as we become

leſs capable to carry on the war; and what aſſiſtance, think ye, my countrymen, ſhall we have from our good allies to obtain a peace? Without doubt we ſhall pay the piper at laſt, and they will parcel out the contended dominions amongſt themſelves, and attempt to make us give up *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon* to bind the bargain; nay, to pay beſides a large ſum of money for the ſhips which we ſhall have deſtroyed, and the other miſchiefs which we ſhall have done, and which we need not do. I hope it will never be our lot to aſſiſt ſome of our neighbours at a vaſt expence, and then reward them at a further expence for accepting our aſſiſtance; and to beat others of our neighbours, to our own loſs as well as theirs, and pay them afterwards for having beat them: what would the world think of us in this caſe, but that as *France* had got the plague, *England* had got the frenzy; and that we were weakening ourſelves as faſt with our own hands, as the divine hand had weakened them?

But if, after all, we cannot get a peace, or ſhall think fit not to ſubmit to the honourable conditions which our honeſt and faithful confederates ſhall judge good enough for heretics, what ſhall we do then? They will have no motives to ſerve us when they have done their own buſineſs, or rather when we have done it for them: they have ſufficiently ſhewn already what inclination they have to ſerve us; and if ever they have done it, they have been well paid for their pains. What condition ſhall we then be in to oppoſe one or more powerful neighbours, and perhaps victorious ones too, when we are enervated and exhauſted, when our people are diſcontented at home, and we have no regular means to maintain fleets and armies, who muſt be forced to maintain themſelves, if we cannot maintain them? Theſe miſchiefs (and terrible ones they are) may be eaſily foreſeen, and ought to be prevented, if we would prevent abſolute and concluſive ruin. What, think you, muſt, in ſuch

a circumſtance of affairs, become of the funds? If we lie ſtill, they are loſt of courſe; and if we apply them to our neceſſary defence, thouſands and thouſands of innocent people muſt be undone and become deſperate, and infinitely inflame the popular diſcontents, and ſtill make more taxes, more, more oppreſſions neceſſary: and yet who will be found ſo hard hearted, as not to ſacrifice the intereſts of thouſands to the ſafety of millions, when no other reſource is left?

Beware, my friends, of the firſt ſtep, and know your whole journey before you move one foot; when you are up to the ears in mire, it will be too late to look back. At firſt we may be told by our confederates and their creatures, that we need only bounce a little, and make a ſhew of force, and every thing will go to our mind; but a burnt child will dread the fire: when we are engaged, we cannot retreat; one ſtep will draw another; it will not depend upon ourſelves, whether we ſhall go on or not; the game will be then in other hands, who will play it to their own advantage, without regarding ours; and what we begin in wantonneſs, will probably end in our confuſion.

What then muſt we think of any men amongſt us, who would draw all theſe miſchiefs, theſe inevitable miſchiefs, upon their country? They muſt certainly be egregiouſly fooliſh, or conſummately wicked. I hope, and believe there are no ſuch; but if there be, without doubt they have taken their meaſures, and have thought how to ſave themſelves, whatever becomes of their country; but in that too they may chance to be miſtaken.

If it be neceſſary to the public ſafety to keep eight or ten camps in readineſs for action in times of full peace, when there is no outward appearance of public diſturbances, and no foreign power promotes or abets any ſuch; how many camps will be neceſſary

when we have enemies aſſaulting us from abroad, and combining and intriguing with our own native traitors at home; eſpecially if the people ſhould be made ſtill more uneaſy, by laying burdens on them which they cannot bear nor ſtand under? For my own part, I can ſee no ſteady ſource or continuing cauſe for the diſſaffection ſo much complained of, but the great and heavy variety of taxes, of which our anceſtors knew nothing, and which it is a ſort of a ſcience now to know; and I doubt that diſſaffection will not be cured by adding to the number.

We can never, therefore, behave ourſelves with more true duty to his majeſty, give better advice and aſſiſtance to his miniſtry, or acquit ourſelves with more fidelity to our country, than by oppoſing, in the moſt vigorous manner, ſuch meaſures as threaten them all with ruin; and by ſhewing the utmoſt reſentment againſt any ill-deſigning perſons, who would wickedly and traiterouſly ſacrifice a great, free, and opulent kingdom, to mad whimſies, or the pitiful mean intereſts of little ſtates.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, July 28. 1722. N°. 87.

Gold and ſilver in a country to be conſidered only as commodities.

SIR,

Boccalini tells us, that *Archimedes* was beat by the bravoes in *Parnaſſus*, for finding out a mathematical demonſtration, by which it was plainly proved, that all the deſigns of great, as well as private men, was dextrouſly to get money out of other people's pockets, and put it in their own. And it is certain, that this is the grand deſign and buſineſs of all mankind, the chief if not the only ſpring of all their actions, and animates and inſpires their beſt as well as worſt peformances. And how commendable ſoever this may be in private men, who already enjoy all the conveniences of life, it is certainly the intereſt and duty of ſtates, by all prudent and juſt methods, to encreaſe their wealth and power, and in conſequence their ſecurity and protection. As government is only the union of many individuals for their common defence; ſo they cannot attain that deſirable end, unleſs by accident of ſituation, ſuperior policy, or by ſufficient number, they can render themſelves ſtrong enough to repel the injuries, and oppoſe the inſults, of ambitious and unruly neighbours; otherwiſe they muſt ſubmit to be undone, or throw themſelves under the protection of ſome greater potentate, and accept ſuch conditions as he pleaſes to give, and for no longer duration than he pleaſes.

As this is the greateſt miſchief which human nature can ſuffer, ſo every honeſt and wiſe man will endeavour to free himſelf, his family, and his country, from ſuch an abject, lamentable, and forlorn condition, and contribute all in his power to make the ſtate which he lives under great, rich, and formidable. I have already at large ſhewn, that no ſtate in a ſmall tract of ground can be ſo, but by liberty, which always produces riches, and every quality, which can grace and adorn the mind, and render mankind preferable to the brute creation.

Now nothing can be called riches, but as it is aplicable, or rather as it is applied, to the uſe of men. The vaſt tracts of *North-America* feed only a few ſcattered and half-ſtarved inhabitants, whilſt the barren rocks of *Switzerland* maintain in plenty great numbers of wealthy and happy people. All *Greece*, *Macedon*, and *Epirus*, together, have not ſo much power now as ſingle cities in them had formerly. Countries without inhabitants will not defend themſelves, nor are worth defending; nor will they maintain inhabitants without their own induſtry and application. Every nation is rich and powerful, in exact proportion to the numbers, the employment, or the idleneſs of the people; and the power of the ſtate is the accumulative wealth of the whole; that is, what every man can ſpare for the common defence, over and above what is neceſſary for his own ſubſiſtence: ſo that to make a ſtate great, the people muſt be made rich and happy: their private happineſs will make them willing to defend their country, and their wealth will enable them to do it.

The riches of private men are ſuch things as are neceſſary or conducive to their perſonal ſupport, convenience, or pleaſure; but many other things are neceſſary for the defence and augmentation of ſtates. There muſt be fortreſſes, artillery, armed ſhips, and magazines of war, and proper encouragements given to

ſkilful perſons to make uſe of them: there muſt be often great armies at land, and fleets at ſea, maintained and paid at the public expence, for the public ſecurity; all which muſt be maintained out of the ſuperfluities of thoſe who ſtay at home; and if they have not all thoſe materials neceſſary to their preſervation, or conducive to their private happineſs in their own country, (as few countries have) they muſt purchaſe them abroad with the produce of their own country, or by ſilver and gold, which purchaſes all commodities. Indeed, by the univerſal conſent of mankind, ſilver and gold is become the medium of all commerce; and every ſtate, as well as private man, is rich and powerful in proportion as he poſſeſſes or can command more or leſs of this univerſal commodity, which procures all the reſt: all other things are riches only *hic et nunc*; but theſe will command every thing, and almoſt every perſon in the world.

Gold and ſilver are the natives but of few countries, and the propriety but of few perſons in thoſe countries, and can be obtained by others only by their conſent, or by force and rapine; and conſequently, no ſtate can grow more conſiderable than their native ſoil will make them, but by robbing their neighbours of what they themſelves want or deſire, or by perſuading them to part with it willingly; that is, either by arms or trade; and which of theſe two will conduce moſt to the happineſs, ſecurity, and augmentation of empires, ſhall be the ſubject of this letter.

If we conſider this queſtion under the head of juſtice and humanity, what can be more deteſtable, than to murder and deſtroy mankind, in order to rob and pillage them? War is comprehenſive of moſt, if not all the miſchiefs which do or ever can afflict men: it depopulates nations, lays waſte the fineſt countries, deſtroys arts, ſciences, and learning, butchers innocents, ruins the beſt men, and advances the worſt;

effaces every trace of virtue, piety, and compaſſion; and introduces confuſion, anarchy, and all kinds of corruption in public affairs; and indeed is pregnant with ſo many evils, that it ought ever to be avoided, when it can be avoided; and it may be avoided when a ſtate can be ſafe without it, and much more ſo when all the advantages propoſed by it can be procured by prudent and juſt methods.

All the advantage procured by conqueſt, is to ſecure what we poſſeſs ourſelves, or to gain the poſſeſſions of others, that is, the produce of their country, and the acquiſitions of their labour and induſtry; and if theſe can be obtained by fair means, and by their own conſent, ſure it muſt be more eligible than to extort them by force.

This is certainly more eaſily and effectually done by a well regulated commerce, than by arms: the balance of trade will return more clear money from neighbouring countries, than can be forced from them by fleets or armies, and more advantageouſly than under the odious name of tribute. It enervates rival ſtates by their own conſent, and obliges them, whilſt it impoveriſhes and ruins them: it keeps our own people at home employed in arts, manufactures, and huſbandry, inſtead of murdering them in wild, expenſive, and hazardous expeditions, to the weakening their own country, and the pillaging and deſtroying their neighbours, and only for the fruitleſs and imaginary glory of conqueſt: it ſaves the trouble, expence, and hazard, of ſupporting numerous ſtanding armies abroad to keep the conquered people in ſubjection; armies, who, for the moſt part too, if not always, enſlave their own country, and ever ſwallow up all the advantages of the conqueſts. I have often wondered at the folly and weakneſs of thoſe princes, who will ſacrifice hundreds of thouſands of their own faithful ſubjects, to gain a precarious and ſlaviſh ſubmiſſion from bordering provinces, who will ſeek all opportunities

to revolt; which cannot be prevented but by keeping them poor, wretched, and miſerable, and conſequently unable to pay the charges of their own vaſſalage; when, if the ſame number of men and the ſame ſums of money were uſefully employed at home, which are neceſſary to make and ſupport the conqueſt, they would add vaſtly more to their power and empire.

It is not the extent of territory, and vaſt tracts of barren and uncultivated land, which make ſtates great and powerful, but numbers of induſtrious people under a proper œconomy, and advantageouſly and uſefully employed; and the ſame number will be always more powerful in a ſmall tract of ground than a great one: they are here always at hand to aſſiſt one another, to carry on manufactures, and to promote and execute any great deſigns: all the materials of trade and induſtry are in place, and by that means the charges of carriage prevented, which ſwallows the advantages of commerce, and renders it unprofitable. The impoſſibility of ſubſiſting by idleneſs renders them induſtrious, emulation rouſes their ambition, and the examples of others animate them to deſire to live in ſplendor and plenty; and all theſe paſſions concur to ſet their hands and wits to work, and to promote arts, ſciences, and manufactures, to ſtrike out new trades, form new projects, and venture upon deſigns abroad, to enrich their own country at home.

Great numbers of people crowded together, are forced by their neceſſities to turn every ſtone, and try every method to ſupport themſelves and families, and by doing ſo will trace and diſcover by degrees all the ſources of wealth. All ways will be found out to make trade commodious and profitable; numerous contrivances be thought on to come at the materials of manufactures eaſily and at cheap rates, and to work them again at the loweſt prices. Rivers will

be made navigable, engines invented, which, with the aſſiſtance of few hands, ſhall ſupply the labour of multitudes; ſtore-houſes will be built to depoſite goods in, whilſt they wait for markets; fiſheries will be erected, colonies planted to furniſh new commodities and new materials of commerce, and will vent too and carry off thoſe turbulent and unruly ſpirits, who are unfit to live in a peaceable ſtate, and muſt rob, hang, or ſtarve there. By all theſe laudable methods, and many more, riches will be amaſſed, money become cheap, and the intereſt of it leſſened; and the lowering the intereſt of money will open new trades, and ſtill bring in more money, as well as improve the native territory, encreaſe vaſtly the purchaſe of land, and encourage the building of cities and towns: for the leſs men expect for the intereſt or profit of their principal, the more they can afford to lay out in trade, building, or huſbandry, to return but the ſame income; and conſequently can grow rich by the commerce and the ſame improvements, which would undo nations where the intereſt of the money is higher.

There are few countries in the world, but by a due culture would maintain many times the inhabitants which poſſeſs it, better than they are at preſent maintained. Our indulgent mother will readily yield up her hidden ſtores to ſuch of her children as make a proper courtſhip and application to her. The treaſures of the earth and ſeas are inexhauſtible: one acre of ground well manured, cultivated, and ſowed with corn, will produce ten times as much for the ſuſtenance of man, as ten acres not cultivated, or ill cultivated; and one acre in gardens will produce ten times as much as in corn; and it is much eaſier, cheaper, and profitable, to improve our own country, and ſo encreaſe its productions, than to fetch the like productions by force from others. It is more ſafe, as well as virtuous, to accept the willing and chaſte

embraces of conjugal affection, than by violence to extort forbidden and dangerous pleaſures, and which for the moſt part, if not always, fail our expectations.

But ſuppoſing the ſoil belonging to any nation ſhould not be ſufficient to ſupport all its inhabitants, which I believe is the caſe of *Holland*; yet it is certain they may purchaſe from their neighbours what they want, for very much leſs than they can earn at home in arts and manufactures. Labour in huſbandry is the leaſt profitable employment in the world; and ten men ſo employed will not earn the wages of one good artiſt, and the meaneſt mechanics and artificers earn more than huſbandmen; and conſequently have a ſurplus from their own labour, after they have bought the production of the other's induſtry. This is the circumſtance of cities and trading towns, who have no growth of their own, and yet grow rich by retailing and manufacturing the growth of the neighbouring countries, over and above what they conſume for their own ſubſiſtence and uſe; and the ſame is true of trading ſtates. As *Tyre*, and other free ſtates, did formerly, ſo *Holland* at preſent grows vaſtly rich and formidable, by keeping its neighbours employed in the poor and menial trade of huſbandry, whilſt they employ their own people in arts and manufactures; a ſmall part of which ſupplies them with the productions of the other's labour, and with the reſt they purchaſe a great part of the riches of the world. By thoſe means they have made themſelves more conſiderable in that little ſpot of land, than great empires have done by conqueſt, which always corrupts, and often enſlaves, the conquerors as well as the conquered.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, Auguſt 4. 1722. N°. 88.

The reaſonableneſs and advantage of allowing the exportation of ſilver and gold, with the impoſſibility of preventing the ſame.

SIR,

HAving in my laſt letter conſidered ſilver and gold as the only certain, durable, and univerſal riches; and, ſince the attaining them is the chief view and deſign of all mankind; I ſhall in this conſider a queſtion which puzzles the greateſt part of the world, and which, as I think, they for the moſt part determine wrongly; namely, When a nation is once poſſeſſed of them, whether it is their intereſt to let them be exported again? In this I have the opinion of moſt ſtates againſt me, who prohibit the carrying them out under the ſevereſt penalties, ſometimes before, and ſometimes after they are converted into their current coin; and to me nothing ſeems more injurious, impertinent, and impotent, than to make ſuch laws.

No ſoil or climate produces all commodities, and no nation works all ſorts of manufactures, which are of common and neceſſary uſe; nor can any man, by his own ſkill and labour, make or acquire any conſiderable part of ſuch things as he wants or deſires; and conſequently he can have no means of attaining them, but by exchanging what he does not want for what he does. But ſince it does and will moſt commonly happen, that the perſon who is poſſeſſed of the commodity which one man deſires, does not want what he has to give in lieu of it, or not enough of it to anſwer the value of what he parts with;

therefore ſomething elſe muſt be found to make the account even.

From hence mankind have found themſelves under a neceſſity to agree upon ſome univerſal commodity, which ſhall meaſure the value of all the reſt, and balance all accounts at laſt. Hitherto nothing has been diſcovered which will anſwer that purpoſe ſo effectually as ſilver and gold: their contexture hinders them from being periſhable, their diviſibility qualifies them to anſwer all occaſions, their ſcarcity enhances their price, ſo as to make a great value lie in a narrow compaſs, and eaſily portable; and the more regular and equal ſupplies of them than of other commodities, render them proper ſtandards for the valuation of other things. Theſe therefore being, by general and almoſt univerſal agreement, the mediums of commerce, the balance of all traffic, and the ultimate view and chief advantage propoſed by it; we are to conſider how far thoſe ends and advantages can be anſwered by exporting them again.

Now it is certain, that many commodities of abſolute and indiſpenſible uſe are in the poſſeſſion of nations who do not want thoſe which we have to give in exchange for them; or, knowing our neceſſities, will not part with them but for ſilver and gold; and therefore we muſt have them upon their terms, or not have them at all. Some of them are the materials of our manufactures, which will return to us again many times the money which we advance in procuring them; and very often they are neceſſary to carry on trade in general, as enabling the merchants to make aſſortments of goods proper for particular markets; or are the materials of navigation, or magazines for war and common defence.

No country wants always the ſame ſupplies, or has the ſame growth and quantity of manufactures to purchaſe them; nor can any merchant have a clear view of the whole commerce of the country which he

deals with; nor do the commodities always bear the ſame price: ſo that the balance will often vary, and muſt be paid at laſt in thoſe univerſal commodities. No nation or private man will deal with another, who will not pay his debts; and if he has not other commodities to pay them with, or if thoſe which he has are not wanted, or will not be accepted in payment, he muſt pay them in ſuch as will; and, whatever it coſts him, muſt deliver them into the cuſtody, or to the order and ſatisfaction of his creditor.

It is fooliſh to imagine, that any precautions, or the greateſt penalties, will keep money in any country, where it is the intereſt of numbers to carry it out: the experience of every nation may convince us of this truth; gold and ſilver lie in ſo little compaſs, are ſo eaſily concealed, and there are ſo many conveniences and opportunities to carry them off, that ſmall encouragements will always find adventurers, and thoſe adventurers will almoſt always ſucceed. There is no way in nature to hinder money from being exported, but by hindering the occaſions of it; that is, by hindering the uſe and conſumption of thoſe things which it is ſent out to buy; for when they are bought they muſt be paid for, or all traffic is at an end.

Theſe propoſitions being, as I conceive, ſelf-evident, it is next to be diſcuſſed, whether it be the intereſt of a ſtate to permit their money to go out freely; or, by annexing penalties to the exporting it, enhance the difficulty, and raiſe the price of carrying it out, by obliging the exporter to pay himſelf largely for his own hazard, as well as the hazard of the ſeas: and I think nothing is more demonſtrable, than that the greater the obſtacle that is lain in his way, and the greater the hazard which he runs, the more he will be obliged to export; for whatever he has agreed to pay beyond ſea, muſt be diſcharged what-

ever it coſts him to get it thither, and he is to be paid beſides all the charges of getting it thither.

Bills of exchange only ſerve the purpoſe, and ſave the expence of paying the carrier; for if one man has money due to him abroad, and the other wants the ſame ſum here, they will both ſave the charges of carriage, by one's paying it where he does not want it, and the other's receiving it where he does: but if there be more demands by the merchants of one country upon their correſpondents in another, than the others can pay by the produce of their effects, or from debts due to them elſewhere, (which will be accepted as payment) the ſurplus muſt be returned in ſilver and gold, and they muſt pay too the perſons who carry it; and other merchants ſeeing their neceſſity, will take advantage of it, and receive premiums for as much as they can return in bills, in proportion to the charge which it will coſt to ſend it in ſpecie, and the haſte which their creditors are in to receive it: but herein they will not have regard only to the commerce between thoſe particular nations, but to the courſe and balance of general trade; for bills often travel from country to country, and take a large circuit, before they center, and the account is finally made up at home. And this I take to be the whole myſtery of exchange, which is either paying, or ſaving the charge of paying, the carrier; and if you do not do it yourſelf, others, who do it for you, will reap advantage from it.

Since then money or bullion muſt be exported, when debts are contracted abroad, I think it is eligible to ſend out the firſt rather than than the latter, or at leaſt to leave people at liberty to export which they pleaſe. Indeed they are the ſame thing; for all money is bullion, and all bullion is eaſily convertible into money; and all that is not otherwiſe manufactured, would be converted into it, if there were no diſadvantage in doing ſo. The advantages are obvious and

the charge to the proprietors nothing; for the ſtamp of authority aſcertains the weight and the fineneſs; and the dividing it into ſmall parcels, makes it more uſeful for commerce, which renders it more valuable abroad as well as at home; and conſequently foreigners will be contented to pay part, if not the whole, of the charge of coining it. It could in no circumſtance be of leſs value, if it were not denied a privilege and advantage which it had before it was coined; which is the liberty of exportation, and being uſed in foreign as well as domeſtic trade: for, whilſt free liberty of exportation is allowed to one, and denied to the other, and yet there are frequent and neceſſary occaſions of exporting one or the other, it muſt happen that either money will be melted into bullion, and ſo the manufacture be loſt, or bullion muſt be bought by money at a price anſwerable to the neceſſity or the hazard of carrying it in ſpecie abroad, or of melting it down at home, and the expence of conſcience afterwards in ſwearing it to be foreign bullion; which ſometimes has raiſed the price 8 or 10 *per cent.*

Now it muſt be obvious to any one, who the leaſt conſiders this queſtion, how much ſuch prohibitions muſt affect our general trade, they being equivalent to the putting an equal duty upon the exportation of our own commodities, which all wiſe nations encourage by all ways that they can, and often by giving premiums to the exporter. They give other nations the means and opportunity to trade ſo much *per cent.* cheaper than we can; which muſt certainly carry away from us many valuable trades: they enhance the value of all foreign materials which we uſe in our manufactures, that are bought with bullion or money, as many of them are; which muſt in conſequence raiſe the price of theſe manufactures, and hinder their ſale; and, above all, make the materials of navigation dear to us, upon which all trade in a great meaſure depends, and the carriage-trade wholly.

But not only thoſe trades, which are altogether or partly carried on by bullion or money, will be affected by them, but all trade whatſoever: for, as I have before ſhewn, that bullion, being the medium of the value of all commodities between nation and nation, as money is between people of the ſame nation; if the latter be of equal weight and fineneſs with the former, and yet leſs valuable; then of neceſſary conſequence home commodities muſt be ſold cheaper in foreign countries, and theirs muſt ſell dearer here; which muſt alter the balance proportionably to our diſadvantage: for we ſell at home for our own money, and buy abroad with bullion; which are equally valuable in themſelves, the coinage excepted, and will be equally bought in foreign markets for the ſame quantity of commodities.

Suppoſe for example, that corn bore the ſame price in reſpect of ſilver and gold here as in *Holland*, and yet we muſt give more for it when that ſilver and gold is converted into money than they do, who get the difference by importing their ſilver; then it is evident that they can afford to buy it of us, and ſell it again to foreign markets cheaper than we can, and ſometimes to ourſelves; and conſequently muſt carry away that trade from us. Theſe events are inevitable, unleſs we let our money be exported, or turn all our coin into bullion, and make that the medium of domeſtic as well as foreign commerce; which muſt ſoon be our caſe, and every day grows more and more ſo: for who will give himſelf the trouble of carrying his bullion to the mint, to have it made leſs valuable than before? Whereas if money had the ſame liberty of exportation as bullion has, all the ſilver not otherwiſe manufactured would immediately be carried thither and coined, and leſs of it be carried out afterwards for the reaſons before given.

But whilſt it remains upon the preſent foot, whatever contracts are made for *Engliſh* goods in *Engliſh*

money, will be paid for with leſs bullion than will coin into the ſame quantity of money; and whatever are bought abroad will coſt us more money than the ſame is worth in bullion: ſo that foreigners will chooſe to carry off our money, rather than our bullion or goods, and will afterwards melt it down, and find their account in returning it upon us again for more money; and ſo on, till they have got all that we have; which can be prevented alone by putting coined and uncoined ſilver upon the ſame foot, and giving them equal advantages, the coinage excepted.

Till this be done, we muſt ſuffer in our exchange with moſt, if not all the countries in the world: for whilſt our coin in quantity is leſs valuable than bullion, and theirs equal or more valuable, every thing that we buy or ſell muſt be affected by it; and we muſt pay our debts with more ſilver, and receive them in leſs than they do; which muſt make a vaſt difference in the return of our whole trade.

This is ſo much the intereſt of every party, and almoſt every man in every party, that I have often wondered how ſo many able patriots that have ſat at the helm ſhould never once think of doing their country this great ſervice. I cannot doubt but men of their great abilities muſt underſtand this plain propoſition; and methinks they ſhould ſometimes find it their intereſt and duty to ſave a little money for their countrymen, and not always to be taking from them, eſpecially when they themſelves loſe nothing by doing ſo much good to others; and though ſome people, who do not underſtand the benefit of ſuch a law, may be at firſt diſtaſted by it, yet I could wiſh to ſee that thoſe who have had no regard to their opinions when they were doing miſchief to them, would not be ſo over-ſcrupulous of offending them in once doing them and their country this great and general benefit.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, Auguſt 11. 1722. N°. 89.

Every man's true intereſt found in the general intereſt. ----- How little this is conſidered!

SIR,

MOST men ſee the advantages of trade to a country, and to every man in it; but very few know how to improve thoſe advantages, and much fewer endeavour to do ſo. As ſoon as any law is enacted, or propoſed for public benefit, particular men ſet their wits to work how to draw ſeparate advantages from thoſe proviſions, whatever becomes of the public; and indeed it is not to be hoped, much leſs expected, that they ſhould ever do otherwiſe. But what is moſt to be lamented is, that the public very often ſuffers by their not conſulting their real intereſts, and in purſuing little views, whilſt they loſe great and ſubſtantial advantages. A very ſmall part of mankind have capacities large enough to judge of the whole of things; but catch at every appearance which promiſes preſent benefit, without conſidering how it will affect their general intereſt; and ſo bring misfortunes and laſting miſery upon themſelves, to gratify a preſent appetite, paſſion, or deſire.

This is certainly true in almoſt every circumſtance of public and private life: the latter falls within all mens obſervation; and the other happens as often, though not as often taken notice of. How many are there, who do not prefer a ſervile office or penſion before the general intereſt of their country, in which their own is involved; and ſo ſacrifice their liberty

and the protection which they receive from equal laws, for momentary and precarious advantages; and by such means lose or hazard a large inheritance, or make it much less valuable, for trifling benefits, which will not pay half the difference?

Nothing is so much the interest of private men, as to see the public flourish: for, without mentioning the pleasure and internal satisfaction which a generous mind must receive, in seeing all people about him contented and happy, instead of meagre and starved looks, nakedness and rags, and dejected and melancholy faces; to see all objects gay and pleasing; to see fruitful and well manured fields; rich, splendid, and populous cities, instead of barren rocks, uncultivated deserts, and dispeopled and empty towns; I say, besides avoiding all this horror, every man's private advantage is so much wrapt up in the public felicity, that by every step which he takes to depreciate his country's happiness, he undermines and destroys his own: when the public is secure, and trade and commerce flourish, every man who has property, or the means of acquiring property, will find and feel the blessed effects of such a circumstance of affairs; all the commodities which he has to dispose of will find a ready vent, and at a good price; his inheritance will encrease every day in value; he is encouraged, and finds it his interest to build, and improve his lands, cultivate new trades, and promote new manufactures; and by these means the people will be employed, and enabled to live in plenty, to marry, encrease, and pay for the productions of the land, which otherwise will have little or no production: foreigners will be invited to partake of our happiness, and add to the public stock; and even the poor and helpless will have their share in the general felicity, arising from the superfluities and charity of the rich. But the reverse of this glorious and hap-

py ſcene ſhews itſelf in enſlaved and corrupted nations.

But as this is abundantly the intereſt of private men, it is much more ſo of princes: the riches of a prince are the riches of his people, and his ſecurity and chief happineſs are their affections: they do not conſiſt in pompous guards, ſplendid courts, heaped up and extorted wealth, ſervile and flattering paraſites, numerous, expenſive, and glittering attendants, profuſion, and extravagance; but in the ſteady and faithful duty and devotions of a grateful and contented people, who derive and own their happineſs to flow from his care and beneficence. Flatterers and paraſites often will find it their intereſt to betray him, (and what elſe can be expected from thoſe who betrayed their country firſt?) his guards often revolt from him, and ſometimes murder him, and neither can be depended upon in any exigency of his affairs; his amaſſed wealth ſhall be often their plunder, and his deſtruction the price of their new engagements. But a whole people can never have an intereſt ſeparate from the intereſts of a good prince: their diffuſive wealth will be always at his call, becauſe it is to be expended for their own benefit: their perſons will ever be at his command, to defend themſelves and him: this is a ſource of wealth and power, which can ſcarce ever be exhauſted. When men fight for themſelves and their all, they are not to be conquered till they are extinguiſhed; and there are few inſtances where they have been ever conquered, at leaſt till they were not worth conquering.

Beſides, the ſuperfluities and wanton gifts of a free and happy people will bring more money into his coffers, than racks and armies can extort from enſlaved countries. The ſtates of *Brabant* alone gave more money formerly to the dukes of *Burgundy* and to *Charles* V. then in all probability the whole ſeventeen provinces would have yielded to *Spain* ſince, if they had been

all ſubdued; and I dare ſay, if *England* ever loſes its liberties, its princes, in a little time, would not be able, with whips and chains, to force as much money out of it in ſeven years, as we have ſeen it pay in one: they might fetch blood and tears from their ſubjects, but little elſe. It is undeniably therefore true, that the public intereſt is the intereſt of both prince and people, which almoſt every one owns in words; and yet how few do ſo in their actions?

Every man ſees the advantage of being formidable abroad, and ſafe at home, and knows that we cannot attain either but by being at the charge of it; and that the more equally and impartially taxes are laid, the fewer will be neceſſary, and more money raiſed: yet how few men will come into equal and impartial taxes? And what have any got by contrary methods? It is certain, that leſs taxes than are now paid to one another, if fairly levied at firſt, would have ended all our wars, and not left us one penny in debt; whereas every landed man in *England* now owes the fourth or fifth part of his eſtate to the public engagements, by declining the payment of perhaps the tenth part of it when it was due, or ought to have been due; and beſides, has rendered all the reſt inſecure, by diſabling the public to defend it.

Who, that is intereſted in the national funds, does not ſee, that if ſome method be not ſoon taken to pay them off, they can never be paid at all; that no nation will deliver themſelves up to a foreign enemy, or be contented to languiſh, expire, and periſh, at home, to make good juggling and extorting bargains, cooked up between courtiers and brokers; that public neceſſities will happen in the courſe of human affairs, and thoſe neceſſities will juſtify or colour uncommon meaſures; and that corrupt miniſters, in times to come, may adviſe their maſters to extraordinary courſes, and deſperate acts of power? And yet how many are there amongſt theſe gentlemen (the greateſt part

of whoſe fortunes depend upon theſe events) who will fall into any effectual meaſures to make the payment of theſe debts due to themſelves practicable, or that are not ready to catch at and to promote the raiſing a new fund; though they muſt ſee that every ſtep which they take towards it renders the payment of the old ones deſperate?

How many courtiers have we ſeen in our days, that have not done every thing which they condemned in their predeceſſors; though by doing ſo they undermined the ground upon which they ſtood, and played the game into their enemies hands again, who did the ſame before into theirs? How often have we ſeen them decline any means of raiſing money, though ever ſo fatal to trade or their country? Or when have we ſeen them expend it afterwards with frugality and prudence, to prevent the neceſſity of raiſing it over again? And yet, by acting thus, they leſſened their own intereſt with the people, and in conſequence too with their prince; who generally will find it neceſſary to diſcard them when they become odious and contemptible; and ſometimes will think it prudent to recommend himſelf to his people, by delivering them up as ſacrifices to public vengeance: whereas if they acted a faithful and juſt part, they might grow old in power, and be double bleſſings to their prince and to their fellow-ſubjects.

Who does not ſee the benefit of navigable rivers, which makes the carrying out our own commodities, and the bringing to us what we want, cheap and eaſy; and conſequently encreaſes the price of the former, and leſſens the price of the latter? And yet a project of that kind always meets oppoſition from many people upon trifling motives, without ever conſidering the advantages on the other ſide, which moſt commonly muſt over-balance their imaginary loſſes, by computing their whole income and expence.

All private men ſee the benefit that would accrue to *England*, and to almoſt every man in it, by bringing all the materials of navigation, and particularly iron, from our own plantations, which are for the moſt part bought for money from rival ſtates, who may be, and are often, our enemies. Though this would ſettle our naval power upon a fixed and ſolid foundation, and leave it no longer to depend upon accidental and precarious ſupplies, liable to the impoſitions and caprices of thoſe nations, and ſubject to be intercepted by others who may be in war with us; yet we have ſeen, oftner than once, that gentlemen of great eſtates have denied their country this general good, and preferred the little advantage of ſelling a particular wood at an advanced price, or the encouragement of a private iron-work, to ſo great a benefit to themſelves and their country; without ever giving themſelves leave to balance the much greater augmentation of wealth and ſecurity, which would accrue perſonally to them, by keeping ſo much money in their country, and by bringing in a great deal more from foreign ſtates, by making navigation eaſy and cheap, by ſupplying themſelves and their tenants with the inſtruments and utenſils of huſbandry, building, and houſe-keeping, at lower rates, and ſo anabling themſelves to make greater profit of their lands, and their tenants to pay them greater rents; and, above all, by encreaſing the public ſafety and power, of which every member will ſoon find the ſenſible effects in his own private affairs.

I confeſs it to be generally true, that the intereſt of any country is to make all ſorts of manufactures themſelves, rather than fetch them from neighbouring countries, or even from their own plantations; but it is always an exception to that truth, when thoſe manfactures are neceſſary to carry on other trades which will return much greater benefit; and more ſo when they are neceſſary to carry on all trade in

general, as iron and ſhipping undoubtedly are, upon the cheapneſs of which all the trade in the world in a great meaſure depends.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, Auguſt 18. 1722. N°. 90.

Monopolies and excluſive companies, how pernicious to trade.

SIR,

I HAVE in my laſt letter given ſome inſtances of men, who, ſeparating themſelves from the public, act againſt their own intereſt, by being too partial to it; but I confeſs it ſometimes happens, that private perſons may receive perſonal advantages from public loſſes; and then, conſidering the depravity of human nature, we are not to hope, and leſs to preſume upon their acting againſt themſelves for other advantages. The chief inducement which men have to act for the intereſt of one ſtate before another, is, becauſe they are members of it, and that their own intereſt is involved in the general intereſt; and the ſame motives, which for the moſt part engage them to promote the advantage of that peculiar ſociety of which they are a part, before all others, will alſo engage them to prefer themſelves and their own family before the intereſts of every member, or all the members together, of the ſame ſociety, whatever becomes of conſcience, honour, and generoſity. Men will be men, in ſpite of all the lectures of philoſophy, virtue, and religion.

This will be often the intereſt of particular men, but can never be the intereſt of the whole ſociety, or the major part of them; whoſe intereſt muſt ever be

the general intereſt, that is, the diffuſive advantage of the whole, which muſt ſuffer in proportion to what any man gets irregularly; and therefore it is their common duty to prevent the unfair gains and depredations of one another; which indeed is the buſineſs of government; *viz.* to ſecure to every one his own, and to prevent the crafty, ſtrong, and rapacious, from preſſing upon or circumventing the weak, induſtrious, and unwary.

I have often wondered how whole ſocieties (every one of which intends moſt religiouſly himſelf and his own benefit) can yet, altogether, ſo eaſily be made the dupes of one another, or of leſſer ſocieties amongſt themſelves, not only in ſuch matters as do not fall within vulgar obſervation, but in inſtances which are obvious to the meaneſt capacities. All the gentlemen through *England* have their eſtates ranſacked, and are deprived of whatever makes their tables elegant and curious, to put fiſhmongers and pulterers wives at *London*, in laces and jewels, without adding to the plenty there, much of it being deſtroyed, or ſuffered to rot or ſtink, by thoſe miſcreants, to keep up the price: their cattle ſell for little in the country, and will not pay the graſier, who muſt pay them their rents; and yet, by the jugglings and combinations of butchers and ſaleſmen, the markets are not cheaper ſupplied; but thoſe inſects ſwallow up the rents of the landlord, and the labour of the huſbandmen; as ſome of the factors do that of the manufacturer: the old uſeful laws againſt regrators, foreſtallers, *&c.* all lie faſt aſleep, and no new ones are thought on to enforce them; yet the nobility and gentry of *England* ſpend many months every year in parliament, ſee all this, buy their own productions at a price by many times greater than they ſell them; but are ſo wholly taken up with other much leſs views, that they ſuffer this great miſchief to go on, and every day to encreaſe, upon no other pretence than the privileges of

particular ſocieties of tradeſmen, who pretend a right to oppreſſion; as if any man could have a right or privilege inconſiſtent with the public good, and were not ever to be ſubſervient to it. It is true, that no government ought to take away mens natural rights, the buſineſs and deſign of government itſelf being to defend them; but ſure ſuch partial and adventitious advantages as they receive to the detriment of others by ill laws, may be taken away by good ones: but no ſooner any attempt is made to remedy theſe univerſal grievances, but the clamour and ſolicitation of theſe humble and inferior oppreſſors puts an end to the remedy.

I do not wonder, that thoſe who ſubſiſt by oppreſſion themſelves ſhould countenance all other ſorts of it; it is their common intereſt to protect one another. But that the country gentlemen, who ſuffer by all kinds of it, and who have the means in their hands to prevent them, ſhould ſuffer themſelves to be plundered and impoveriſhed, to enrich harpies and pickpockets, and enable them to live in pride and luxury, is ſo ſtupendous, that it could not be believed, if we did not conſtantly ſee it.

But theſe are petty abuſes, when compared to the much greater grievances of uniting great numbers of artful and wealthy merchants into conſpiracies and combinations againſt general trade; and by that means giving or ſelling the induſtry and acquirements of a whole nation to ſatiate and glut a few over-grown plunderers, and in the end to deſtroy the trade itſelf; which muſt ever be the caſe, when trade is committed to the management of excluſive companies. The ſucceſs and improvements of trade depend wholly upon ſupplying the commodities cheap at market; and whoever can afford thoſe of equal goodneſs at but half *per cent.* cheaper than his neighbour, will command the ſale. Now it is impoſſible that any company can do this upon equal terms with a pri-

vate merchant, nor would they if they could. Private men will think of every way to come at their goods cheap, will make it their whole buſineſs to work up the manufactures themſelves, or buy them at the beſt hand, will ſearch narrowly into their excellencies or defects, will procure carriage at the loweſt prices, ſee them ſhipped themſelves, and ſometimes ſell them in perſon, and as they find proper and advantageous opportunities; and the mutual emulation and contention with one another for the preference of markets, obliges them to ſell often for little profit, and ſometimes to loſs, in expectation of better fortune at other times; but nothing of this is ever done by companies.

Thoſe who have the direction of their affairs, have often but ſmall part of their fortunes embarked in their ſtock, and always have an intereſt ſeparate from that of the company, and commonly, if not always, raiſe vaſt eſtates at their expence; the materials of their ſhips, and the commodities which they carry, are generally ſold by themſelves, or bought of their friends and relations by confederacy, at exorbitant prices: favourite ſhipwrights are employed for preſents; their relations or creatures are made captains or maſters of their veſſels, to carry on private commerce, to the detriment of the company; governors of forts, factors, and agents, are ſent abroad to get great eſtates upon the public, and perhaps ſhare them with their patrons at home; their goods ſhall be ſet in ſuch lots, and ſold at ſuch times as ſhall be moſt for the private intereſt of the governing directors, who will have them often bought up in truſt for themſelves or friends; and by theſe means, as the company oppreſſes the reſt of the nation, the governors and directors cheat the company. But if theſe truſtees be ever ſo honeſt, they will not take the ſame pains for others as for themſelves; nor can it be expected that men of their fortunes will employ their whole time for

ſuch allowances as are or can be afforded by the ſociety who employs them.

Beſides, it is the intereſt of the nation to ſell their commodities at as good a price as the markets abroad can afford to buy them, and to bring in foreign commodities as cheap as they can afford to ſell them; eſpecially ſuch as do not interfere with our own (which ought to be prohibited when it can be done without a greater inconvenience); and the intereſt of companies is directly contrary to all this: for other people being prohibited to deal in the ſame commodities, they can put what price they pleaſe upon both, and ever will put what is moſt for their advantage, and ſo ſtarve the manufacturer at home, at the ſame time that their agents charge great prices to the company, and ſell the commodities which they bring in return of them at extravagant advantages, often to the diſcouragement of our own manufactures, which depend upon their cheapneſs; their buſineſs being always to encreaſe the price of ſtock, without encreaſing trade.

Beſides all this, they keep forts abroad at a great expence, to colour the neceſſity of ſuch monopolies, and to oppreſs and rob the natives there with ſecurity; for it is a jeſt to imagine that they can any ways conduce to fair trade. Every nation in the world that has any thing to buy or ſell, will ſee their account in doing ſo, and will find it their intereſt to encourage a fair commerce, which will be ever for their own advantage; and if they do not, there is no trading with them againſt their own conſents, tho' their country be encompaſſed with forts, which will only provoke and make them enemies; aud, in fact, the private traders to *Afric* pay the company 10 *per cent.* towards their forts, and ſeldom or never come near them, or receive any benefit by them, and yet have broke the company, whilſt they thrive themſelves. The ſame was true of the interlopers to *In-*

dia formerly, who neither desired nor were suffered to take any advantage of the company's forts, and always were oppressed by their governors, or agents, and captains of ships, and yet would soon have undone them, if they had been suffered to go on.

The *Dutch* make other advantages of their forts and garisons, which is to keep great conquered realms and powerful kings in subjection, and secure to themselves the whole commerce of their countries, by which means they have almost the monopoly of the spices in the world; of which, it is said, they every year burn mountains to keep up the price, as all exclusive companies will ever do: but we have scarce any trade to some of those places, where we are at the charge of keeping forts, which stand there no mortal can tell why. But supposing that forts were necessary to carry on any particular trade, what colour is there to deny that they ought to be kept at the public expence, or by the contributions of all the merchants, who are to receive advantage from them in proportion to the trade which they carry on; or what pretence is there to confine an advantageous trade to one town alone, and to but few men in that town?

So that, upon the whole, if we consider these companies only as they regard trade, which is the only pretence for establishing them, they are the bane of all fair commerce, the discouragement of our manufactures, the ruin of private and industrious traders, and must end in the ruin of themselves, and all trade whatever; and no one receives advantages from them, but the governors, directors, commanders, or agents, at home and abroad, who have ever raised immense estates, whilst the kingdom has been impoverished, and the company undone. But there are other mischiefs still behind, which strike yet much deeper; namely, the influence and violence that they bring upon

our conſtitution; which ſhall be the ſubject of my next letter.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, Auguſt 25. 1722. N°. 91.

How excluſive companies influence and hurt our government.

SIR,

IN my laſt letter I have conſidered excluſive companies as they affect the trade and commerce of the kingdom: in this I ſhall view them in relation to our conſtitution; and ſhew, that they alter the balance of our government, too much influence our legiſlature, and are ever the confederates or tools of ambitious and deſigning ſtateſmen.

Very great riches in private men are always dangerous to ſtates, becauſe they create greater dependence than can be conſiſtent with the ſecurity of any ſort of government whatſoever; they place ſubjects upon too near a level with their ſovereign; make the nobility ſtand upon too great an inequality in reſpect of one another; deſtroy, amongſt the commons, that balance of property and power, which is neceſſary to a democracy, or the democratical part of any government, overthrow the poiſe of it, and indeed alter its nature, though not its name: for this reaſon, ſtates who have not an *Agrarian* law, have uſed other means of violence or policy to anſwer the ſame ends. Princes often, either by extraordinary acts of power, by feigned plots and conſpiracies, and ſometimes by the help of real ones, have cut off theſe excreſcent members and rivals of their authority, or muſt have run

the hazard of being cut off by them. Ariſtocracies put them upon expenſive embaſſies, or load them with honorary and chargeable employments at home, to drain and exhauſt their ſuperfluous and dangerous wealth; and democracies provide againſt this evil, by the diviſion of the eſtates of particulars after their death amongſt their children or relations in equal degree.

We have inſtances of the firſt in all arbitrary monarchies, as well as in all the *Gothic* governments formerly, and in *Poland* at preſent, which are conſtant ſtates of war or conſpiracy between their kings and nobles; and which ſide ſoever gets the better, the others are for the moſt part undone. By doing the ſecond, the nobles of *Venice* keep up their equality; and *Holland*, *Switzerland*, and the free ſtates of *Germany*, make the proviſion laſt named; which, as I have ſaid, anſwers in ſome meaſure the purpoſes of an *Agrarian* law: but by waiting for the diviſion of overgrown ſubſtance in private hands, other ſtates have been undone; and particularly *Florence* was enſlaved by the overgrown power of the houſe of *Medici*.

And as great riches in private men is dangerous to all ſtates, ſo great and ſudden poverty produces equal miſchiefs in free governments; becauſe it makes thoſe who by their birth and ſtation muſt be concerned in the adminiſtration, neceſſitous and deſperate; which will leave them the means, and give them the will to deſtroy their country: for the political power will remain ſome time in their hands after their natural power and riches are gone; and they will ever make uſe of it to acquire that wealth by violence and fraud which they have loſt by folly and extravagance. And as both of theſe extreams are certainly true of particular men, ſo they are more dangerous in numbers of men joined together in a political union; who, as they have more wealth than any particular man ever had or can have, ſo they will have the ſeparate inte-

reſt of every individual to aſſiſt them, ariſing from the dependance of friendſhip, relation, acquaintance, or creatures, without that emulation and envy which will always be raiſed by the ſudden and exorbitant riches of private men. It is certain, that they both make too violent an alteration in property, and almoſt always produce violent convulſions in government.

Now companies bring all theſe miſchiefs upon us; they give great and ſudden eſtates to the managers and directors, upon the ruins of trade in general, and for the moſt part, if not always, bring ruin upon thouſands of families, who are embarked in the ſociety itſelf. Thoſe who are in the direction and the ſecret of the management, beſides all their other advantages, draw out and divide all their principal, and what they can borrow upon their credit; perſuade innocent and unwary people to believe that they divide only the profits of their trade, and, by a thouſand other artifices heightening their advantages, draw them in to ſhare in them; and when they have wound up the cheat to the higheſt pitch that it can go, then like rats leave a falling houſe, and multitudes of people to be cruſhed by it. This was the caſe of the *Eaſt-India* and *African* companies formerly, whoſe ſtock ſold for 300 *per cent.* when it was not worth a groat; and how far it is the caſe of the preſent *Eaſt-India* company, their members are concerned to enquire.

What ruin, devaſtation, and havoc of eſtates! What public miſery, and deſtruction of thouſands, I may ſay, millions, have we ſeen by the eſtabliſhment and wicked intrigues of the preſent *South-ſea* company, only to make a few unſhapely and monſtrous members in the body politic! What has that company done for the benefit of trade, which they were eſtabliſhed, forſooth, to promote? They have ſuffered numbers of our manufactures to rot in their ſhips, hindred private traders from carrying on an advanta-

geous commerce to the lower parts of *America* and the *South-ſea*; and, like the dog in the manger, will neither eat themſelves, nor let any one elſe eat; and, it is ſaid, by their wiſe conduct, have loſt a million or two of the company's principal.

The benefits ariſing by theſe companies, generally, and almoſt always, fall to the ſhare of the ſtock-jobbers, brokers, and thoſe who cabal with them; or elſe are the rewards of clerks, thimble-men, and men of nothing; who neglect their honeſt induſtry to embark in thoſe cheats, and ſo either undo themſelves and families, or acquire ſudden and great riches; then turn aukward ſtateſmen, corrupt boroughs, where they have not, nor can have, any natural intereſts; bring themſelves into the legiſlature with their pedling and jobbing talents about them, and ſo become brokers in politics as well as ſtock, wanting every qualification which ought to give them a place there.

It is a ſtrange and unnatural tranſition from a fiſhmonger or pedlar to a legiſlator: however, as ſuch doughty ſtateſmen, by their ſingle abilities, can do no good, ſo they can do but little harm; but when united in a body under the direction of artful managers combining with great men, they can turn all things into confuſion, and generally do ſo. When men have great ſums of money to give, and will give it, they will ever find people to take it; and there can be no ſtanding againſt them in a body, how contemptible ſoever they are in particulars. How often have the cries of the whole kingdom of *England* been able to prevail againſt the intereſt of the *Eaſt-India* company? What by proper application in former reigns made to our courts, to miniſters and favourites, and to the members of each houſe of parliament, they have been able to contend and get the better of the tears and complaints of the whole kingdom beſides, and to lay aſleep the true and real intereſt of thoſe who aſſiſted them; and if ever hereafter our three

great companies ſhould unite together (as it is to be feared they will always do when their intereſts do not claſh) what power is there in being to oppoſe them, that will be able and willing to do it? In *Holland*, which is a more jealous government than ours, the *Eaſt-India* company governs the ſtate, and is in effect the ſtate itſelf; and I pray God that we may never ſee the like elſewhere!

What have we been able to do to redreſs the ravages brought upon us by the *South ſea* project? Which yet muſt have produced much greater, if we had not ſuffered theſe. When it was in its meridian, I have heard ſome perſons argue the reaſonableneſs of their having a monopoly of the trade of *England*, ſince they were poſſeſſed of moſt of the property of *England*; and I do not ſee by what means it could have been prevented. They would have filled the legiſlature with their own members, all our great men muſt have been their penſioners, and the crown itſelf been obliged to have kept meaſures with them; they would have been the only ſhop to have gone to for money, would not have parted with it but upon their own terms, and would have been ever lying upon the catch, to purchaſe more privileges and advantages: ſo that the nobility and gentry of *England* muſt either have embarked their fortunes and expectations in this monopoly, or have been humbly contented to have been governed by a faction, compoſed for the moſt part of pedlars, grocers, and brokers, for ſuch as lately were ſo; and the conſtitution itſelf had been gone, and changed into a ſtock-jobbing cabal.

We have ſeen but few inſtances where the private traders of *England*, and the intereſts of general trade, have been able to diſpute with the intereſts of little companies or particular ſocieties of tradeſmen, or the peculiar privileges of corporations; though they are burdens and a dead weight on the eſtates of every perſon in both houſes, leſſen their income, and en-

creaſe their expences: ſuch is the faſcination and witchcraft of political confederacy! What will be the event of theſe combinations no man can foreſee, and every wiſe man muſt dread. Indeed, I do not ſee how we can prevent their diſmal conſequences, but by paying off our debts; and, by diſſipating thoſe factious combinations, diſſolve the enchantment.

After all that I have ſaid, I muſt confeſs, that the *Eaſt-India* company is liable to leſs objections than any other trading monopoly, but not for the reaſons which they give, but for a reaſon which is worth an hundred of theirs: for as all beneficial trades are moſt ſucceſsfully carried on by free and open commerce, ſo all loſing ones do leſs miſchief when monopolized; and as the firſt ought to receive all poſſible encouragement, ſo the other ought to be put under ſuitable diſcouragements: and ſince we can have no proſpect at preſent of that trade's being put upon an advantageous foot, the next beſt thing that we can deſire, is to let it go on upon the preſent eſtabliſhment; which in all probability will ſoon deſtroy it, and perhaps put it upon a good one, if that can be: for it is certain, that if it could be carried on with its full ſwing, it would eaſe us of every penny of our money, and deſtroy every manufacture in the kingdom, as well as every man in it; which in a proper time may poſſibly be ſhewn at large.

In fine, monopolies are equally dangerous in trade, in politics, in religion: a free trade, a free government, and a free liberty of conſcience, are the rights and the bleſſings of mankind.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, September 1. 1722. N°. 92.

Againſt the petition of the South-ſea *company, for a remittance of two millions of their debt to the public.*

SIR,

IT has been juſtly obſerved of corporations, or political combinations of men, that they have bodies, but no ſouls, nor conſequently conſciences. What calls this obſervation to my mind, is an *addreſs to his majeſty from the* Sout-ſea *company*, which I have lately ſeen in print, moſt modeſtly requeſting, that in this great profuſion of money, general affluence, and overflowing of trade, the nation will give them two millions: and the reaſons that they give for it are, 1ſt, That they want the money; next, That they have agreed with the *bank;* and 3dly, That they will do what without doubt is the intereſt of all their members, except directors and brokers, to do; that is, they will conſent that a conſiderable part of their ſtock ſhall be turned into annuities (and they had been the wiſer if they had ſaid all, for then no more of it could have been loſt by management): and, to wind up their whole oratory, they add a fourth reaſon, which is, the benefit that the public has received already by their intereſt being reducible in a few years to four *per cent.* which reduction was part of their original bargain that was purchaſed for the ſeven millions, of which five have been remitted already, and now it is to be a conſideration for remitting the other two.

I can never give myſelf leave to believe (whatever may be ſurmiſed by others) that any perſon (employ-

ed by his majeſty) in the preſent great exigencies of the kingdom, the almoſt univerſal poverty in the country, the want of trading ſtocks and credit in cities, and in great as well as little towns, the prodigious load of debt under which the nation groans, and the general uneaſineſs conſpicuous in the faces, and too obſervable in the diſcourſes, of people of all ſects and denominations; I ſay, I cannot think that, under ſuch circumſtances of public affairs, any miniſter can countenance ſo wild a propoſition, as wantonly to deſire us to give away two millions of the nation's money, only to bind a bargain between two ſtock-jobbing ſocieties; which could not be obtained from a late aſſembly, who I preſume will not be diſobliged if I ſay no more of them.

I muſt therefore believe, if any perſon in power has been concerned in this negotiation, that he has effectually taken care of the public, and has comprehended its intereſt in the agreement; and I am the rather induced to believe this, becauſe of an expreſſion in the addreſs itſelf, to wit, *that the company will be ready to do any thing for the public ſervice*, &c. with a caution notwithſtanding, *that it be conſiſtent with the ſecurity of their preſent fund:* I hope that this ſentence has an alluſion to ſome project intended to be propoſed to buy off the two millions, and that they deſign to offer to ſink one hundred thouſand pounds *per annum* of their annuities, which is the intereſt of two millions: and this will anſwer all honeſt purpoſes, will indemnify the public, eaſe them of the difficulty of raiſing ſo great a ſum, and leſſen the income of particular members not above ſix or ſeven ſhillings *per cent.* yearly.

It is impoſſible to ſuſpect that thoſe gentlemen, who for ſome years together oppoſed wild ſchemes, and wilder expences in carrying them on, and who (if they are to be believed themſelves) rather choſe to throw up their then advantages and expectations,

than comply with ſuch gallantries, ſhould at laſt loſe the merit of ſo much virtue, by wantonly and unneceſſarily diſcharging one company from their contract, only to prevent another from performing theirs, and this at two millions loſs to their country: ſure *England* is not in a condition to diſcharge all reckonings at home and amongſt foreign ſtates too; if ſo, every man ought to bring in his bill, and then we ſhall all be upon the ſquare.

On the contrary, I perſuade myſelf that the gentlemen, whoſe deſerts have now ſet them at the helm, have, during their retirement from buſineſs, obſerved the miſcarriages of their predeceſſors, deſign to avoid the rocks upon which the others have ſplit, and conſequently have put on ſteady reſolutions to extricate the kingdom out of its preſent calamities; and, poſſeſſed with this opinion, I am determined (as I believe many others are) to give them my hearty aſſiſtance to attain thoſe good ends, and to forget paſt errors if new ones does not rub up our memories: I neither envy their preferments, nor I believe ſhall court them; but ſhall ever eſteem my ſervices to be overpaid, if I can contribute to ſave my country.

We all know what a noble project has been lately authorized; what ends were deſigned to be, and have been, ſerved by it; how many thouſands were directly ruined by it, and how many more by the fatal conſequences which have enſued: but all the arts of the projectors could never have ſucceeded, if many well-meaning people had not been drawn in to conſent to this iniquity, by the proſpect of ſeeing the public debts put in a method of being paid off; which they thought would atone for many evils that were foreſeen by wiſe men, who yet did not foreſee the hundredth part of the miſchief which has ſince happened; and after we had ſuffered more than words can expreſs, the greateſt part of the conſideration which drew us into theſe ſufferings has been remitted, I

will not ſay by any of thoſe, but, to thoſe, who brought all our misfortunes upon us; and now the poor remainder is modeſtly called for; and, if obtained, the wretched people, and, amongſt the reſt, all who vigourouſly oppoſed this vile project, muſt bear the loſs, and the contrivers of the wickedneſs muſt carry off the plunder.

Sure ſuch a proceeding ſounds very odd, and ought to be ſupported by obvious reaſons! It is a very ſingular ſort of generoſity, to puniſh the innocent, in order to reward the guilty; to fine or tax thoſe who did their utmoſt to oppoſe the progreſs of public miſchief, to repair the loſſes of thoſe who, thro' guilt, covetouſneſs, or folly, contributed to it. In great public calamities there muſt be many ſufferers, and ſome who do not deſerve to be ſo; yet I never heard that they called for repriſals upon their countrymen. Provinces are laid waſte, cities and towns burnt, in war, and ſhips taken by pyrates; and yet no bills brought in, or demands made, upon the public: in peſtilential diſtempers, families are ſhut up in their houſes, and whole cities within their walls, where thouſands die for want of food or proper neceſſaries, and thoſe who are left alive are moſtly undone; and yet no nations think themſelves obliged to make good their loſſes: in ſuch caſes every one muſt bear his own misfortunes, even when they come from the hand of God, and he himſelf does not contribute to them; and all that wiſe ſtates can do, is to take care of the whole, relieve particulars as far as is conſiſtent with the public ſafety, and leave the reſt to providence.

But, beſides the ſhrewd reaſons which are in print and are above repeated, let us hear what others are offered to load the public with this loſs. Firſt, we are told that the people's repreſentatives had drawn the ſubſcribers into it; and therefore the people are bound in conſcience to repair them: a very notable

way of arguing indeed! and which, if carried to its extent, would provide admirably well for the ſecurity of nations. Suppoſe the ſtates of any country ſhould make a fooliſh law, or engage in a fooliſh war, by which a third part of the people are undone, muſt the reſt make them amends, who perhaps are half undone themſelves? The penſioner parliament, in king *Charles* the ſecond's time, were choſen by the people to act for the common benefit of the kingdom, and they betrayed their principals, and took money from the court to act againſt it; and was that a good reaſon for the next parliament to give a ſanction to all the miſchiefs that their predeceſſors did, or to pray for it? Sure the laſt parliament were as much the repreſentatives of the *South ſea* company as of the reſt of the kingdom, and acted as agreeably to their inclinations and their deſires, or elſe their acknowledgments were much miſplaced.

They tell us, that the public is better able to bear the loſs than private men; which certainly is not true at preſent; for the public is much poorer than moſt private men in *England*, if regard be had to their occaſions and their debts: but if it were ſo, are they therefore to take the ill bargains of all private men to themſelves, and protect them in their good ones? Muſt every man who has ſuffered by playing the fool, or playing the knave, call upon the nation for repriſals? But ſuppoſing only innocent and unwary people (as all the members of the preſent *South-ſea* company undoubtedly are) ought to be objects of public compaſſion; who ſhall make recompence to the millions of others who have ſuffered in their eſtates, by the univerſal confuſion occaſioned by this worthy project; who repair the many bankrupts, the many creditors who have loſt their debts, the many young ladies who have loſt their fortunes, the mechanics and ſhopkeepers who have loſt their buſineſs, ſpent their ſtocks, and yet have run in debt to ſub-

ſiſt their families; and the gentlemen, merchants, and farmers, who can get little for their commodities and products of their eſtates, farms, and trades? And muſt all theſe contribute at laſt, out of what remains, to repair the misfortunes of thoſe who brought all theſe evils upon them?

But becauſe I would avoid giving offence to tender ears, by ſeeming to take too much part with the inconſiderable intereſt of men who are vulgarly called the mob, I ſhall repreſent the caſe of perſons who much better deſerve ſome people's conſideration; I mean brokers, ſtock-jobbers, dealers in funds, and ſuch who, for many years together, have ſupported the government, by making twice or thrice the advantages of their money that they could do any where elſe. Who ſhall repair the loſſes of the contractors for ſtock or ſubſcriptions, or of thoſe who lent them money at five, ten, and twenty, *per cent. per menſem*, and cannot be paid again? Who pay the many ſums loſt in the hands of goldſmiths, and by their pretended ſubſcriptions of effects without the owner's conſent? Who the loſſes of thoſe who bought in the *Eaſt-India* company and *bank* at two or three hundred *per cent.* all occaſioned by this worthy project; or of thoſe who bought in this company at eight or nine hundred, and ſold at one or two; who thoſe who bought, or were hindred from ſelling out of theſtocks of all companies, by that honeſt and ſerviceable bargain to the public made between the *bank* and the *South ſea*? Who ſhall pay the loſſes in the bubbles, ſome of which were eſtabliſhed or countenanced by parliament, and others by patents, all which have equal right to put in their claims? And laſtly, who ſhall make ſatisfaction to the whole kingdom, who muſt be reduced by ſuch means to an incapacity of paying its debts, and conſequently of defending itſelf? I have heard of no project yet for leſſening the public expences, or

of the courtiers leſſening their own ſtated incomes, or occaſional gains.

And what, after all, are the particular merits of theſe gentlemen to whom ſo much favour is to be ſhewn; and who will receive the benefit of it? Thoſe who remain of the original company have no pretence to it; and at preſent their capital, with the addition which they have received by the diviſion of the fictitious ſtock, is more valuable than at firſt; I believe much more ſo: thoſe who have bought in ſince the fall, have as little pretence to be conſidered, becauſe they knew the terms upon which they bought: ſuch as have raiſed fortunes by dabbling in the public, ought not to complain if they have loſt by one project what they got by another; and thoſe who have great or plentiful offices in other reſpects, muſt be very immodeſt if they expect to repair their follies out of the eſtates of thoſe who are more neceſſitous than themſelves. So that the few that can hope for relief are the poor and helpleſs, who were trepanned by the reſt to buy in at a great price, and could not ſell out again before the fall; and I dare appeal to all mankind, whether ſuch could get relief, if their intereſts were ſeparated from their oppreſſors: if it be ſo, we have reaſon to ſing *te deum*, for the world is finely mended; but till I can find ſome other inſtances of this tender regard to mercy and innocence, I muſt beg leave to ſuppoſe, that there is already, or is to be, ſome other conſideration for the remitting theſe two millions, if ever they are remitted.

There is another reaſon left behind, and a ſhrewd one it is; namely, that we muſt ſupport public credit, by enabling the *bank* to ſupport the *South ſea*, and in conſequence enabling them both to ſell their ſtocks for twice as much as they are worth, (and ſo leave a new loſs upon other people, who with equal reaſon muſt be again repaired); for it is certain, that all or moſt of the company-ſtocks ſell at preſent a-

bove their real value. Now, with all due ſubmiſſion to the gentlemen of the *Alley*, it ſeems to me to be a very odd way of ſupporting credit, to render the public incapable of paying its debts: but it is no new thing amongſt ſome ſorts of people, to endeavour to ſupport credit by the means which deſtroy all credit. My head has been ever ſo ill turned, as to think that nations muſt preſerve the opinion of their integrity by the ſame rules and maxims that private men find neceſſary; that is, always by ſelling good merchandiſes, and not ſtuffing their bales and caſks with counterfeit wares, and covering them at top with thoſe which look well. But we have heard of thoſe times when moonſhine and ſhadows have ſold for ſilver and gold, for lands and tenements; and the wiſdom of ſtates has been employed to keep up the imaginary fraudulent value of this ſort of airy merchandiſe; when thouſands and thouſands of unwary people have been undone by ſuch purpoſes, new projects have been formed and countenanced by authority to do as many more: I mean, this has been lately done in *France*, whoſe example ſhould not be followed by any who deſign not to introduce the government of *France*.

All wiſe and honeſt governments ought to protect their innocent, induſtrious, and unguarded, ſubjects againſt the ſnares of cheats and frauds of pickpockets, and not combine with ſuch wretches, and be perpetually forming ſchemes to ruin multitudes for the enriching a few, and to proſtitute their power, and their public honour, to patronize and eſtabliſh combinations of oppreſſion; and when one ſort of it can be ſupported no longer, to ſet their wits to work to find out another, It puts me in mind of a ſtory told of Dr. *Barebone*, who had once drawn an eminent merchant into a building project at *Mile-end*, where by he loſt many thouſand pounds; and when he complained of it, the doctor promiſed to make him rep

ration, by letting him ſhare in another which he had juſt begun at the farther end of *Weſtminſter*, whereby he loſt as much more; and when his bubble, juſtly provoked, drew his ſword upon the doctor, and bid him draw too, he, like a true ſtoick, with great calmneſs, and wholly unconcerned aſked, *Whither he would be drawn; for that he had drawn him from one end of the town to the other already?* Whatever has been done in neighbouring countries, I am perſuaded we are in no danger of any ſuch attempts here.

And now having, as I conceive, fully anſwered the pretences of the *South-ſea* company for getting the two millions remitted to them, which pretences they are pleaſed to call reaſons; I ſhall offer them one of my own why they ſhould not deſire it, for that they will be loſers upon the whole by it. As I remember, the price of their ſtock rather decreaſed than encreaſed upon the remitting the five millions; and it is fallen now upon the expectation of having the reſt remitted: and the reaſon is obvious; for nothing can keep up the credit of public or private men, but an opinion that they are able to pay their debts, and are willing to do ſo; and no man in his wits will believe either, if he do not ſee them endeavour to pay off their old debts, and avoid all occaſions of contracting new ones. When a man owes more than he can pay, he muſt compound with his creditors, ly in goal, or run away, unleſs he has privilege; and then they have nothing left to do, for the moſt part, but to ſhake their ears, rail, and run away too. People muſt be very weak not to know, if ever a queſtion ſhould ariſe, Whether a nation will be undone, or undo a ſmall part of it? which it will chooſe; and therefore every wiſe man, whoſe fortune lies in public ſecurities, will think himſelf concerned to make the payment of them practicable, and therefore will conſider whether it is not his intereſt to loſe a ſmall part of his income to ſecure the whole; and every

man would conſider this over and over, if he did not deſign at all adventures to ſave one, and leave the ſtorm to fall upon others: and how well all hitherto have ſucceeded in this honeſt intention, we have had as many inſtances as we have had public calamities, and lately a very pregnant one, when every man deſigned to ſell, and no man could do ſo but managers and brokers.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, September 8. 1722. N°. 93.

An eſſay upon heroes.

SIR,

I Deſign this letter as a diſſertation upon heroes, who were at firſt a ſort of brave diſintereſted men, that having more courage and proweſs than others, went about doing good to others, and to all, at their own expence and danger. They eſtabliſhed and reformed communities, and taught them laws, and puniſhed thoſe who violated juſtice and law: they deſtroyed public robbers and monſters, and the greateſt of all public robbers and monſters, tyrants; and lived the patterns of virtue and uſeful valour. Hence they were called heroes, a ſort of middle beings, ſuperior to other men, and akin to the gods.

But ſo wild is the nature of man, and ſo impudent the nature of ambition, that whereas the primitive heroes were the bulwarks of ſociety, and the preſervers of men, thoſe who pretended to ſucceed them, were the diſturbers of ſociety, and the deſtroyers of men; and ſuch tyrants and monſters as the old heroes had deſtroyed, did themſelves (impudently) ſet up for he-

roes. With the ſame modeſty, ſuperſtition, which deſtroys religion, has, in the greateſt part of the world, uſurped the place of religion; tyranny, which is the extirpation of government, calls itſelf government: and thus aroſe perſecuting prieſts and lawleſs kings. But ſo are words and the world abuſed; and with ſo much ſafety, and even applauſe, is miſchief committed, when it has but a good name.

Alexander deified himſelf, and *Cæſar* was deified by others, for being univerſal murderers; and *Coke* of *Bury* was hanged for attempting one murder: had he been at the head of a hundred thouſand cut-throats, and murdered a million, he might have been recorded for a heroe, his name been handed down to after-ages with elogiums, and public declamations made in the ſchools upon his conduct and virtues.

Child, the highwayman, robbed the mail, and was put to death; but, inſtead of the mail, had he robbed a nation (I mean any nation but this) he might probably have governed it; and, inſtead of hanging in chains, led a whole people in chains, and been dubbed an able ſtateſman, and a faithful miniſter.

Miſchief is inſeparable from the profeſſion of a preſent hero, whoſe buſineſs and ambition is to multiply conqueſts, and conſequently miſeries, upon thoſe whom he conquers. What a wild and inhuman ſpirit! to plague the world, in order to make a figure in it; to commit great villanies, for a good name; to deſtroy the peace and proſperity of mankind, to gain their eſteem; and to ſhed their blood, to ſhew themſelves fit to govern them! For none gain by ſuch accompliſhments of theirs, but their ſoldiers, whoſe lives too they throw away as wantonly as theſe take away the lives of others. The chief gainers therefore are only a few officers, ſervants, and ſtrumpets, who are about their perſons, and execute their will and rage for their own ends: and ſo, to glut a reſtleſs tyrant and his inſtruments, men and nations muſt be

ſlaughtered or enſlaved. This is the heroiſm, this the glory, of conquering!

Such is the difference between the old original heroes and theſe their apes, who, by fraud, violence, perjury, and reſtleſs cruelty, make war upon their ſubjects and neighbours; and, by ſacrificing the virtuous and the brave, or, by making them their inſtruments to ſacrifice others, and by diſtreſſing, exhauſting, plundering, and chaining, all, puſh human miſery as far as it can go. Theſe are the wolves and tygers of human race; imperial beaſts of prey, who, if the world would preſerve itſelf, ought to be driven out of the world, or hung up in it *in terrorem*; or, like theſe their more innocent brethren, who only kill for food, to be locked up in dens; and ſhewn, as they are, for monſters: or perhaps it would be ſtill a more equitable puniſhment, if they could be caught, to ſhut up a number of them in a mad-houſe with their beloved arms about them, there to fight and tear one another's fleſh, and ſpill their own deteſtable blood, till they had no more to ſpill. This would be giving a ſort of ſatisfaction to mankind, for ſo much human blood outrageouſly and wantonly ſpilt.

But this is not the only mock-heroiſm in the world; there is yet another ſort as miſchievous, but ſtill more ridiculous; and that is, a violent appetite for war, and victory, and conqueſt, without engaging perſonally in the danger, or coming near it; but, being very valorous by proxy, and fond of fighting without drawing a ſword. This was the prudent bravery of a late aged conqueror, who was never tired of war, yet never tired his own perſon in it: in the heat of a battle fought for his glory, he run no riſk, but ſat ſecurely at a great diſtance with the wiſe old woman his miſtreſs, waiting for laurels of other people's winning. When his agents had bought a town for him treacherouſly, or his generals ſtolen a province as treacherouſly, ſtill it was victory, ſtill fair

conqueſt; and the glory was his at three hundred leagues diſtance: for every thing that he did was glorious, the meaneſt and the baſeſt things; and by theſe means he became *immortal*, immortal in conqueſt without a ſcar.

The primitive heroes ventured their lives for the good of others: the mock heroes expoſe others to danger and death for the good of themſelves, and their own perſonal renown; and all the time ſtay at home, and wait for fame in a whole ſkin. They ſlaughter thouſands who obey them, and undo millions who ought not to obey them; and all to enſlave others, who neither wiſh nor do them any harm, and with whom they have nothing at all to do. Even moſt of the inſtruments which they make uſe of, are made as miſerable as they make thoſe whom they oppreſs; and few or none ſhare the benefit of the plunder, but ſuch as, wanting merit of their own to gain an honeſt ſubſiſtence, prey upon the induſtry of thoſe that do. So ſtrongly does miſery thrive under their influence, and nothing elſe!

They keep themſelves poor, ſuſpicious, and in a ſtate of war with their own ſubjects, whom they juſtly ſuſpect for their worſt enemies, becauſe they ſupply them with conſtant reaſon to be ſo; and therefore they live in a perpetual ſtate of rapine and enmity towards them, and in a continued dread of violence and revolts from them; inſtead of giving them fatherly protection on one ſide, and receiving from them dutiful and ſincere allegiance on the other; and all for the fruitleſs and imaginary glory of conqueſt, and of dominion over their fellow-creatures againſt their will; or, in other words, of being ſkilful pillagers and oppreſſors, and ſucceſsful murderers.

It is, however, not to be wondered at, that whilſt ſo many princes are beſet with ſycophants, always ready to applaud at a venture their wildeſt ſallies and deſigns; or with traitors, who, finding their own vile

advantages in them, are ever determined to abet and execute them: I ſay, it is not ſtrange, that princes in theſe circumſtances ſhould run frequently into wild freaks, and pernicious enterprizes, to the ruin of themſelves and their ſubjects. But it is ſtupendous, that theſe their baneful inſtruments and worſt foes ſhould be able, in any inſtance, to perſuade nations to dance after their deſtructive maggots, and be contented to be undone, to make ſome of the worſt of men amongſt themſelves rich and ſaucy.

What have the people in any monarchical government ever gained by the conqueſts made by their prince, but to be made ſlaves; or if they were ſlaves before, worſe ſlaves, and to have their chains rivetted yet faſter? For, beſides that theſe conqueſts give him a pretence and an ability to keep more troops, and conſequently encreaſe his power over them; the conquered nation will find a ſort of revenge in joining to reduce their new maſters to the ſame wretched condition with themſelves, and perhaps find an opportunity of conquering the conquerors. One nation will be played upon another, and neither will be truſted to the guard of their own countrymen; but the ſoldiers of one country will be quartered upon the other, and kept at a great diſtance from home, leſt by conſtant converſation with their relations, friends, and neighbours, they ſhould, contrary to their duty, warp towards the love and intereſt of their country: and indeed in moſt countries where troops are kept, they are always removed from place to place, to prevent their friendſhip and correſpondence with the natives.

What did *England* gain formerly by their conqueſts upon the continent, but conſtant wars, ſlaughter, and poverty to themſelves, and to their princes precarious foreign provinces at an *Engliſh* expence; and had ſtanding armies been then the faſhion of the world, *England* would doubtleſs have conquered itſelf into ſlavery. The *Romans*, when they had extended their

conqueſts ſo far and wide, that they were forced to keep provincial armies to awe and preſerve the conquered countries, became a prey to thoſe armies; and their emperors afterwards durſt no longer truſt to *Roman* troops, but encreaſed their ſlavery by the help of thoſe nations whom they had conquered, and who became, in their turns, maſters of thoſe who had maſtered them.

When *Alexander* had ventured his own army of *Macedonians*, and the beſt men in *Greece*, to ruin *Perſia*, and a great part of the world, which had given him no provocation; what advantages did *Greece* and *Macedon* reap from his mighty victories and conqueſts, but to become a little province of a great barbarous empire, which by their arms and proweſs he conquered, and exhauſted them of all their braveſt men to preſerve? Their condition would ſtill have been worſe, if he had left a ſucceſſor behind him to have preſerved his whole empire entire, who would have made *Perſia*, or ſome other province, the ſeat of it, and governed *Greece* at a diſtance by baſhaws: as it was, he left it in a ſtate of conſtant war and depredation, and they were toſſed and tumbled from one oppreſſion to another, till they found a ſort of relief in being conquered by the *Romans*.

What did the *French* gain by the long wars and many conqueſts of their late great monarch, but extreme poverty, ſtreighter ſervitude, great depopulation, and general bankruptcy? So much did they ſuffer by his acquiſitions, and ſo dear did they pay for his pernicious glory.

What did the *Swedes* gain by the conqueſts of the late king, but to loſe them again, as they got them, at a vaſt expence of blood and treaſure; and to be reduced to ſuch weakneſs, as to want the aſſiſtance of their neighbours to preſerve them from falling under the power of a prince, whom, by conquering him, they taught to conquer them?

And if the conquering countries are ſuch miſerable loſers by conqueſt, what muſt be the doleful condition of the conquered, which are conſidered only as the ſources of plunder, and the profeſſed objects of oppreſſion? Almoſt all *Europe* are witneſſes of the brutiſh havoc which the conquerors make, and of the diſmal ſcenes of ruin that they leave behind them. If the late *French* king could have conquered, or bought, or ſurprized, the *United Provinces* (which by all theſe genorous means he endeavoured) from the richeſt and moſt populous republic upon earth, they would have been now a neſt of beggarly fiſhermen, and in a lower condition, if poſſible, than any of the fine *French* provinces, which had the honour of being governed by that paternal prince. Never was ſuch mockery, as for a prince to publiſh reaſons to a people, with whom he had nothing to do, why they ſhould be conquered by him; when, let their condition be as ill as it will, it is an hundred to one, nay it is almoſt certain, that he will make it ten times worſe.

Alas for that nation whoſe prince is a hero! ſays an excellent and amiable *French* writer, who ſaw, with ſorrow, the woful condition of his own nation, from the mercileſs and unnatural affectation of heroiſm in the then king.

The ſame admirable author, in another place, gives us a lively image of heroes and conqueſts in theſe words, which he makes *Telemachus* ſpeak, as he views the field of battle filled with carcaſes, and drenched in blood: "Such are the heavy evils "that follow wars! What blind fury urges unhap"py mortals! So few are the days that they have to "live upon this earth, and ſo miſerable do they "make theſe few days! Why will they run thus "headlong into the jaws of death, which is of itſelf "making haſty approaches to devour them? Why "add ſo many frightful deſolations to a ſhort and "bitter life, made ſo by heaven already? Men are

" all brethren, and they tear and butcher one ano-
" ther, more unnaturally fierce and cruel than the
" wild beaſts of the deſart! Lions make not war
" upon lions, nor tygers upon tygers: they attack
" only animals of a different ſpecies. Man! Man
" alone, in ſpite of his reaſon, does things that crea-
" tures without reaſon would never do.

" But why theſe conſuming wars? Is there not
" land enough in the univerſe to ſatisfy all men with
" more than they can cultivate? Are there not vaſt
" tracts of deſart lands, ſo vaſt that mankind is not
" ſufficient to fill them? How then! A falſe glory,
" a vain title of *conqueror*, which a prince is fond
" of, kindles a war far and wide; and one ſingle
" man, thrown by heaven into the world, in wrath,
" ſacrifices brutally ſo many others to his vanity!
" his glory requires it, and all muſt periſh before
" him: countries ſwim in blood, towns and cities
" ſuffer devouring flames; and what eſcapes from
" the ſword and the fire, famine, more cruel than
" both, muſt conſume; and all that this man, who
" thus ſports himſelf with throwing all human na-
" ture into pangs, may find in this general deſtruc-
" tion his pleaſure and his glory. What monſtrous
" glory! Can we too much deſpiſe, too much ab-
" hor, theſe monſtrous men who have thus forgot
" humanity? Without being men, they ſet up
" for demi-gods; and earn the curſes, inſtead of,
" what they aim at, the admiration, of ages to
" come.

" Oh! with what tenderneſs ſhould princes un-
" dertake wars! That they ought to be ſtrictly juſt,
" is not enough; they muſt be ſtrictly neceſſary, neceſ-
" ſary for the public good. The blood of the people
" ought never to be ſhed but to ſave the people;
" and the occaſion ought to be extreme. But flatter-
" ing counſels, falſe ideas of glory, vain jealouſies,

" boundleſs rapaciouſneſs under ſpecious diſguiſes,
" and raſh engagements, draw almoſt all princes pre-
" cipitately or inſenſibly into wars which prove fa-
" tal to them. In them they hazard all without ne-
" ceſſity, and do as much miſchief to their ſubjects
" as to their enemies."

Thus the divine late archbiſhop of *Cambray*, from whom I have tranſlated this affecting paſſage. It is a book that has ten thouſand excellencies, and ought to be read by all mankind.

I will conclude with wiſhing, That all nations would learn the wiſdom of the prudent *Sancho*, who, when the hero his maſter madly attacked the wind-mills and the lions, ſtood at a ſafe diſtance and in a whole ſkin. If their governing *Don Quixotes* will fight, right or wrong, let them fight by themſelves, and not ſit at home and wantonly ſacrifice their people againſt wind-mills and fulling-mills.

G

I am, &c.

Saturday, September 15. 1722 N°. 94.

Againſt ſtanding armies.

SIR,

WHEN, in king *William*'s reign, the queſtion was in debate, Whether *England* ſhould be ruled by ſtanding armies? the argument commonly uſed by ſome, who had the preſumption to call themſelves *Whigs*, and owned in the *balancing letter*, (ſuppoſed to be written by one who gave the word to all the reſt) was, That all governments muſt have their periods one time or other, and when that time came, all endeavours to preſerve liberty were fruitleſs; and ſhrewd hints were given in that letter, that *England* was reduced to ſuch a condition; that our corruptions were ſo great, and the diſſatisfaction of the people was ſo general, that the public ſafety could not be preſerved, but by encreaſing the power of the crown: and this argument was uſed by thoſe ſhameleſs men, who had cauſed all that corruption, and all that diſſatisfaction.

But that gentleman and his followers were ſoon taught to ſpeak other language: they were removed from the capacity of perplexing public affairs any more: the nation ſhewed a ſpirit that would not ſubmit to ſlavery; and their unhappy and betrayed maſter, from being the moſt popular prince who ever ſat upon the *Engliſh* throne, became, through the treachery of his ſervants, ſuſpected by many of his beſt ſubjects, and was rendered unable, by their jealouſies, to defend himſelf and them; and ſo conſiderable a faction was formed againſt his adminiſtration, that no good man can reflect, without concern and horror, on

the difficulties which that great and good king was reduced to grapple with during the remainder of his troubleſome reign.

I have lately met with ſome creatures and tools of power, who ſpeak the ſame language now: they tell us, that matters are come to that paſs, that we muſt either receive the *Pretender*, or keep him out with bribes and ſtanding armies; that the nation is ſo corrupt, that there is no governing it by any other means; and, in ſhort, that we muſt ſubmit to this great evil, to prevent a greater: as if any miſchief could be more terrible than the higheſt and moſt terrible of all miſchiefs, univerſal corruption, and a military government. It is indeed impoſſible for the ſubtilty of traitors, the malice of devils, or for the cunning and cruelty of our moſt implacable enemies, to ſuggeſt ſtronger motives for the undermining and overthrow of our excellent eſtabliſhment, which is built upon the deſtruction of tyranny, and can ſtand upon no other bottom. It is madneſs in extremity, to hope that a government founded upon liberty, and the free choice of the aſſertors of it, can be ſupported by other principles; and whoever would maintain it by contrary ones, intends to blow it up, let him alledge what he will. This gives me every day new reaſons to believe what I have long ſuſpected; for if ever a queſtion ſhould ariſe, Whether a nation ſhall ſubmit to certain rules, or ſtruggle for a remedy? theſe gentlemen well know which ſide they will chooſe, and certainly intend that which they muſt chooſe.

I am willing to think, that theſe impotent babblers ſpeak not the ſenſe of their ſuperiors, but would make ſervile court to them from topics which they abhor. Their ſuperiors muſt know, that it is raving and frenzy to affirm, that a free people can be long governed by impoteut terrors; that millions will conſent to be ruined by the corruptions of a few; or that thoſe few will join in the ruin any longer than their corrup-

tion laſts: that every day new and greater demands will riſe upon the corrupters; that no revenue, how great ſoever, will feed the voraciouſneſs of the corrupted; and that every diſappointment will make them turn upon the oppreſſors of their country, and fall into its true intereſt and their own: that there is no way in nature to preſerve a revolution in government, but by making the people eaſy under it, and ſhewing them their intereſt in it, and that corruption, bribery, and terrors, will make no laſting friends, but infinite and implacable enemies; and that the beſt ſecurity of a prince amongſt a free people, is the affections of his people; which he can always gain, by making their intereſt his own, and by ſhewing that all his views tend to their good. They will then, as they love themſelves, love him, and defend him who defends them. Upon this faithful baſis his ſafety will be better eſtabliſhed than upon the ambitious and variable leaders of a few legions, who may be corrupted, diſobliged, or ſurpriſed, and often have been ſo; and hence great revolutions have been brought about, and great nations undone, only by the revolt of ſingle regiments.

Shew a nation their intereſt, and they will certainly fall into it: a whole people can have no ambition but to be governed juſtly; and when they are ſo, the intrigues and diſſatisfactions of particulars will fall upon their own heads. What has any of our former courts ever got by corruption, but to diſſaffect the people, and weaken themſelves? Let us now think of other methods, if it be only for the ſake of the experiment. The ways of corruption have been tried long enough in paſt adminiſtrations: let us try in this what public honeſty will do; and not condemn it before we have fully proved it, and found it ineffectual; and it will be time enough to try other methods when this fails.

That we muſt either receive the *Pretender*, or keep up great armies to keep him out, is frightful and unnatural language to *Engliſh* ears. It is an odd way of dealing with us, that of offering us, or forcing upon us, an alternative, where the ſide which they would recommend is full as formidable as the ſide from which they would terrify us. If we be to be governed by armies, it is all one to us, whether they be proteſtant or popiſh armies; the diſtinction is ridiculous, like that between a good and a bad tyranny. We ſee, in effect, that it is the power and arms of a country that form and direct the religion of a country; and I have before ſhewn, that true religion cannot ſubſiſt where true liberty does not. It was chiefly, if not wholly, king *James*'s uſurped power, and his many forces, and not his being a papiſt, that rendered him dreadful to his people. Military governments are all alike; nor does the liberty and property of the ſubject fare a bit the better or the worſe for the faith and opinion of the ſoldiery. Nor does an arbitrary proteſtant prince uſe his people better than an arbitrary popiſh prince; and we have ſeen both ſorts of them changing the religion of their country according to their luſt.

They are therefore ſtupid politicians, who would derive advantages from a diſtinction which is manifeſtly without a difference: it is like, however, that they may improve in their ſubtilties, and come, in time, to diſtinguiſh between corrupt corruption and uncorrupt corruption, between a good ill adminiſtration and an ill good adminiſtration, between oppreſſive oppreſſion and unoppreſſive oppreſſion, and between *French* dragooning and *Engliſh* dragooning; for there is ſcarce any other new pitch of nonſenſe and contradiction left to ſuch men in their reaſonings upon public affairs, and in that part which they act in them.

Of a piece with the reſt is the ſtupid cunning of ſome ſort of ſtateſmen, and practiſed by moſt foreign

courts, to blame the poor people for the miſery which they bring upon them. They ſay, that they are extremely corrupt; and ſo keep them ſtarving and enſlaved by way of protection. They corrupt them by all manner of ways and inventions, and then reproach them for being corrupt. A whole nation cannot be bribed; and if its repreſentatives are, it is not the fault, but the misfortune of the nation: and if the corrupt ſave themſelves by corrupting others, the people, who ſuffer by the corruptions of both, are to be pitied, and not abuſed. Nothing can be more ſhameleſs and provoking, than to bring a nation, by execrable frauds and extortions, againſt its daily proteſtations and remonſtrances, into a miſerable paſs, and then father all thoſe villainies upon the people, who would have gladly hanged the authors of them. At *Rome* the whole people could be entertained, feaſted, and bribed; but it is not ſo elſewhere, where the people are too numerous, and too far ſpread, to be debauched, cajoled, and purchaſed; and if any of their leaders are, it is without the people's conſent.

There is ſcarce ſuch a thing under the ſun as a corrupt people, where the government is uncorrupt: it is that, and that alone, which makes them ſo; and to calumniate them for what they do not ſeek, but ſuffer by, is as great impudence as it would be to knock a man down, and then rail at him for hurting himſelf. In what inſtances do the people of any country in the world throw away their money by millions, unleſs by truſting it to thoſe who do ſo? Where do the people ſend great fleets, at a great charge, to be frozen up in one climate, or to be eaten up of worms in another, unleſs for their trade and advantage? Where do the people enter into mad wars againſt their intereſt, or, after victorious ones, make peace, without ſtipulating for one new advantage for themſelves; but, on the contrary, pay the enemy for having beaten them? Where do the people plant colonies, or

purchaſe provinces, at a vaſt expence, without reaping, or expecting to reap, one farthing from them; and yet ſtill defend them at a further expence? Where do the people make diſtracted bargains, to get imaginary millions; and, after having loſt by ſuch bargains almoſt all the real millions which they had, yet give more millions to get rid of them? What wiſe or dutiful people conſent to be without the influence of the preſence of their prince, and of his virtues; or of thoſe of his family, who are to come after him? No,-----theſe things are never done by any people; but where ever they are done, they are done without their conſent; and yet all theſe things have been done in former ages, and in neighbouring kingdoms.

For ſuch guilty and corrupt men, therefore, to charge the people with corruption, whom either they have corrupted, or cannot corrupt, and, having brought great miſery upon them, to threaten them with more; is, in effect, to tell them plainly, "Gentlemen, "we have uſed you very ill, for which you, who "are innocent of it, are to blame; we therefore "find it neceſſary, for your good, to uſe you no "better, or rather worſe: and, if you will not ac- "cept of this our kindneſs, which, however, we will "force upon you, if we can, we will give you up "into the terrible hands of raw-head and bloody- "bones; who, being your enemy, may do you as much "miſchief as we, who are your friends, have done "you." I appeal to common ſenſe, whether this be not the ſum of ſuch threats and reaſonings in their native colours.

The partizans of *Oliver Cromwell*, when he was meditating tyranny over the three nations, gave out, that it was the only expedient to balance factions, and to keep out *Charles Stuart*; and ſo they did worſe things to keep him out, than he could have done if they had let him in. And, after the king's reſtoration, when there was an attempt made to make him abſolute,

by enabling him to raiſe money without parliament, (an attempt which every courtier, except lord *Clarendon*, came into) it was alledged to be the only expedient to keep the nation from falling back into a commonwealth: as if any commonwealth upon earth were not better than any abſolute monarchy. His courtiers foreſaw, that by their mad and extravagant meaſures they ſhould make the nation mad, and were willing to ſave themſelves by the final deſtruction of the nation: they therefore employed their creatures to whiſper abroad ſtupid and villainous reaſons, why people ſhould be content to be finally undone, leſt ſomething not near ſo bad ſhould befal them.

Thoſe who have, by abuſing a nation, forfeited its affections, will never be for truſting a people, who, they know, juſtly deteſt them; but, having procured their averſion and enmity, will be for fortifying themſelves againſt it by all proper ways: and the ways of corruption, depredation, and force, being the only proper ones, they will not fail to be practiſed; and thoſe who practiſe them, when they can no longer deny them, will be finding reaſons to juſtify them; and, becauſe they dare not avow the true reaſons, they muſt find ſuch falſe ones as are moſt likely to amuſe and terrify. And hence ſo much nonſenſe and improbability uttered in that reign, and ſometimes ſince, to vindicate guilty men, and vilify an innocent people, who were ſo extravagantly fond of that prince, that their liberties were almoſt gone before they would believe them in danger.

It is as certain, that king *James* II. wanted no army to help him to preſerve the conſtitution, nor to reconcile the people to their own intereſt: but, as he intended to invade and deſtroy both, nothing but corruption and a ſtanding army could enable him to do it; and (thank God) even his army failed him, when he brought in *Iriſh* troops to help them. This therefore was his true deſign, but his pretences were

very different: he pleaded the neceſſity of his affairs, nay, of public affairs; and of keeping up a good ſtanding force to preſerve his kingdoms, forſooth, from inſults at home and from abroad. This was the bait; but his people, who had no longer any faith in him, and to whom the hook appeared threatening and bare, would not believe him, nor ſwallow it; and if they were jealous of him, reſtleſs under him, and ready to riſe againſt him, he gave them ſufficient cauſe. He was under no hardſhip nor neceſſity, but what he created to himſelf; nor did his people withdraw their affections from him, till he had withdrawn his right to thoſe affections. Thoſe who have uſed you ill, will never forgive you; and it is no new thing wantonly to make an enemy, and then calumniate and deſtroy him for being ſo.

When people, through continual ill uſage, grow weary with their preſent ill condition, they will be ſo far from being frightened with a change, that they will wiſh for one; and, inſtead of terrifying them, by threatening them with one, you do but pleaſe them, even in inſtances where they have no reaſon to be pleaſed. Make them happy, and they will dread any change; but while they are ill uſed, they will not fear the worſt. The authors of public miſery and plunder may ſeek their own ſafety in general deſolation; but to the people nothing can be worſe than ruin, from what hand ſoever it comes: a proteſtant muſket kills as ſure as a popiſh one; and an oppreſſor is an oppreſſor, to whatever church he belongs: the ſword and the gun are of every church, and ſo are the inſtruments of oppreſſion. The late directors were all ſtaunch proteſtants; and *Cromwell* had a violent averſion to popery.

We are, doubtleſs, under great neceſſities in our preſent circumſtances; but to encreaſe them, in order to cure them, would be a prepoſterous remedy, worthy only of them who brought them upon us;

and who, if they had common ſhame in them, would conceal, as far as they could, under ſilence, the heavy evils, which, though they lie upon every man's ſhoulders, yet lie only at the doors of a few. The plea of neceſſity, if it can be taken, will juſtify any miſchief, and the worſt miſchiefs. Private neceſſity makes men thieves and robbers; but public neceſſity requires that robbers of all ſizes ſhould be hanged. Public neceſſity therefore, and the neceſſity of ſuch pedant politicians, are different and oppoſite things. There is no doubt, but men guilty of great crimes would be glad of an enormous power to protect them in the greateſt; and then tell us that there is a neceſſity for it. Thoſe againſt whom juſtice is armed will ever talk thus, and ever think it neceſſary to diſarm her. But whatever ſincere ſervices they may mean to themſelves by it, they can mean none to his majeſty, who would be undone with his ſubjects by ſuch treacherous and ruinous ſervices: and therefore it is fit that mankind ſhould know, and they themſelves ſhould know, that his majeſty can and will be defended againſt them and their *pretender*, without ſtanding armies; which would make him formidable only to his people, and contemptible to his foes, who take juſtly the meaſure of his power from his credit with his ſubjects.

But I ſhall conſider what preſent occaſion there is of keeping up more troops than the uſual guards and garriſons; and ſhall a little further animadvert upon the arts and frivolous pretenees made uſe of, in former reigns, to reduce this government to the condition and model of the pretended *jure divino* monarchies, where millions muſt be miſerable and undone, to make one and a few of his creatures lawleſs, rampant, and unſafe.

T *and* G

I am, &c.

Saturday, September 22. 1722. N°. 95.

Further reaſonings againſt ſtanding armies.

SIR,

IT is certain, that liberty is never ſo much in danger, as upon a deliverance from ſlavery. The remaining dread of the miſchiefs eſcaped, generally drives or decoys men into the ſame or greater: for then the paſſions and expectations of ſome run high; the fears of others make them ſubmit to any misfortunes, to avoid an evil that is over; and both ſides concur in giving a deliverer all that they are delivered from. In the tranſports of a reſtoration, or victory, or upon a plot diſcovered, or a rebellion quelled, nothing is thought too much for the benefactor, nor any power too great to be left to his diſcretion, tho' there can never be leſs reaſon for giving it him than at thoſe times; becauſe, for the moſt part, the danger is paſt, his enemies are defeated and intimidated, and conſequently that is a proper juncture for the people to ſettle themſelves, and to ſecure their liberties, ſince no one is likely to diſturb them in doing ſo.

However, I confeſs, that cuſtom, from time immemorial, is againſt me, and the ſame cuſtom has made moſt of mankind ſlaves. *Agathocles* ſaved the *Syracuſians*, and afterwards deſtroyed them: *Piſiſtratus*, pretending to be wounded for protecting the people, prevailed with them to allow him a guard for the defence of his perſon; and by the help of that guard uſurped the ſovereignty: *Cæſar* and *Marius* delivered the commons of *Rome* from the tyranny of the nobles, and made themſelves maſters of both commons and nobles: *Sylla* delivered the ſenate from the inſolence

of the people, and did them more miſchief than the rabble could have done in a thouſand years: *Guſtavus Ericſon* delivered the *Swedes* from the oppreſſion of the *Danes*, and made large ſteps towards enſlaving them himſelf: the *Antwerpians* called in the duke of *Alencon* to defend them againſt the *Spaniards*; but he was no ſooner got, as he thought, in full poſſeſſion of their town, but he fell upon them himſelf with the forces which he brought for their defence: but the townſmen happened to be too many for him, and drove theſe their new protectors home again: which diſappointment, and juſt diſgrace, broke that good duke's heart. *Oliver Cromwell* headed an army which pretended to fight for liberty; and by that army became a bloody tyrant: as I once ſaw a hawk very generouſly reſcue a turtle dove from the perſecution of two crows, and then eat him up himſelf.

Almoſt all men deſire power, and few loſe any opportunity to get it; and all who are like to ſuffer under it ought to be ſtrictly upon their guard, in ſuch conjunctures as are moſt likely to encreaſe and make it uncontroulable. There are but two ways in nature to enſlave a people, and to continue that ſlavery over them; the firſt is ſuperſtition, and the laſt is force: by the one we are perſuaded that it is our duty to be undone; and the other undoes us whether we will or no. I take it, that we are pretty much out of danger of the firſt, at preſent; and, I think, we cannot be too much upon our guard againſt the other: for, though we have nothing to fear from the beſt prince in the world; yet we have every thing to fear from thoſe who would give him a power inconſiſtent with liberty, and with a conſtitution which has laſted almoſt a thouſand years without ſuch a power, which will never be aſked with an intention to make no uſe of it.

The nation was ſo mad upon the reſtoration of king *Charles* II. that they gave him all that he aſked,

and more than he aſked: they complimented him with a vaſt revenue for life, and almoſt with our liberties and religion too; and if unforeſeen accidents had not happened to prevent it, without doubt we had loſt both; and if his ſucceſſor could have had a little patience, and had uſed no rogues but his old rogues, he might have accompliſhed the buſineſs, and popery and arbitrary power had been of divine inſtitution at this day: but he made too much haſte to be at the end of his journey, and his prieſts were in too much haſte to be on horſeback too; and ſo the beaſt grew ſkittiſh, and overthrew them both.

Then a new ſet of deliverers aroſe, who had ſaved us from king *James's* army, and would have given us a bigger in the room of it, and ſome of them foreigners. They told us that the king longed for them, and it was a pity that ſo good a prince ſhould loſe his longing, and miſcarry: but he did loſe it, and miſcarried no otherwiſe than by loſing a great part of the confidence which many of his beſt ſubjects before had in his moderation; which loſs made the remainder of his reign uneaſy to him, and to every good man who ſaw it. I remember that all men then declared againſt a ſtanding army, and the courtiers amongſt the reſt, who were only for a *land force*, to be kept up no longer than till the king of *France* diſbanded his, and till the kingdom was ſettled, and the people better ſatisfied with the adminiſtration; and then there was nothing left to do, in order to perpetuate them, but to take care that the people ſhould never be ſatisfied: an art often practiſed with an amazing ſucceſs!

The reaſons then given for keeping up an army were, the great number of *Jacobites*, the diſaffection of the clergy and univerſities, the power and enmity of *France*, and the neceſſity of preſerving ſo excellent a body of troops to maintain the *treaty of partition*, which they had newly and wiſely made. But not-

withſtanding that the army was diſbanded, no plot, conſpiracy, or rebellion, happened by their diſbanding. The *partition treaty* was broke; a new army was raiſed, which won ten times as many victories as the former; and *Europe*, at laſt, is ſettled upon a much better foot than it would have been by the *partition treaty*. The emperor is as ſtrong as he ought to be. The *Dutch* have a good barrier. Another power is raiſed in *Europe* to keep the balance even, which neither can nor will be formidable to us, without our own fault; *France* is undone, and the regent muſt be our friend, and have dependance upon our protection: ſo that ſome few of theſe reaſons are to do now, what altogether could not do then, though we are not the tenth part ſo well able to maintain them as we were then.

I ſhould be glad to know in what ſituation of our affairs it can be ſafe to reduce our troops to the uſual guards and gariſons, if it cannot be done now. There is no power in *Europe* conſiderable enough to threaten us, who can have any motives to do ſo, if we purſue the old maxims and natural intereſt of *Great Britain*; which is, *To meddle no farther with foreign ſquabbles, than to keep the balance even between* France *and* Spain. And this is leſs neceſſary too for us to do now than formerly; becauſe the emperor and *Holland* are able to do it, and muſt and will do it, without us, or at leaſt with but little of our aſſiſtance; but if we unneceſſarily engage againſt the intereſts of either, we muſt thank ourſelves, if they endeavour to prevent the effects of it, by finding us work at home.

When the army was diſbanding in king *William*'s reign, a prince was in being who was perſonally known to many of his former ſubjects, had obliged great numbers of them, was ſupported by one of the moſt powerful monarchs in the world, that had won numerous victories, and had almoſt always defeated his

enemies, and who ſtill preſerved his power and his animoſity: his pretended ſon was then an infant, and, for any thing that then appeared, might have proved an active and a dangerous enemy; and it was to be feared, that his tutors might have educated him a half proteſtant, or at leaſt have taught him to have diſguiſed his true religion. At that time the *revolution* and revolution principles were in their infancy; and moſt of the biſhops and dignified clergy, as well as many others in employment, owed their preferments and principles to the abdicated family; and the reverſe of this is our caſe now.

France has been torn to pieces by numerous defeats, its people and manufactures deſtroyed by war, famine, the plague, and their *Miſſiſſippi* company; and they are ſo divided at home, that they will find enough to do to ſave themſelves, without troubling their neighbours, eſpecially a neighbour from whom the governing powers there hope for protection. The prince who pretended to the thrones of theſe kingdoms is dead; and he who calls himſelf his heir is a bigoted papiſt, and has given but little cauſe to fear any thing from his abilities or his proweſs. The principles of liberty are now well underſtood, and few people in this age are romantic enough to venture their lives and eſtates for the perſonal intereſts of one whom they know nothing of, or nothing to his advantage; and we ought to take care that they ſhall not find their own intereſt in doing it; and, I conceive, nothing is neceſſary to effect this, but to reſolve upon it. Almoſt all the dignified clergy, and all the civil and military officers in the kingdom, owe their preferments to the *revolution*, and are as loyal to his majeſty as he himſelf can wiſh. A very great part of the property of the kingdom ſtands upon the ſame bottom with the *revolution*. Every day's experience ſhews us how devoted the nobility are to gratify their king's juſt deſires and inclinations; and nothing can

be more certain, than that the preſent houſe of commons are moſt dutifully and affectionately inclined to the true intereſt of the crown, and to the principles to which his majeſty owes it. And beſides all this ſecurity, a new conſpiracy has been diſcovered and defeated; which gives all occaſion and opportunity to prevent any ſuch attempts for the future; which can never be done, but by puniſhing the preſent conſpirators, and giving no provocation to new ones: in both which, I hope, we ſhall have the hearty concurrence of thoſe who have the honour to be employed by his majeſty; by which they will ſhew, that they are as zealous to prevent the neceſſity of ſtanding armies, as I doubt not but the parliament will be.

I preſume, no man will be audacious enough to propoſe, that we ſhould make a ſtanding army part of our conſtitution; and if not, When can we reduce them to a competent number better than at this time? Shall we wait till *France* has recovered its preſent difficulties; till its king is grown to full age and ripeneſs of judgment; till he has diſſipated all factions and diſcontents at home, and is fallen into the natural intereſts of his kingdom, or perhaps aſpires to empire again? Or, ſhall we wait till the emperor and king of *Spain* have divided the bear's ſkin, and poſſibly become good friends, as their predeceſſors have been for the greateſt part of two centuries; and perhaps cement that friendſhip, by uniting for the common intereſts of their religion? Or, till madam *Sobieſky*'s heir is at age, who may have wit enough to think, that the popiſh religion is dearly bought at the price of three kingdoms? Or, are we never to diſband, till *Europe* is ſettled according to ſome modern ſchemes? Or, till there are no malecontents in *England*, and no people out of employments who deſire to be in them?

It is certain, that all parts of *Europe* which are enſlaved, have been enſlaved by armies; and it is abſolutely impoſſible, that any nation which keeps them amongſt themſelves can long preſerve their liberties; nor can any nation perfectly loſe their liberties who are without ſuch gueſts: and yet, though all men ſee this, and at times confeſs it, yet all have joined, in their turns, to bring this heavy evil upon themſelves and their country. *Charles* II. formed his guards into a little army, and his ſucceſſor encreaſed them to three or four times their number; and without doubt theſe kingdoms had been enſlaved, if known events had not prevented it. We had no ſooner eſcaped theſe dangers, than king *William*'s miniſtry formed deſigns for an army again, and neglected *Ireland* (which might have been reduced by a meſſage) till the enemy was ſo ſtrong, that a great army was neceſſary to recover it; and when all was done abroad that an army was wanted for, they thought it convenient to find ſome employment for them at home. However, the nation happened not to be of their mind, and diſbanded the greateſt part of them, without finding any of theſe dangers which they were threatened with from their diſbanding. A new army was raiſed again when it became neceſſary, and diſbanded again when there was no more need of them; and his preſent majeſty came peaceably to his crown, by the laws alone, notwithſtanding all the endeavours to keep him out, by long meaſures concerted to that purpoſe.

It could not be expected, from the nature of human affairs, that thoſe who had formed a deſign for reſtoring the *pretender*, had taken ſuch large ſteps towards it, and were ſure to be ſupported in it by ſo powerful an aſſiſtance as *France* was then capable of giving, ſhould immediately loſe ſight of ſo agreeable a proſpect of wealth and power, as they had before enjoyed in imagination: yet it ſeems very

plain to me, that all the diſturbance which afterwards happened might have been prevented by a few timely remedies; and when at laſt it was defeated with a vaſt charge and hazard, we had the means in our hands of rooting out all ſeeds of faction and future rebellions, without doing any thing to provoke them; and it is certain, that his majeſty was ready to do every thing on his part for that purpoſe, which others over and over promiſed us; and what they have done, beſides obliging the nation with a ſeptennial parliament, encreaſing the public debts a great many millions, and by the *South-ſea* project paying them off, I leave to themſelves to declare.

However, I confeſs, an army at laſt became neceſſary; and an army was raiſed time enough to beat all who oppoſed it: ſome of them have been knocked on the head, many carried in triumph, ſome hanged, and others confiſcated, as they well deſerved. And, I preſume, the nation would ſcarce have been in the humour to have kept up an army to fight their ghoſts, if a terrible invaſion had not threatened from *Sweden*; which, however, was at laſt frightened into a fleet of colliers, or naval ſtores, indeed I have forgot which. This danger being over, another ſucceeded, and had like to have ſtole upon us from *Cadiz*, notwithſtanding all the intelligence that we could poſſibly get from *Gibraltar*, which lies juſt by it; and this ſhews, by the way, the little uſe of that place: but we have miraculouſly eſcaped that danger too; the greateſt part of their fleet was diſperſed in a ſtorm, and our troops have actually defeated in the *Highlands* ſome hundreds of the enemy, before many people would believe they were there. Since this we have been in great fear of the *Czar*; and laſt year one reaſon given by many for continuing the army was, to preſerve us againſt the plague.

But now the king of *Sweden* is dead, the *Czar* is gone a ſophi-hunting, the plague ceaſed, and the

king of *Spain*'s beſt troops have taken up their quarters in *Italy*, where (if I gueſs right) they will have employment enough; and what are we to keep up the army now to do, unleſs to keep out the ſmall-pox? Oh! but there is a better reaſon than that, namely, a plot is diſcovered, and we cannot find out yet all who are concerned in it; but we have pretty good aſſurance, that all the *Jacobites* are for the *pretender*; and therefore we ought to keep in readineſs a great number of troops (which are to ſleep on horſe-back, or lie in their jack-boots) which may be ſufficient to beat them all together, if they had a twelve-month's time given them to beat up for volunteers, to buy horſes and arms, to form themſelves into regiments, and exerciſe them; leſt, inſtead of lurking in corners, and pratting in taverns, and at cock-matches, they ſhould ſurprize ten or twelve thouſand armed men in their quarters. I dare appeal to any unprejudiced perſon, whether this be not the ſum of ſome mens reaſonings upon this ſubject.

But I deſire to know of theſe ſagacious gentlemen, in what reſpect ſhall we be in a worſe ſtate of defence than we are now, if the army were reduced to the ſame number as in king *William*'s time, and in the latter end of the queen's reign; and that it conſiſted of the ſame proportion of horſe and foot, that every regiment had its complete number of troops and companies, and every troop and company had its complement of private men. It is certain, that, upon any ſudden exigency, his majeſty would have as many men at command as he has now, and, I preſume, more common ſoldiers, who are moſt difficult to be got upon ſuch occaſions; for officers will never be wanting, and all that are now regimented will be in half pay, and ready at call to beat up and raiſe new regiments, as faſt as the others could be filled up, and they may change any of the old men into them, which reduces it to the ſame thing. By this

we ſhall ſave the charge of double or treble officering our troops, and the terror of keeping up the corps of thirty or forty thouſand men, though they are called only thirteen or fourteen; and ſure it is high time to ſave all which can be ſaved, and, by removing all cauſes of jealouſy, to unite all, who, for the cauſe of liberty, are zealous for the preſent eſtabliſhment, in order to oppoſe effectually thoſe who would deſtroy it.

I will ſuppoſe, for once, what I will not grant, that thoſe called Whigs are the only men amongſt us who are heartily attached to his majeſty's intereſt; for I believe the greateſt part of the Tories, and the clergy too, would tremble at the thought of popery and arbitrary power, which muſt come in with the *pretender*: but taking it to be otherwiſe, it is certain that the body of the Whigs, and indeed I may ſay almoſt all, except the poſſeſſors and candidates for employments or penſions, have as terrible apprehenſions of a ſtanding army, as the Tories themſelves. And dare any man lay his hand upon his heart, and ſay, That his majeſty will find greater ſecurity in a few thouſand more men already regimented, than in the ſteady affections of ſo many hundred thouſands who will be always ready to be regimented? When the people are eaſy and ſatisfied, the whole kingdom is his army; and king *James* found what dependence there was upon his troops, when his people deſerted him. Would not any wiſe and honeſt miniſter deſire, during his adminiſtration, that the public affairs ſhould run glibly, and find the hearty concurrence of the ſtates of the kingdom, rather than to carry their meaſures by perpetual ſtruggles and intrigues, to waſte the civil liſt by conſtant and needleſs penſions and gratuities, by always aſking for new ſupplies, and rendering themſelves, and all who aſſiſt them, odious to their countrymen?

In ſhort, there can be but two ways in nature to govern a nation: one is by their own conſent; the other by force: one gains their hearts; the other holds their hands. The firſt is always choſen by thoſe who deſign to govern the people for the people's intereſt; the other by thoſe who deſign to oppreſs them for their own: for, whoever deſires only to protect them, will covet no uſeleſs power to injure them. There is no fear of a people's acting againſt their own intereſt, when they know what it is; and when, through ill conduct, or unfortunate accidents, they become diſſatisfied with their preſent condition, the only effectual way to avoid the threatening evil is, to remove their grievances.

When *Charles* duke of *Burgundy*, with moſt of the princes of *France*, at the head of an hundred thouſand men, took up arms againſt *Lewis* XI. this prince ſent an embaſſy to *Sforza*, duke of *Milan*, deſiring that he would lend him ſome of his veteran troops; and the duke returned him for anſwer, That he could not be content to have them cut to pieces (as they would aſſuredly have been) but told him at the ſame time, that he would ſend him ſome advice which would be worth ten times as many troops as he had; namely, That he ſhould give ſatisfaction to the princes, and then they would diſperſe of courſe. The king improved ſo well upon the advice, that he diverted the ſtorm, by giving but little ſatisfaction to the princes, and none at all to thoſe who followed them. The body of the people in all countries are ſo deſirous to live in quiet, that a few good words, and a little good uſage from their governors, will at any time pacify them, and make them very often turn upon thoſe benefactors, who, by their pains, expence, and hazard, have obtained thoſe advantages for them. Indeed, when they are not outrageouſly oppreſſed and ſtarved, they are almoſt as ready to part with their liberties as others are to aſk for them.

By what I have before ſaid I would not be underſtood to declare abſolutely againſt continuing our preſent forces, or encreaſing them, if the importance of the occaſion requires either, and the evils threatened be not yet diſſipated: but I could wiſh, that if ſuch an occaſion appear, thoſe who think them at this time neceſſary, would declare effectually, and in the fulleſt manner, that they deſign to keep them no longer than during the preſent emergency: and that, when it is over, they will be as ready to break them, as I believe the nation will be to give them, when juſt reaſons offer themſelves for doing ſo.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, September 29. 1722. N°. 96.

Of parties in England; *how they vary, and interchange characters, juſt as they are in power, or out of it, yet ſtill keep their former names.*

SIR,

THE *Engliſh* climate, famous for variable weather, is not leſs famous for variable parties; which fall inſenſibly into an exchange of principles, and yet go on to hate and curſe one another for theſe principles. A *Tory* under oppreſſion, or out of a place, is a *Whig*; a *Whig* with power to oppreſs, is a *Tory*. The *Tory* damns the *Whig*, for maintaining a reſiſtance, which he himſelf never fails to practiſe; and the *Whig* reproaches the *Tory* with ſlaviſh principles, yet calls him rebel if he do not practiſe them. The truth is, all men dread the power of oppreſſion out of their own hands, and almoſt all men wiſh it irreſiſtible when it is there.

We change ſides every day, yet keep the ſame names for ever. I have known a man a ſtaunch *Whig* for a year together, yet thought and called a *Tory* by all the *Whigs*, and by the *Tories* themſelves. I have known him afterwards fall in with the *Whigs*, and act another year like a *Tory*; that is, do blindly what he was bid, and ſerve the intereſt of power, right or wrong: and then all the *Tories* have agreed to call him a *Whig*; whereas all the while he was called a *Tory*, he was a *Whig*: afterwards, by joining with the *Whigs*, he became an apoſtate from *Whiggiſm*, and turned *Tory*.

So wildly do men run on to confound names and things: we call men opprobriouſly *Tories*, for practiſing the beſt part of *Whiggiſm*; and honourably chriſten ourſelves *Whigs*, when we are openly acting the vileſt parts of *Toryiſm*, ſuch parts as the *Tories* never attempted to act.

To know fully the ſignification of words, we muſt go to their ſource. The original principle of a *Tory* was, to let the crown do what it pleaſed; and yet no people oppoſed and reſtrained the crown more, when they themſelves did not ſerve and direct the crown. The original principle of a *Whig* was, to be no farther for the intereſt of the crown, than the crown was for the intereſt of the people.---A principle founded upon everlaſting reaſon, and which the *Tories* have come into as often as temptations were taken out of their way; and a principle which the *Whigs*, whenever they have had temptations, have as vilely renounced in practice. No men upon earth have been more ſervile, crouching, and abandoned creatures of power, than the *Whigs* ſometimes have been; I mean ſome former *Whigs*.

The *Tories* therefore are often *Whigs* without knowing it; and the *Whigs* are *Tories* without owning it. To prove this, it is enough to reflect upon times and inſtances, when the aſſerting of liberty, the legal

and undoubted liberties of *England*, has been called *libelling* by thoſe profeſſed patrons of liberty, the *Whigs;* and they have taken extravagant, abitrary, and violent methods to ſuppreſs the very ſound of it; whilſt the *Tories* have maintained and defended it, and put checks upon thoſe, who, though they had riſen by its name, were eager to ſuppreſs the ſpirit, and had appointed for that worthy end an inquiſition, new to the conſtitution, and threatening its overthrow: an inquiſition where men were uſed as criminals without a crime, charged with crimes without a name, and treated in ſome reſpects as if they had been guilty of the higheſt.

Parties like or diſlike our conſtitution, juſt as they are out of power, or in it: thoſe who are out of power like it, becauſe it gives them the beſt protection againſt thoſe who are in power; and thoſe who have been in power have blamed it, for not giving them power enough to oppreſs all whom they would oppreſs. No power cares to be reſtrained, or to have its hands tied up, though it would tie up all hands but its own:---- Like ſects in religion, who all abhor perſecution, and diſclaim its ſpirit, while it is over them, but fall all almoſt into it when they are uppermoſt. The papiſts among us make a great outcry againſt perſecution and oppreſſion; becauſe, though they be protected in their lives and eſtates, their maſs houſes are taken from them, and they are taxed double, though they do not pay double: yet it is moſt certain, that their religion makes it a ſin to tolerate any other religion, and obliges its votaries, on pain of damnation, to burn and deſtroy all who will not blindly, and againſt conſcience, ſubmit to its abſurd and contradictory opinions, and to its impious and inhuman ſpirit.

The golden rule prevails little in the world; and no man ſcarce will bear, if he can avoid it, what almoſt all men will make others bear, if they can. Men

who have the government on their ſide, or are in the government, will never ſee its exceſſes while they do not feel them; nay, they will be very apt to complain, that the government wants more power; and ſome, in thoſe circumſtances, have ſaid, and called in God Almighty for a witneſs and a voucher, that it ought to be irreſiſtible: but when they diſlike the government, and the government is jealous of them, their tone is quickly and entirely changed, they are loud with the firſt againſt the long hands of power, and its encroachments and oppreſſions, and often make faults as well as find them.

In king *Charles* II.'s reign, at the trial of *Mead* and *Penn*, for preaching (a great crime, in thoſe days, out of a church) one of the king's council declared, That he now ſaw the wiſdom, neceſſity, and equitableneſs of the *Spaniſh* inquiſition, and thought that it would never be well with the church and monarchy, till one was eſtabliſhed here; or words to that effect. Now, can any one think that this wicked and impudent man, with all his malice againſt his country, would not have hated and dreaded the inquiſition as much as any other man, but that he was determined to be of the ſame ſide?

I never yet met with one honeſt and reaſonable man out of power who was not heartily againſt all ſtanding armies, as threatening and pernicious, and the ready inſtruments of certain ruin: and I ſcarce ever met with a man in power, or even the meaneſt creature of power, who was not for defending and keeping them up: ſo much are the opinions of men guided by their circumſtances! Men, when they are angry with one another, will come into any meaſures for revenge, without conſidering that the ſame power which deſtroys an enemy, may deſtroy themſelves; and he to whom I lend my ſword to kill my foe, may with it kill me.

Men are catched, and ruled, and ruined, by a preſent appetite; and, for preſent gratification, give up even ſelf-preſervation. So weak is reaſon, when paſſion is ſtrong! Moſt of the inſtruments of arbitrary power have been ſacrificed to it as wantonly as they had ſacrificed others; and were juſtly cruſhed under a barbarous *Babel* of their own raiſing. But that has been no leſſon to others, who have been for complimenting their prince with a power which made all men, and themſelves amongſt the reſt, depend for their life and property upon his breath; for no other reaſon, than that it made many others depend at the ſame time upon theirs.

Nothing is more wild, fickle, and giddy, than the nature of man; not the clouds, nor the winds. We ſwallow greedily to day what we loathed yeſterday, and will loath again to-morrow; and would hang at night thoſe whom we hugged in the morning. We love men for being of our opinion, when we are in the wrong; and hate them afterwards, if they be in the right. We are enraged at thoſe who will not renounce their ſenſe, to follow us in our anger; and are angry at them for being angry, when we have made them ſo. We boaſt of being guided by our own ſentiments; but will allow no body to be directed by theirs, if theirs thwart ours. We are governed by our own intereſt, and rail at thoſe that are. We oppoſe thoſe who will not purchaſe our friendſhip; and when they do, we oppoſe all that oppoſe them. Thoſe who are for us with reaſon on their ſide, provoke us, if they are not ſo without reaſon. We commend human reaſon, and mean only our own folly. And our religion, however ridiculous, is always the beſt for all men, who are in a dangerous way, if they be not in our abſurd one. If we adhere to our opinions, and will not alter our conduct, we cannot forgive thoſe who will not join with us; and if they do, we do not

forgive them when we change, if they do not change too.

Thus inconſiſtent, fooliſh, and ſhameleſs, is the nature of men; ſelfiſh and prone to error. Methinks thoſe who were once in our circumſtances and ſentiments, might, at leaſt, forgive us, if, when they leave us and their own principles for a very bad reaſon, we ſtill adhere to ours for a very good one: but this piece of plain equity is not to be expected. Men are ſo partial to themſelves, that almoſt every man, if he could, would ſet up the arbitrary ſtandard of his own will, and oblige all men blindly to follow it. The ſtory of *Procruſtes* is full of excellent inſtruction, and a lively emblem of human nature: that tyrant had an iron bed, which he ſeemed to intend for the ſtandard of human ſtature; thoſe who were too long for it, had their legs chopped of; thoſe who were too ſhort, had their bodies extended by a rack; and both the long and the ſhort were made to fit the tyrant's bed. What is the inquiſition, what is tyranny, and what is any extravagant power, but *Procruſtes*'s bed? And who would not be a *Procruſtes*, if he had his will, in ſome reſpect or other?

The very name of *France* uſed to be an abomination to the *Whigs*: they hated the country for the ſake of its government; and were eternally upbraiding the *Tories* with a fondneſs for that government. Who would have expected, after all this, that ever the *Whigs*, or any of them, could have ſpoken with patience, much leſs with approbation, of the *French* government? Any the leaſt hint of this kind was ſhameful and unpardonable in a *Whig*. But there are *Whigs*, who, not content to ſhew their diſlike and reſentment of every thing ſaid or done in behalf of liberty, and the *Engliſh* conſtitution, have boldly told people how ſuch things would be rewarded in *France*: that is to ſay, the government of *France* is defended by galleys, wheels, racks, and dragoons, and we want

the ſame methods here; for, if they diſlike ſuch methods, how come they to mention them? If men commit crimes againſt the *Engliſh* government, there are *Engliſh* laws to puniſh them; but if they be guilty of no crime againſt the laws of *England*, why are they thought worthy of the arbitrary puniſhments of *France*, unleſs thoſe who think that they are, thirſt after the arbitrary power of *France?* Or, if they mean not thus, why do they talk thus; and, ſhewing rage without provocation, ſcatter words without a meaning? I know no ſort of *Engliſhmen* worthy of *French* chains, and *French* cruelty, but ſuch apoſtate *Engliſhmen* as wiſh for the power and opportunity of inflicting them upon their countrymen, and of governing thoſe by terrors and tortures, who deſpiſe weak capacities, and deteſt vile meaſures.

And have *Whigs* at laſt the face to tell us how they rule in *France?* Here is an inſtance of *Toryiſm* which every modern *Tory*, of any ſenſe, diſclaims and abhors; and which ſome modern *Whigs* have modeſtly avowed, and are therefore become old *Tories*. Thus do parties chop and change. One party, by railing with great juſtice at another, gets into its place; and loſes it as juſtly, by doing the very things againſt which it railed.

By theſe means, and by thus acting every one of them contrary to their profeſſions, all parties play the game into one another's hands, though far from intending it; and no party has ever yet found their account in it, whatever their leaders may have done: for the moſt part, a revolution of five or ſix years ſubjects them to oppreſſions of their own inventing. Others get into their ſeat, and turn their own hard meaſures upon them; nor can they complain, with a good grace, that they ſuffer thoſe evils which they have made others to ſuffer; and their own conduct having been as bad as that of which they complain, they have not ſufficient reputation to oppoſe the pro-

greſs of public miſchief and miſcarriages, which perhaps they began.

It is therefore high time for all parties to conſider what is beſt for the whole; and to eſtabliſh ſuch rules of commutative juſtice and indulgence, as may prevent oppreſſion from any party. And this can only be done by reſtraining the hands of power, and fixing it within certain bounds as to its limits and expence. Under every power that is exorbitant, millions muſt ſuffer to aggrandize a few; and men muſt be ſtrangely partial to themſelves and their own expectations, if, in the almoſt eternal changes and revolutions of miniſtries, they can hope to continue long to be any part of thoſe few.

G

I am, &c.

Saturday, October 6. 1722. N°. 97.

How much it is the intereſt of governors to uſe the governed well; with an enquiry into the cauſes of diſaffection in England.

SIR,

NO man, or ſmall number of Men, can ſupport themſelves in power upon their own proper ſtrength, without taking in the aſſiſtance of a great many others; and they can never have that aſſiſtance, unleſs they take in their intereſts too, and unleſs the latter can find their own account in giving it: for men will laugh at bare arguments brought to prove that they muſt labour, be robbed of that labour, and want, that others may be idle, riot and plunder them. Thoſe governments therefore, which are founded up-

on oppreſſion, always find it neceſſary to engage intereſts enough in their tyranny to overcome all oppoſition from thoſe who are tyranized over, by giving ſeparate and unequal privileges to the inſtruments and accomplices of their oppreſſion, by letting them ſhare the advantages of it, by putting arms in their hands, and by taking away all the means of ſelf-defence from thoſe who have more right to uſe them.

But when a government is founded upon liberty and equal laws, it is ridiculous for thoſe in the adminiſtration to have any hopes of preſerving themſelves long there, but by juſt actions, or the appearance of juſt actions; and by letting the people find, or fancy that they find, their own happineſs in their ſubmiſſion. It is certain, that people have ſo juſt a dread of public diſturbances, that they will bear a great deal before they will involve themſelves in tumults and wars; and mankind are ſo prone to emulation and ambition, and to purſue their ſeparate intereſts, that it is eaſy to form them into parties, and to play thoſe parties in their turns upon one another; but all parties will at laſt confer notes, and find out, that they are made uſe of only as cudgels in the hands of wicked men, to aſſault each other by turns till they are both undone. It is downright madneſs, to hope long to govern all againſt the intereſts of all; and ſuch knight-errants have qualifications only to be ſent to *Bedlam*, or to be ſhut up in ſome other madhouſe.

People will for ſome time be dallied with, and amuſed with falſe reaſonings, miſrepreſentations, and promiſes, wild expectations, vain terrors, and imaginary fears; but all theſe hopes and apprehenſions will vaniſh by degrees, will produce a quite contrary effect, and no wiſe man would think it prudent to provoke a whole people. What could the late king *James* do againſt his whole people? His miniſters betrayed him, his family deſerted him, his ſoldiers re-

volted from him: and it was fooliſh to expect any thing elſe; for how could he hope, that thoſe who could have no motive to ſtand by him, beſides their own perſonal intereſt, and every motive to oppoſe him ariſing from conſcience and honour, would not leave him when that intereſt changed, and when they could ſerve themſelves better by ſerving their country?

I laugh at the ſtupid notions of thoſe, who think that more is due from them to their patrons, who are truſted to diſpoſe of employments for the public benefit, than to their country, for whoſe ſake, and by whoſe direction, thoſe employments were firſt inſtituted, out of whoſe pockets the profits of them ariſe, and from whoſe confidence or credulity their pretended benefactors derive all their power to give them. Thoſe who receive them, accept the gift upon the terms of the conſtitution; that is, to execute them faithfully for the public good, and not to take the people's money to deſtroy the people.

What did the whole power of *Spain* do againſt a few revolted provinces, when all the people were enraged by oppreſſion? How many armies were loſt, how many millions fooliſhly ſquandered, to recover by force what a few juſt conceſſions would have done at once? Her generals no ſooner took one town, but two revolted; and they ſometimes loſt ten without ſtriking a ſtroke, for one that they gained by the ſword: what by the mutinies of her own ſoldiers, and other common events, which uſually happen in ſuch caſes, they twice loſt altogether, and were forced to begin their game anew; and ſo deſtroyed a mighty empire, to oppreſs a little part of it, whoſe affections might have been regained by doing them but common juſtice.

It is ſenſeleſs to hope to overcome ſome ſorts of convulſive diſtempers, by holding the patients hands, and tying him with ropes, which will only encreaſe

the malady; whereas the ſofteſt remedies ought to be uſed: violent methods may ſtop the diſtemper for a little time; but the cauſe of the grief remains behind, and will break out again the more furiouſly. What did king *James* get by all his bloody executions in the *Weſt*, by his manacling us with chains, and keeping up a military force to lock them on, but to frighten his friends, ſtill more to provoke his enemies, and at laſt to unite them all againſt himſelf? And yet, I believe, I may venture to aſſert, that if, inſtead of throwing his broad ſeal into the *Thames*, and deſerting his people, he had ſuffered his parliament to ſit, and given up ſome of the inſtruments of his tyranny, and had permitted them to have taken a few proper precautions to have hindered it for the future, he need not have been a fugitive through the world.

It is certain, that if king *Charles* had made at firſt, and with a good grace, but half of thoſe conceſſions which were extorted from him afterwards, that bloody war, ſo fatal to himſelf and his family, had been prevented, and the ambition or malice of his perſonal enemies had been ſuppreſſed, or turned to their own confuſion, and he himſelf might have reigned a happy prince, with as much power as he had right to by the conſtitution: whereas, if my lord *Clarendon* be to be believed, the whole kingdom (very few excepted) took part againſt the court at firſt, and continued to do ſo, till ſome leading men in the houſe of commons diſcovered intentions to overturn the monarchy itſelf. And I will add further, that if ſome men, whom I could name, had ſet themſelves at the head of the proſecutions againſt the *South-Sea* directors, and their directors, agents, and accomplices, and had propoſed, or ſhewn an inclination to have come into effectual methods to have paid off the public debts, and to have leſſened the public expences, the name of a *Jacobite* had been as contemptible as it is

now dreadful; and a few conſtables might poſſibly have ſaved the charge of a great many camps.

It is fooliſh therefore to be frightened with apprehenſions which may be removed at pleaſure: the way to cure people of their fears, is, not to frighten them further, but to remove the cauſes of their fears. If the kingdom be diſaffected, (as its enemies of all ſorts would make us believe) let enquiry be made into the motives of that diſaffection. It cannot be perſonally to his majeſty, who is a moſt excellent prince; and his greateſt opponents neither do nor can object to him thoſe vices, which too often accompany and are allied to crowns: nor is there the leaſt pretence to accuſe him of any deſigns of enlarging his prerogative beyond its due bounds; but on the contrary it is ſaid, that he was content by the peerage bill to have parted with a conſiderable branch of it in favour of his people, whatever uſe others intended to make of that conceſſion. It is certain, that when he came to the crown, he had a large ſhare in the affections of his people, and he himſelf has done nothing to make it leſs.

It cannot be to his title, which is the beſt upon earth, even the poſitive conſent of a great and free nation, and not the preſumptive conſent of ſucceſſion: beſides, all his ſubjects of any degree have ſworn and ſubſcribed to his title, and the ink is yet wet upon their fingers; nor can any formidable number of them (whilſt they are governed juſtly and prudently) have any motives to call in a *popiſh* pretender, educated in principles diametrically oppoſite to their civil and religious intereſts.

Whence therefore ſhould ſuch diſaffection ariſe, if there be any ſuch, as I hope there is not? And it appears plainly, that there is not, or that it is not general, by the dutiful reception which his majeſty met with in all places throughout his late progreſs in the *Weſt*. And the ſame loyal diſpoſition would appear

more and more every day, if thoſe who have the honour to be admitted to his more immediate confidence would repreſent honeſtly to him, how acceptable his preſence would always be to his people.

It is childiſh to ſay, that a few flies and inſects can raiſe a great duſt; or, that a ſmall number of diſappointed and unpreferred men can ſhake a great kingdom, with a wiſe prince at the head of it, ſupported with ſuch powers and dependencies. A great fire cannot be raiſed without fewel, and the materials which make it muſt have been combuſtible before. And if this be our caſe, we ought to aſk, How they came to be ſo? and, Who made them inflameable? Who laid the gun-powder? as well as, Who fired, or intended to fire, it? When we have done this, we ought to remove the cauſes of the diſtemper, allay the heat of the fever by gentle lenitives, throw in no more fiery ſpirits to inflame the conſtitution, but do all that we can to ſoften and cool it.

Every country in the world will have many malecontents; ſome through want and neceſſity; others through ambition and reſtleſneſs of temper; many from diſappointments and perſonal reſentment; more from the fear of juſt puniſhment for crimes: but all theſe together can never be dangerous to any ſtate, which knows how to ſeparate the people's reſentments from theirs. Make the former eaſy, and the others are diſarmed at once. When the cauſes of general diſcontent are removed, particular diſcontents will ſignify nothing.

The firſt care which wiſe governors will always take, is, to prevent their ſubjects from wanting, and to ſecure to them the poſſeſſion of their property, upon which every thing elſe depends. They will raiſe no taxes but what the people ſhall ſee a neceſſity for raiſing; and no longer than that neceſſity continues: and ſuch taxes ought to be levied cautiouſly, and laid out frugally. No projects ought to be formed to en-

rich a few, and to ruin thouſands: for when men of fortune come to loſe their fortunes, they will try by all means to get new ones; and when they cannot do it fairly, they will do it as they are able; and if they cannot do it all, will throw all things into confuſion, to make others as miſerable as themſelves. If people are poor, they will be deſperate, and catch at every occaſion, and join with every faction, to make public diſturbances, to ſhuffle the cards anew, and to make their own condition better, when they find it cannot be worſe.

Wiſe ſtateſmen will ſee all this at a diſtance; will uſe the beſt precautions, and moſt prudent meaſures, to procure general plenty, encreaſe trade and manufactures, and keep the people uſefully employed at home, inſtead of ſtarving, and prating ſedition in the ſtreets. They will not be perpetually provoking them with conſtant injuries, giving them eternal occaſions and reaſons for diſſatisfaction, and then quarrel with them for ſhewing it, and be ſtill encreaſing their diſcontents, by prepoſterouſly endeavouring to put a ſtop to them by new ſhackles, armed bands, bribery, and corruption, and by laying on them freſh burdens and impoſitions to maintain ſuch oppreſſions; and ſo when they have raiſed reſentment to the higheſt pitch, vainly hope to ſtop the tide with their thumbs. This is what the king of *Spain* did formerly in the *Dutch* provinces, and king *James* II. lately in *England;* but what, I hope, will never be ſeen here again.

But it will be ſaid, that people will be ſometimes diſſatisfied without any juſt provocations given to them by their governors: the neceſſities of all ſtates will ſometimes ſubject them to greater taxes, and other ſeeming oppreſſions, than they can well bear; and then, like ſick men, they will quarrel with their phyſicians, their beſt friends, and their remedies, and reproach all who have the direction of their affairs; as a countryman once curſed cardinal *Mazarini*, when

his aſs ſtumbled, (perhaps juſtly, for the oppreſſions of that miniſter might have rendered him unable to feed his aſs, and to keep him in good heart).

When this happens to be the caſe, there ought to be double diligence uſed to prevent any ill conſequences from ſuch diſaffection: no war ought to be continued longer than it is abſolutely neceſſary to the public ſecurity; nor any new one to be entered into out of wantonneſs, ambition, or, indeed, out of any other motive than ſelf-defence: no more money ought to be raiſed than is ſtrictly neceſſary for the people's protection; and they are to be ſhewn that neceſſity, and are to ſee, from time to time, the accounts of what they give, that it is diſburſed frugally and honeſtly, and not engroſſed by private men, laviſhed upon minions, or ſquandered away in uſeleſs penſions to undeſervers; and that the product of the whole people's labour and ſubſtance is not ſuffered to be devoured by a few of the worſt of the people. *For* (as it is ſaid elſewhere)

What can be more invidious, than for a nation ſtaggering under the weight and oppreſſion of its debts, eaten up with uſury, and exhauſted with payments, to have the additional mortification to ſee private and worthleſs men riot in their calamities, and grow rich, whilſt they grow poor; to ſee the town every day glittering with new and pompous equipages, whilſt they are mortgaging and ſelling their eſtates, without having ſpent them; to ſee blazing meteors ſuddenly exhaled out of their jakes, and their mud, as in Egypt, *warmed into monſters?* *

T

I am, *&c.*

* Conſiderations upon the ſtate of the nation, and of the civil liſt; written by Mr. *Trenchard.*

Saturday, October 13. 1722 N°. 98.

Addreſs to the members of the houſe of commons.

SIR,

I Have hitherto directed my letters to yourſelf; but I deſire you will direct the incloſed to the illuſtrious deputies of the whole people of *England*. Not that I preſume to think myſelf capable to inform them of their duty, or that they want ſuch information, or would accept it from me; but I intend to ſhew my good wiſhes to my countrymen, and to prepare them to expect the bleſſed effects of their diſcreet choice; not in the leaſt doubting but their worthy repreſentatives will ſpeak aloud the almoſt unanimous ſentiments of the whole nation; and by ſo doing, preſerve the dignity of the crown, and the liberty of the people whom they repreſent.

To the honourable the members of the preſent houſe of commons.

GENTLEMEN,

YOU have now the political power of all the commons of *Great Britain* delegated to you; and, as I doubt not but you will make an honeſt uſe of it, ſo will you have their natural power too at your command; that is, you will have their thanks, their wiſhes, their prayers, and their perſons, as well as their purſes, to ſerve your king and country. This is the greateſt truſt that can be committed by men to one another; and contains in it all that is valuable here on earth, the lives, the properties, the liberties, of your countrymen, and in a great meaſure of all

Europe, and your own preſent and eternal happineſs too. This great truſt, gentlemen, is not committed to you for your own ſakes, but for the protection, ſecurity, and happineſs of thoſe whom you repreſent. And you are accountable to your own conſciences, and to the high tribunal of heaven, for the juſt execution of this great authority: not to mention the applauſes and bleſſings of millions of people, which will attend the faithful diſcharge of your duty; and the deteſtation, reproaches, and curſes, with their other worſe conſequences, which ought to purſue corruption and bribery, and which I am ſure you will never deſerve.

You have, gentlemen, the pureſt religion in the world to cheriſh and ſupport; the intereſts, reputation, and ſecurity, of the beſt of princes to guard and defend: you have a great and populous nation, abounding with men of underſtanding, integrity, and courage, imploring your aſſiſtance; whom you are obliged, by all the ties of gratitude, juſtice, and generoſity, by all the laws of God and man, to protect and preſerve: a people loaded with debts, enervated by war, and in former reigns plundered by miſcreants, and juſt ready to ſink under thoſe burdens, unleſs they can receive ſudden help from your healing hands. Here is a ſcene of glory, an opportunity put by gracious Heaven into your hands, to exerciſe your virtues, and to obtain a reputation far above the tinſel triumphs of fabulous and imaginary heroes. Virtuous men could not aſk more of providence; nor could providence beſtow more upon mortal men, than to ſet them at the head of a corrupted and almoſt undone people, and to give them the honour of reſtoring their power, and reforming their manners. I cannot doubt, but theſe ſtrong and forcible motives will call up all your virtue, generoſity, and public ſpirit; and inſpire you with reſolutions to aſſiſt our gracious ſovereign in redreſſing all our grievances, and in making us once more a great and happy people. It is in your

power to do ſo; and from your endeavours we hope and expect it.

Every man whom you repreſent has a right to apply to and to petition you for protection and redreſs, and with modeſty and humility to complain of his own or his country's ſufferings; and, by virtue of this undoubted right, I addreſs to you in my own behalf, and in the behalf of millions of my fellow-ſubjects, who, next to God and our gracious ſovereign, are to receive their preſervation and whole happineſs from your breath. Your own perſonal ſecurity too is nearly linked and blended with theirs; for you can make no laws, countenance no corruptions, nor bring or ſuffer any miſchiefs upon your country, but what muſt fall upon yourſelves and your poſterity; and for theſe reaſons, as well as from your known principles of honour and virtue, I aſſure myſelf that you will act for your own and the public intereſt.

The moſt notorious conſpirators, and chief inſtruments of power, who headed that deteſtable parliament that gave up the liberties of a neighbouring nation, involved themſelves in the general ruin, and were amongſt the firſt who loſt their eſtates. Even the penſionary parliament in king *Charles* the ſecond's time ſtopped ſhort, and turned upon that corrupt miniſtry, when the laſt ſtroke was levelled againſt our liberties: they well ſaw, that when they ſhould become no longer neceſſary, they would be no more regarded, but be treated as traytors always are by thoſe who take advantage of their treaſon: for it is a ſteady maxim always with oppreſſors, to court and gratify the people whom they enſlave, by ſacrificing their inſtruments which they make uſe of, when they can be no longer ſerviceable; a maxim which diſcharges all obligations to them, and gives ſome recompence to their unhappy and undone ſubjects, by ſhewing them the grateful ſight of their worſt and moſt implacable enemies caught in their own ſnare.

View, gentlemen, the diſmal and melancholy ſcene before your eyes; behold, not above thirty years ſince, a powerful nation engaged in an expenſive, but ſucceſsful war, for defence of their own liberties, and of all *Europe*; which might have been equally carried on with leſs money than is now paid for intereſt, without leaving us one penny in debt; but a nation in late reigns almoſt undone by the vile and deſpicable arts of ſtock-jobbers, combining with others, from whom we expected preſervation, and now loaded with numerous taxes: their finances diſcompoſed; their trade loaded with various and burdenſome duties, or manacled with excluſive companies; and in debt almoſt ſixty millions; and by that means (as we have lately experienced) unable to contend with ſmall powers, without every year encreaſing our debts and burdens; and no effectual method ever yet taken to pay them off, or leſſen them, but always new methods found out to enhance the account.

Sure, gentlemen, none of you can hope that neighbouring nations will ſit ſtill, and not take advantage of our weakneſs; even thoſe nations for whoſe ſakes we are brought into this forlorn condition. The viciſſitude of human affairs muſt bring new wars among us, though none among ourſelves could find their accounts in courting them; and how think you, in ſuch a circumſtance, we ſhall defend our country? For my own part, I can ſee but one remedy at hand, and that is a dreadful one; unleſs we take ſpeedy and effectual methods to leſſen the public expences, to cut off all exorbitant fees, penſions, and unneceſſary ſalaries, to encourage trade, regulate our finances, and all defects in the adminiſtration; and by ſuch means ſave all which can be ſaved, and apply it to the diſcharge of the public burdens.

I wiſh that our dabblers in corruption would count their gains, and balance their loſſes with their wicked advantages. Let them ſet down in one column their

mercenary gifts, and precarious dependences; ſometimes half purchaſed with money, ſometimes by dividing the profits with paraſites, and always with the loſs of their integrity and reputation; and on the other ſide, let them write down expenſive contentions, and conſtant attendance in town to the neglect of their families and affairs, and a manner of living often unſuitable to their fortunes, and deſtructive to their health, and at leaſt one fourth part of their eſtates mortgaged, and liable to the diſcharge of the public debts; and, above all the reſt, the inſecurity of what remains, which muſt be involved in every ſpecies of public miſery: and then let them caſt up the account, and ſee where the balance lies. This is not a fictitious and imaginary computation, like *South ſea* ſtock, but a real and true ſtate of the unhappy caſe of twenty dealers in corruption, for one who has been a gainer by it; without mentioning the juſt loſſes which many of them have ſuffered by the laſt deteſtable project.

Conſider too, what a figure they make in their ſeveral countries amongſt their neighbours, their acquaintance, their former friends, and often even amongſt their own relations. See how they have been hunted and purſued from place to place, with reproaches and curſes from every honeſt man in *England*; how they have been rejected in counties, and populous and rich boroughs, and indeed, only hoped for ſucceſs any where by the mere force of exorbitant corruption, which has ſwallowed up a great part of their unjuſt extortions. Then let them ſet againſt all theſe evils a good conſcience, a clear reputation, a diſengaged eſtate, and being the happy members of a free, powerful, and ſafe kingdom; all which was once their caſe, and might have continued ſo, if they had acted with integrity. Sure it is worth no man's time to change an eſtate of inheritance, ſecured to him by ſteady and impartial laws, for a precarious title to

the greateſt advantages at the will of any man whatſoever.

But even theſe corrupt advantages are no longer to be had upon the ſame terms. The bow is ſtretched ſo far that it muſt break if it goes farther. Corruption, like all other things, has its bounds, and muſt at laſt deſtroy itſelf, or deſtroy every thing elſe. We are already almoſt mortgaged from head to foot. There is ſcarce any thing which can be taxed, that is not taxed. Our veins have been opened and drained ſo long, that there is nothing left but our heart's blood; and yet every day new occaſions ariſe upon us; which muſt be ſupplied out of exhauſted channels, or cannot be ſupplied at all. How think you, gentlemen, this can be done? What has been raiſed within the year, has not been found ſufficient to defray the expences of the year: and will any one amongſt you, in times of full peace, conſent to new mortgage the kingdom to ſupply the current ſervice? And if you could be prevailed upon to conſent to it, how long do you believe it can laſt, or you find creditors? And what can be the conſequence of ſuch credit? Sure it muſt make the payment deſperate; and if ever that grows to be the caſe, what think you will be the event? Who do you imagine will have the ſweeping of the ſtakes? Do you believe that thoſe who brought your misfortunes upon you will pay the reckoning at laſt, or ſave themſelves, by endeavouring to compleat their wickedneſs? There is no way, gentlemen, to prevent all thoſe evils which lour over and threaten you and us, but by preventing or removing the cauſes of them; and I hope that you will think it worthy your beſt conſiderations, and moſt vigorous endeavours, to do ſo, rather than to ſuffer under, and be undone by, them.

By doing this great ſervice to your country, you will not only conſult your reputation, your own intereſts, and the intereſts of thoſe whom you repreſent;

but in the moſt effectual manner will ſerve your prince, by making him a glorious king over an happy, ſatisfied, dutiful, and grateful, people. A great and rich people can alone make a great king; their diffuſive and accumulative wealth is his wealth, and always at his command, when employed for his true glory, which is ever their happineſs and ſecurity; and the figure which he does or can make among foreign ſtates, bears exact proportion to the affections which he has amongſt his own people: if his people be diſaffected, his neighbours and his enemies will deſpiſe him; and the latter will inſult him, if they think his ſubjects will not defend him. And therefore, ſince nothing is wanting on his majeſty's part, to make him beloved, honoured, I had almoſt ſaid, adored, by his people; it lies upon you, gentlemen, to remove all thoſe cauſes, which at any time hereafter, by the fault of others, may ſully and blemiſh his high character. It is your duty and your intereſt too, to acquaint him with all miſcarriages in the inferior adminiſtration, which you have frequent opportunities of knowing, and which is next to impoſſible he ſhould otherwiſe know. Princes are ſeated aloft in the upper regions, and can only view the whole of things, but muſt leave the detail and execution of them to inferior agents.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, October 20. 1722. N°. 99.

The important duty of attendance in parliament, recommended to the members.

SIR,

I Know not a more laudable ambition in any man, than that of procuring, by his credit with the people, a place in the legiſlature; and when it is procured this way, it is a teſtimony given by his country to his uprightneſs, and to his capacity to ſerve it. This is as high an honour as an *Engliſhman* can arrive at, and few but *Engliſhmen* can arrive at it; and the truſt is ſtill as high as the honour, and encreaſes it. The liberty, the property, nay, the virtue, credit, and religion of his country, are in his hands. Can Heaven or earth afford ſtronger motives for diligence, probity, and attendance? When the happineſs or miſery, the ſecurity or bankruptcy, the freedom or ſervitude, of a nation, and all the good or evil which this life affords, depend upon his behaviour, he will find ſufficient cauſe, from virtue, tenderneſs, and duty, to call up all his care, induſtry, and zeal.

But ſo it has often happened in the world, that all the activity and attendance, or moſt of it, have been on the wrong ſide; and as the evil that is in the world does infinitely over balance the good, they who pull down are vaſtly more numerous, as well as more buſy, than they who build up. Vice reigns amongſt men, while virtue ſcarce ſubſiſts; and in many countries the public has been as vigorouſly aſſaulted, as it has been ſlowly and faintly defended. Thus it is that liberty is almoſt every where loſt: her foes are artful, united, and diligent: her defenders are few,

diſunited, and unactive. And therefore we have ſeen great nations, free, happy, and in love with their own conditions, firſt made ſlaves by a handful of traytors, and then kept ſo by a handful of ſoldiers: I mean a handful in compariſon of the people, but ſtill enough to keep them in chains.

So that in moſt nations, for want of this particular zeal in every man for his country, in which all men are compriſed, the public, which is every man's buſineſs, becomes almoſt any man's prey. It was thus under the firſt triumvirate, when *Pompey*, *Craſſus*, and *Cæſar*, three citizens of *Rome*, were, by the aſſiſtance of *Roman* armies, ſharing out the *Roman* world among themſelves: nay, they procured the authority of the ſenate, and the ſanction of the people, for this monſtrous three-headed tyranny over ſenate and people; and procured it by means that will always procure it: ſome they bought, others they terrified, and all they deceived, corrupted, and oppreſſed. The tribunes of the people, who were the people's repreſentatives, and ſhould have been their protectors, they bribed; and the people were betrayed and ſold by their tribunes.

Such is the misfortune of mankind, and ſo uncertain is the condition of human affairs, that the very power given for protection contains in it a ſufficient power to deſtroy; and ſo readily does government ſlide, and often ſtart into oppreſſion! And only by watching and reſtraining power, is this monſtrous and dreadful tranſition prevented. For this good purpoſe we have parliaments, to whom our miniſters are accountable; and by whom the adminiſtration is ſupported, and it limits and power fixed. And to our having parliaments, it is owing that we are not groaning under the ſame vile vaſſalage with the nations round about us. They had once their parliaments as well as we; but in room of parliaments their governors have ſubſtituted armies, and conſe-

quently formed a military government, without calling it ſo: but, whatever it be called, that government is certainly and neceſſarily a military government, where the army is the ſtrongeſt power in the country: and it is eternally true, that a free parliament and a ſtanding army are abſolutely incompatible, and can never ſubſiſt together.

By parliaments therefore liberty is preſerved; and whoever has the honour to ſit in thoſe aſſemblies, accepts of a moſt ſacred and important truſt; to the diſcharge of which all his vigilance, all his application, all his virtue, and all his faculties, are neceſſary; and he is bound, by all the conſiderations that can affect a worthy mind, by all the ties that can bind a human ſoul, to attend faithfully and carefully upon this great and comprehenſive duty: a duty, which, as it is honeſtly or faithleſly executed, determines the fate of millions, and brings proſperity or miſery upon nations.

Whatever has happened in former reigns, we have reaſon to hope, that none come now into parliament, with an execrable intention to carry to market a country which has truſted them with its all; and it would be ridiculous to throw away reaſon upon ſuch banditti, upon public enemies to human ſociety. Such men would be worſe than *Cannibals*, who only eat their enemies to ſatisfy their hunger, and do not ſell and betray into ſervitude their own countrymen, who truſt them with the protection of their property and perſons. But, as I have heard that ſome men formerly, to whom this important truſt has been committed, have been treacherous enough, through negligence, to ſacrifice their duty to lazineſs or pleaſure, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew the deformity of ſuch conduct.

The name of a member of parliament has a great and reſpectful ſound; his ſituation is attended with many privileges, and an eminent figure! All which make men ambitious of acquiring a ſeat there; though

I am told that ſome of them have ſcarce ever appeared there. The glory and terror of the name was enough for them; which glory they tarniſhed, and converted into their crime and their ſhame, by neglecting the duty which was annexed to it, and alone produced it. Small and ridiculous muſt be the glory of that general, who never attends the duties of war, and is always abſent upon the day of battle; or of a miniſter, who, while he ſhould be making diſpatches, or concerting ſchemes for the public, is waſting his time at ombre, at cheſs, or with a miſtreſs.

It would ſcarce be believed, if it had not been felt, that the inſenſibility of men, as to all that is good and honourable, ſhould go ſo far as to carry the directors and guardians of the public to a cock-match, a race, or a drunken bout, when a queſtion has been upon the ſtage which has concerned the very being of the public. This paſſion for pleaſure is ſtrangely prepoſterous upon ſuch occaſions, and to follow it is cruel; cruel and diſloyal to our country, and even to ourſelves. All our happineſs, and conſequently all our reaſonable pleaſures, are contained in the general happineſs; and when that is gone, or leſſened, through our neglect, we need not be ſurpriſed, but may thank ourſelves, if in the public misfortunes and curſe we find our own.

When a pernicious queſtion has been carried, it is a poor apology to alledge, and had better be left unalledged, that *I was not there*. Why were you not there? Was it not your duty to be there? And were you not bound, by the ſolemn and awfull truſt which you undertook, to have been there? Had you been there, perhaps it would not have been carried, perhaps not attempted; or if both, you would have acquitted your own ſoul, and had the honourable teſtimony of your country, and of a good conſcience.

Every-body knows, that in the penſionary parliaments, in *Charles* II.'s time, the ſeſſion was almoſt al-

ways drawn out into a tedious length, on purpoſe to tire the members, and drive them all out of town, except the truſty creatures of the court, who were in parliament with no other view than to make a penny of their betrayed principles, and to pick the public purſe, for the promiſe of having ſhares with thoſe who ſet them on. Were not the abſent members anſwerable, in a great degree, for the treachery of thoſe ſtaunch and patient parracides, by leaving them an opportunity to commit it, when they knew that they would commit it? When a man leaves his wife with a known raviſher, and his money in the hands of a noted thief, he may blame himſelf if he ſuffer loſs and diſhonour.

Members of parliament are ſet in a high place, as public ſtewards and guards (the beſt and only ſure guards that a free country can have) to watch for the public welfare, to ſettle the public expences, and to defend public and private property from the unclean and ravenous hands of harpies; and they are obliged, by every motive that can oblige, to adhere to their ſtation and truſt: when the major part neglect or deſert it, who knows but in times to come there may be always enough remaining to give it up, and be remaining for that very end? He who does not prevent evil when he may, does in effect commit it, by leaving others to do ſo, who he cannot be ſure will not do it.

I have heard that ſome of theſe truants from parliament have boaſted that they never voted wrong: but how often have they been out of the way, when they ſhould have voted right, and oppoſed voting wrong? And is not this omiſſion of voting well the next crime to voting ill? And where it is habitual, is it not worſe than even now and then voting ill? He who commits but two murders, is leſs guilty, as to the community, than he who permits twenty which he might have hindered; and he who robs ten thouſand pounds from

the public, is a more innocent man than he who ſuffers it to be robbed of an hundred thouſand: or, if he who does not prevent a great evil, be leſs guilty in his own eyes than he who actually commits a leſs; the public, which feels the difference between ten and twenty, muſt judge far otherwiſe, and conſider him as the more pernicious criminal of the two, as they who are traytors within the law are the moſt dangerous traytors of all.

How ridiculous is it to take a great deal of pains, and to ſpend a great deal of money, to come into parliament, and afterwards come ſeldom or never there, but keep others out, who would perhaps give conſtant attendance? It is fooliſh to alledge, that the adverſary is ſo ſtrong, that your attendance will be uſeleſs; for it has rarely happened, that any dreadful miſchief has been carried in a full houſe, or indeed attempted; but opportunities have always been taken from the abſence of the country members. Beſides, how often has it happened, that one extravagant attempt has given a ſteady majority to the other ſide? The penſionary parliament itſelf, in king *Charles* II.'s time, turned upon that corrupt court: king *James*'s firſt loyal and paſſive obedience parliament did the ſame, when he declared for governing by armies; and in king *William*'s time, the anti-court party, who for many years together could ſcarce ever divide above eighty or ninety, yet grew ſo very conſiderable, upon the attempt for a ſtanding army, that the court, for ſeveral years after, could not boaſt of a much greater number of followers; and though I confeſs that this produced many real miſchiefs to the public, yet the courtiers had no one to blame but themſelves for it. How abſurd is it for men to bring themſelves into ſuch a dilemma, as either to ſubmit to certain ruin, or, in ſome inſtances, to hazard their lives and eſtates to get rid of it, by an unequal ſtruggle; when both may be eaſily prevented, by doing what they have

promiſed to do, what is their duty, and ought to be their pleaſure, to do, and what may be done without further expence, than making an honeſt uſe of two monoſyllables?

The notions of honour generally entertained, are ſtrangely wild, unjuſt, and abſurd. A man that would die rather than pick a private pocket, will, without bluſhing, pick the pockets of a million: and he who would venture his life to defend a friend, or the reputation of a harlot who has none, will not loſe a dinner, or a merry meeting, to maintain the wealth and honour of his country. There have been gentlemen of this ſort of honour, who really wiſhed well to the public; yet, rather than attend to a debate of the utmoſt conſequence to the public, would with infinite punctualneſs meet a company of ſharpers, to throw away their eſtates at ſeven or eleven. So much ſtronger is pernicious cuſtom than public virtue and eternal reaſon, which alone ought to create and govern cuſtom; and ſo much to the public ſhame and misfortune are ſuch wicked cuſtoms, from the influence of which even wiſe men are not intirely exempted! ſo weak and wild a thing is the nature of man!

It is obſerved of *Cato* the younger, that *he always came firſt to the ſenate, and left it laſt.* *Pompey* and his faction, finding that he would never be perſuaded nor frightened into their execrable deſigns againſt their country, contrived a thouſand treacherous devices to keep him out of the way: but he ſaw their ill arts, and diſappointed them. He ſaid, that he entered upon the buſineſs of the ſtate, as the buſineſs of every honeſt man; that he conſidered the public as the proper object of his care, zeal, and attendance, and not as a bank for his own private wealth, or a ſource of perſonal honours; that it was a hideous reproach for men who are guided by reaſon, and by it ſuperior to all other creatures, to take leſs care of the ſociety to which they belong, than ſuch inſects as bees and

ants take of their hives and common ſtores; that he would never preſer private intereſt or pleaſure to that of the public, and that none of thoſe conſiderations ſhould ever with-hold him from attending faithfully in the ſenate.

Here is a virtuous and illuſtrious example, which I would leave upon the minds of my readers, and particularly recommend to thoſe who may moſt want it. When *Cæſar* had, by all manner of wicked ways, by violence, by fraud, and by bribery, procured the government of *Gaul* and *Illyricum* for five years, with an army of four legions, with which he afterwards enſlaved *Rome* itſelf; *Cato* could not reproach his own heart, that he had been abſent when that fatal law paſſed: he oppoſed it with all his zeal and eloquence, and with the hazard of his life; and told thoſe who made it, what they afterwards ſadly felt, that *they were placing an armed tyrant in their citadel.*

Conſider, for God's ſake, gentlemen, the extent and ſacredneſs of your truſt: Your country and conſtitution are in your hands: one unjuſt, one raſh law, may overturn both at once, and you with them, and cancel all law and all property for ever; and one good and wiſe law may ſecure them to your late poſterity. Can it be indifferent to you, whether the one or the other of theſe laws paſs? And if it be not indifferent, will you avoid attending? Be but as aſſiduous againſt evil as others have often been for it, and you have a fair chance to prevent it for ages. Why ſhould not honour, virtue, and good conſcience, be as active and zealous as falſhood, corruption, and guilty minds? Conſider the injuſtice, the barbarity, the treachery, and the terrible conſequences, of ſloth and abſence. Liberty, when once loſt, is ſcarce ever recovered, almoſt as rarely as human life, when it is once extinguiſhed.

G

I am, &c.

Saturday, October 27. 1722. N°. 100.

Diſcourſe upon libels.

SIR,

I Intend in this, and my next letter, to write a diſſertation upon libels, which are liberties aſſumed by private men, to judge of and cenſure the actions of their ſuperiors, or ſuch as have poſſeſſion of power and dignities. When perſons, formerly of no ſuperior merit to the reſt of their fellow ſubjects, came to be poſſeſſed of advantages, by means which, for the moſt part, they condemned in another ſituation of fortune, they often have grown, on a ſudden, to think themſelves a different ſpecies of mankind; they took it into their heads to call themſelves the government, and thought that others had nothing to do but to ſit ſtill, to act as they bade them, and to follow their motions; were unwilling to be interrupted in the progreſs of their ambition, and of making their private fortunes by ſuch ways as they could beſt and ſooneſt make them; and conſequently have called every oppoſition to their wild and ravenous ſchemes, and every attempt to preſerve the people's right, by the odious names of ſedition and faction, and charged them with principles and practices inconſiſtent with the ſafety of all government.

This liberty has been approved or condemned by all men, and all parties, in proportion as they were advantaged or annoyed by it. When they were in power, they were unwilling to have their actions ſcanned and cenſured, and cried out, that ſuch licence ought not to be borne and tolerated in any well-conſtituted commonwealth; and when they ſuffered under

the weight of power, they thought it very hard not to be allowed to utter their groans, and to alleviate their pain, by venting ſome part of it in complaints; and it is certain, that there are benefits and miſchiefs on both ſides the queſtion.

What are uſually called libels, undoubtedly keep great men in awe, and are ſome check upon their behaviour, by ſhewing them the deformity of their actions, as well as warning other people to be upon their guard againſt oppreſſion; and if there were no further harm in them, than in perſonally attacking thoſe who too often deſerve it, I think the advantages which ſuch perſons receive will fully attone for the miſchiefs which they ſuffer. But I confeſs, that libels may ſometimes, though very rarely, foment popular, and perhaps cauſeleſs diſcontents, blaſt and obſtruct the beſt meaſures, and now and then promote inſurrections and rebellions; but theſe latter miſchiefs are much ſeldomer produced than the former benefits; for power has ſo many advantages, ſo many gifts and allurements, to bribe thoſe who bow to it, and ſo many terrors to frighten thoſe who oppoſe it; beſides the conſtant reverence and ſuperſtition ever paid to greatneſs, ſplendor, equipage, and the ſhew of wiſdom, as well as the natural deſire which all or moſt men have to live in quiet, and the dread which they have of public diſturbances, that I think I may ſafely affirm, that much more is to be feared from flattering great men, than detracting from them.

However, it is to be wiſhed, that both could be prevented; but ſince that is not in the nature of things, whilſt men have deſires or reſentments, we are next to conſider how to prevent the great abuſe of it, and, as far as human prudence can direct, preſerve the advantages of liberty of ſpeech, and liberty of writing (which ſecures all other liberties) without giving more indulgence to detraction than is neceſſary to ſecure the other: for it is certainly of much leſs con-

ſequence to mankind, that an innocent man ſhould be now and then aſperſed, than that all men ſhould be enſlaved.

Many methods have been tried to remedy this evil: in *Turky*, and in the eaſtern monarchies, all printing is forbidden; which does it with a witneſs: for if there can be no printing at all, there can be no libels printed; and by the ſame reaſon there ought to be no talking, leſt people ſhould talk treaſon, blaſphemy, or nonſenſe; and, for a ſtronger reaſon yet, no preaching ought to be allowed, becauſe the orator has an opportunity of haranguing often to a larger auditory than he can perſuade to read his lucubrations: but I deſire it may be remembered, that there is neither liberty, property, true religion, arts, ſciences, learning, or knowledge, in theſe countries.

But another method has been thought on, in theſe weſtern parts of the world, much leſs effectual, yet more miſchievous, than the former; namely, to put the preſs under the direction of the prevailing party; to authorize libels to one ſide only, and to deny the other ſide the opportunity of defending themſelves. Whilſt all opinions are equally indulged, and all parties equally allowed to ſpeak their minds, the truth will come out; and even, if they be all reſtrained, common ſenſe will often get the better: but to give one ſide liberty to ſay what they will, and not ſuffer the other to ſay any thing, even in their own defence, is comprehenſive of all the evils that any nation can groan under, and muſt ſoon extinguiſh every ſeed of religion, liberty, virtue, or knowledge.

It is ridiculous to argue from the abuſe of a thing to the deſtruction of it. Great miſchiefs have happened to nations from their kings and their magiſtrates; ought therefore all kings and magiſtrates to be extinguiſhed? A thouſand enthuſiaſtic ſects have pretended to deduce themſelves from ſcripture; ought therefore the holy writings to be deſtroyed? Are mens hands to

be cut off, becauſe they may and ſometimes do ſteal and murder with them? Or their tongues to be pulled out, becauſe they may tell lyes, ſwear, or talk ſedition?

There is ſcarce a virtue but borders upon a vice, and, carried beyond a certain degree, becomes one. Corruption is the next ſtate to perfection: courage ſoon grows into raſhneſs; generoſity into extravagancy; frugality into avarice; juſtice into ſeverity; religion into ſuperſtition; zeal into bigotry and cenſoriouſneſs; and the deſire of eſteem into vain-glory. Nor is there a convenience or advantage to be propoſed in human affairs, but what has ſome inconvenience attending it. The moſt flaming ſtate of health is nearеſt to a plethory: there can be no protection, without hazarding oppreſſion; no going to ſea, without ſome danger of being drowned; no engaging in the moſt neceſſary battle, without venturing the loſs of it, or being killed; nor purchaſing an eſtate, going to law, or taking phyſic, without hazarding ill titles, ſpending your money, and perhaps loſing your ſuit, or being poiſoned. Since therefore every good is, for the moſt part, if not always, accompanied by ſome evil, and cannot be ſeparated from it, we are to conſider which does predominate; and accordingly determine our choice by taking both, or leaving both.

To apply this to libels: if men be ſuffered to preach or reaſon publicly and freely upon certain ſubjects, as for inſtance, upon philoſophy, religion, or government, they may reaſon wrongly, irreligiouſly, or ſeditiouſly, and ſometimes will do ſo; and by ſuch means may poſſibly now and then pervert and miſlead an ignorant and unwary perſon; and if they be ſuffered to write their thoughts, the miſchief may be ſtill more diffuſive; but if they be not permitted, by any or all theſe ways, to communicate their opinions or improvements to one another, the world muſt ſoon be over-run with barbariſm, ſuperſtition, injuſtice, tyran-

ny, and the moſt ſtupid ignorance. They will know nothing of the nature of government beyond a ſervile ſubmiſſion to power; nor of religion, more than a blind adherence to unintelligible ſpeculations, and a furious and implacable animoſity to all whoſe mouths are not formed to the ſame ſounds; nor will they have the liberty or means to ſearch nature, and inveſtigate her works; which employment may break in upon received and gainful opinions, and diſcover hidden and darling ſecrets. Particular ſocieties ſhall be eſtabliſhed and endowed to teach them backwards, and to ſhare in their plunder; which ſocieties, by degrees, from the want of oppoſition, ſhall grow as ignorant as themſelves: armed bands ſhall rivet their chains, and their haughty governors aſſume to be gods, and be treated as ſuch, in proportion as they ceaſe to have human compaſſion, knowledge, and virtue. In ſhort, their capacities will not be beyond the beaſts in the field, and their condition worſe; which is univerſally true in thoſe governments where they lie under thoſe reſtraints.

On the other ſide, what miſchief is done by libels to balance all theſe evils? They ſeldom or never annoy an innocent man, or promote any conſiderable error. Wiſe and honeſt men laugh at them, and deſpiſe them, and ſuch arrows always fly over their heads, or fall at their feet. If king *James* had acted according to his coronation oath, and kept to the law, *Lilly-Burlero* might have been tuned long enough before he had been ſung out of his kingdoms. And if there had been no *South-ſea* ſcheme, or if it had been juſtly executed, there had been no libels upon that head, or very harmleſs ones. Moſt of the world take part with a virtuous man, and puniſh calumny by the deteſtation of it. The beſt way to prevent libels, is, not to deſerve them, and to deſpiſe them, and then they always loſe their force; for certain experience ſhews us, that the more notice is taken of them, the more they are

publiſhed. Guilty men alone fear them, or are hurt by them, whoſe actions will not bear examination, and therefore muſt not be examined. It is fact alone which annoys them; for if you will tell no truth, I dare ſay you may have their leave to tell as many lies as you pleaſe.

The ſame is true in ſpeculative opinions. You may write nonſenſe and folly as long as you think fit, and no one complains of it but the bookſeller: but if a bold, honeſt, and wiſe book ſallies forth, and attacks thoſe who think themſelves ſecure in their trenches, then their camp is in danger, they call out all hands to arms, and their enemy is to be deſtroyed by fire, ſword, or fraud. But it is ſenſeleſs to think that any truth can ſuffer by being thoroughly ſearched, or examined into; or that the diſcovery of it can prejudice true religion, equal government, or the happineſs of ſociety, in any reſpect: truth has ſo many advantages above error, that ſhe wants only to be ſhewn, to gain admiration and eſteem; and we ſee every day that ſhe breaks the bonds of tyranny and fraud, and ſhines through the miſts of ſuperſtition and ignorance: and what then would ſhe do, if theſe barriers were removed, and her fetters taken off?

Notwithſtanding all this, I would not be underſtood, by what I have ſaid, to argue, that men ſhould have an uncontrouled liberty to calumniate their ſuperiors, or one another; decency, good manners, and the peace of ſociety, forbid it: but I would not deſtroy this liberty by methods which will inevitably deſtroy all liberty. We have very good laws to puniſh any abuſes of this kind already, and I well approve them, whilſt they are prudently and honeſtly executed, which I really believe they have for the moſt part been ſince the revolution: but as it cannot be denied, that they have been formerly made the ſtales of ambition and tyranny, to oppreſs any man who durſt aſſert the laws of his country, or the true Chriſtian religion;

ſo I hope that the gentlemen ſkilled in the profeſſion of the law will forgive me, if I entrench a little upon their province, and endeavour to fix ſtated bounds for the interpretation and execution of them; which ſhall be the ſubject of my next letter.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, November 3. 1722 N°. 101.

Second diſcourſe upon libels.

SIR,

I Have been told, that in ſome former reigns, when the attorney-general took it in his head to make innocent or doubtful expreſſions criminal, by the help of forced innuendo's, the method of proceeding was as follows: if the council for the priſoner inſiſted, that the words carried no ſeditious meaning, but might and ought to be underſtood in a reaſonable ſenſe; he was anſwered, that his exception would be ſaved to him upon arreſt of judgment; in the mean time the information was was tried, and the malign intention of the words was aggravated and left to a willing jury; and then, upon a motion in behalf of the priſoner, to arreſt judgment, becauſe the words were not criminal in law, he was told, that the jury were judges of the intention; and having found it an ill one, it was too late to take the exception. Whether this was ever the truth, I have not lived long enough to affirm from my own knowledge; or, whether this method of proceeding be law now, I have not ſkill enough in that ſcience to determine: but I think I may juſtly ſay, that if it be law, it is worth

the conſideration of our legiſlature whether it ought to continue ſo.

It is certain, that there is no middle in nature, between judging by fixed and ſteady rules, and judging according to diſcretion, which is another word for fancy, avarice, reſentment, or ambition, when ſupported by power, or freed from fear. And I have ſaid in my former letter, that as there can be no convenience but has an inconvenience attending it, ſo both theſe methods of judging are liable to objections. There is a conſtant war between the legiſlature and the pleader; and no law was ever enacted with ſo much circumſpection, but flaws were found out afterwards in it, and it did not anſwer all the purpoſes intended by the law-makers; nor can any poſitive law be framed with ſo much contrivance, but artful men will ſlip out of it, and particularly in relation to libels. There are ſo many equivoques in language, ſo many ſneers in expreſſion, which naturally carry one meaning, and yet may intend another, that it is impoſſible by any fixed and ſtated rules to determine the intention, and puniſh all who deſerve to be puniſhed. But to get rid of this inconvenience at the expence of giving any man or number of men, a diſcretionary power to judge another's intentions to be criminal, when his words do not plainly denote them to be ſo, is ſubverting all liberty, and ſubjecting all men to the caprices, to the arbitrary and wild will, of thoſe in power. A text in ſcripture cannot be quoted, without being ſaid to reflect on thoſe who break it; nor the ten commandments read, without abuſeing all princes and great men, who often act againſt them all.

I muſt therefore beg leave to think, that it is a ſtrange aſſertion, which, as I have heard, has been advanced by lawyers in *Weſtminſter-hall*; *viz.* That it is an abſurdity to affirm, That a judge and jury are the only people in *England* who are not to un-

derſtand an author's meaning; which, I think, may be true in many inſtances, when they act judicially, and the words which he uſes, candidly conſtrued, do not import that meaning. *Tiberius* put many ſenators to death for looking melancholy or diſſatisfied, or enviouſly at his power; and *Nero* many others for not laughing at his play, or laughing in the wrong place, or ſneering inſtead of laughing; and very probably both judged right in their intentions; but ſure no body will think amongſt us, that ſuch examples ought to be copied. A man, by not pulling off his hat, or not low enough, by a turn upon his heel, by a frowning countenance, or an over-pleaſant one, may induce his ſpectators to believe that he intends a diſreſpect to one to whom it is criminal to own it; yet it would be a ſtrange act of power to puniſh him for this unobſervance. So words may be certainly choſen with ſuch art or want of it, that they may naturally carry a complaint, and perhaps may mean it; and yet other people, by knowing that the perſon intended does not deſerve one, may think him abuſed. And if this way of judging may be indulged in *Weſtminſter-hall*, the Lord have mercy upon poets, and the writers of dedications, and of the epitaphs too upon great men. Surely it is of leſs conſequence to mankind, that a witty author ſhould now and then eſcape unpuniſhed, than that all men ſhould hold their tongues, or not learn to write, or ceaſe writing.

I do agree, when the natural and genuine meaning and purport of words and expreſſions in libellous writings carry a criminal intention, that the writer ought not to eſcape puniſhment by ſubterfuge or evaſion, or by a ſly interpretation hid in a corner, and intended only for a court of juſtice, nor by annexing new names to known things, or by uſing circumlocutions inſtead of ſingle ſounds and expreſſions; for words are only arbitrary ſigns of ideas; and if any man will coin new words to old ideas, or annex new ideas to old

words, and let this meaning be fully underſtood, without doubt he is anſwerable for it. But when words uſed in their true and proper ſenſe, and underſtood in their literal and natural meaning, import nothing that is criminal; then to ſtain their genuine ſignification to make them intend ſedition (which poſſibly the author might intend too) is ſuch a ſtretch of diſcretionary power, as muſt ſubvert all the principles of free government, and overturn every ſpecies of liberty. I own, that with ſuch a power ſome men may eſcape cenſure who deſerve cenſure, but with it no man can be ſafe; and it is certain, that few men or ſtates will be aggrieved by this indulgence, but ſuch as deſerve much worſe uſage.

It is a maxim of politics in deſpoitc governments, That twenty innocent perſons ought to be puniſhed, rather than one guilty man eſcape; but the reverſe of this is true in free ſtates, in the ordinary courſe of juſtice: for ſince no law can be invented which can give power enough to their magiſtrates to reach every criminal, without giving them, by the abuſe of the ſame law, a power to puniſh innocence and virtue, the greater evil ought to be avoided: and and therefore when an innocent or criminal ſenſe can be put upon words or actions, the meaning of which is not fully determined by other words or actions, the moſt beneficent conſtruction ought to be made in favour of the perſon accuſed. The cauſe of liberty, and the good of the whole, ought to prevail, and to get the better of the juſt reſentment otherwiſe due to the impertinence of a factious ſcribbler, or the impotent malice of a turbulent babbler.

This truth every man acknowledges, when it becomes his own caſe, or the caſe of his friends or party; and almoſt every man complains of it when he ſuffers by it: ſo great is the difference of mens having power in their hands or upon their ſhoulders! But at preſent, I think that no party amongſt us can

find their account either in the ſuppreſſion or in the reſtraint of the preſs, or in being very ſevere in their animadverſion upon the liberties taken by it. The independent *Whigs* think all liberty to depend upon freedom of ſpeech, and freedom of writing, within the bounds of manners and diſcretion, as conceiving that there is often no other way left to be head by their ſuperiors, nor to apprize their countrymen of deſigns and conſpiracies againſt their ſafety; which they think ought to be done boldly, though in reſpect to authority, as modeſtly as can be conſiſtent with the making themſelves underſtood; and ſuch amongſt them as have lately quitted their independence, think themſelves obliged to handle a ſubject tenderly, upon which they have exerted themſelves very ſtrenuouſly in another circumſtance of fortune.

Very many of the *Tories*, who may be at preſent ranked amongſt the former ſort of men, and who every day ſee more and more the advantages of liberty, and forget their former prejudices, will not be contented hereafter to receive their religion and politics from an ignorant licenſer, under the direction of thoſe who have often neither religion nor politics. And even the *Jacobites* themſelves are ſo charmed with their own doughty performances, that they would not loſe the pleaſure of ſcolding at or abuſing thoſe whom they cannot hurt. Many of our ſpiritual guides will not be deprived of doing honour to themſelves, and advantage to their flocks, from informing the world what they ought to believe by their particular ſyſtems; and the diſſenting preachers are willing to keep their own flocks, and would not have the reaſonableneſs of their ſeparation judged of alone by thoſe who differ from them, and have an intereſt in ſuppreſſing them. And I believe that all our world, would be willing to have ſome other news beſides what they find in the *gazette*; and I hope that I may venture to ſay, that is no number of men amongſt us

ſo very popular, as by their ſingle credit and authority to get the better of all theſe intereſts.

But, beſides the reaſons that I have already given, there is another left behind, which is worth them all; namely, That all the methods hitherto taken to prevent real libels have proved ineffectual; and probably any method which can be taken, will only prevent the world from being informed of what they ought to know, and will increaſe the others. The ſubjecting the preſs to the regulation and inſpection of any men whatſoever, can only hinder the publication of ſuch books, as authors are willing to own, and are ready to defend; but can never reſtrain ſuch as they apprehend to be criminal, which always come out by ſtealth. There is no hindering printers from having preſſes, unleſs all printing be forbidden, and ſcarce then: and dangerous and forbidden libels are more effectually diſperſed, enquired after, and do more miſchief, than libels openly publiſhed; which generally raiſe indignation againſt the author and his party. It is certain, that there were more publiſhed in king *Charles* II.'s and king *James*'s times, when they were ſeverly puniſhed, and the preſs was reſtrained, than have ever been ſince. The beginning of *Auguſtus*'s reign ſwarmed with libels, and continued to do ſo, whilſt informers were encouraged; but when that prince deſpiſed them, they loſt their force, and ſoon after died. And, I dare ſay, when the governors of any country give no occaſion to juſt reflections upon their ill conduct, they have nothing to fear from calumny and falſhood.

Whilſt *Tiberius*, in the beginning of his reign would preſerve the appearance of governing the *Romans* worthily, he anſwered a paraſite, who informed him, in the ſenate, of libels publiſhed againſt his perſon and authority, in theſe words; *Si quidem locutus aliter fuerit, dabo operam ut rationem factorum meorum dictorumque reddam; ſi perſeveraverit, invicem eum o-*

dero: "If any man reflect upon my words or ac-
"tions, I will let him know my motives and reaſons
"for them; but if he ſtill go on to aſperſe and hate
"me, I will hate him again." But afterwards, when that emperor became a bloody tyrant, words, ſilence, and even looks, were capital.

T

I am, &c.

Saturday, November 10. 1722. N°. 102.

The contemptibleneſs of grandeur without virtue.

SIR,

THE firſt reaſonable deſire which men have, is, to be in eaſy circumſtances, and as free from pain and dangers as human condition will permit; and then all their views and actions are directed to acquire homage and reſpect from others; and, indeed, in a larger ſenſe, the latter are included in the former. Different ways are taken to attain this end; arts, arms, learning, power, but moſt of all, riches, are ſought after; and when juſt and proper means are uſed to acquire them, the purſuit is reaſonable, and always to be commended. But when they are gained by injuſtice, the end is fruſtrated for which alone they are valuable; that is, the reſpect is loſt which they are intended to procure: for, who does not value an honeſt man in moderate circumſtances, before another grown rich by oppreſſion? Who does not eſteem a ſteady patriot, who deſpiſes threats, bribes, and dignities, when they ſtand between him and his duty to his country, before an over-grown plunderer, who has ſacrificed a nation to his ambition? Men will indeed bow down in the houſe of *Rimmon*, but

they deteſt the idol in their heart. It is all falſe homage. Such men are adored publicly, and curſed privately; and moſt of thoſe who ſeem to adore them, would with much more pleaſure follow them to the ſcaffold.

How many have we ſeen in our days, who are thought to have died martyrs to their pride and covetouſneſs, hooted with the reproaches and deteſtation of every honeſt man in *England*, and, I doubt not, with the private curſes of many of their own followers? And how many are there in all countries, who are never ſeen or ſpoken of but with contempt and indignation, even in the midſt of greatneſs?

What is there in this world worth being a knave for; eſpecially a man's being ſo, who already enjoys all the conveniencies of life? Who would loſe the juſt applauſe of honeſt men, wiſe men, and free men, for the ſervile incenſe of flatterers? How much more preferable is it, to make millions of people happy, and receive the grateful acknowledgments of a thankful nation, than to purchaſe their hatred and reſentments, by making them abject, poor, and miſerable, and themſelves and their families ſo too in conſequence? And what is all this for? To create falſe dependents, who flatter them, in order to cheat them, or otherwiſe make their advantages of them, inſtead of ſteady and true friends: for a certain degree of familiarity is neceſſary to friendſhip, or free converſation; without which no converſation is agreeable, or worth having. Few men take pleaſure in the company of thoſe who are much their ſuperiors, who always ſtrike them with awe, and moſt commonly with emulation; and what is got amongſt them is generally ſpent amongſt equals.

I have ſeen many ſupple and bowing gueſts at the table of a great man, whom, for his vanity, he treated magnificently, and at a great expence; none of which he would have kept company with in any other

place, nor perhaps they with him. Men of virtue and underſtanding are conſcious of their own worth: they will be ſought after, and can be brought rarely to contribute to the pride, grandeur, and oſtentation of thoſe whom they privately hate, fear, or contemn: and therefore the latter, in their own defence, are obliged to aſſociate with the moſt worthleſs part of mankind, with flatterers and paraſites, hunters of good tables, ſharpers, and pickpockets; which are the uſual attendants and ornaments of their greatneſs. Their domeſtic followers are generally made up of inſolent and debauched beggars, who fancy themſelves to be gentlemen; and as they cheat their maſter to be ſo, ſo depending upon his protection, they inſult his neighbours, ride over the country people, and are perpetually annoying the peaceable and induſtrious farmers and labourers, and giving examples of prodigality and lewdneſs; inſomuch that an eſtate is ſome years purchaſe leſs valuable that lies within the influence of ſuch malignant conſtellations.

Their ſons are educated in idleneſs, debauchery, and ignorance; taught to believe, that greatneſs conſiſts in pride, inſolence, and extravagance; and ſo, for the moſt part, want every qualification proper to adorn their characters, to ſerve their prince or country, or to direct their own conduct, govern their families, or manage their own eſtates; which generally become the property of their ſtewards, bailiffs, or debauched followers, whilſt they themſelves often pay large intereſt to them for their own money, run in debt to tradeſmen and mechanics for the common conveniencies of life, whom they either pay not at all, or pay treble values to; till at laſt their neceſſities make them ſubmit to a paltry penſion; and, inſtead of being the generous aſſertors of public liberty, they become the mean and humble inſtruments of power.

Their daughters partake of this happy education; they are bred up to be above looking to their own families, or to know any thing of their own affairs; and, indeed, it is become a qualification now, to be good for no one thing in the world, but to dance, dreſs, play upon the guitar, to prate in a viſiting-room, or to play amongſt ſharpers at cards and dice: and when they cannot be exerciſing theſe laudable accompliſhments, they are always in the vapours and the ſpleen; and ſo they can get no huſbands, or ruin thoſe who are indiſcreet enough to marry them. The neceſſities of their parents, ariſing from their profuſion in all other reſpects, will not afford fortunes great enough to marry them to men of their own quality, who run into the city for grocers and mercers daughters, to repair their ſhattered affairs, and generally uſe them as ſuch. For all private gentlemen (whoſe alliance is worth courting) are ever afraid of her ladyſhip, and think themſelves not worthy of ſo much honour; very few inſtances excepted of vain and inconſiderate young gallants, who are caught with outſide ſhew and pageantry, and drawn in to make great ſettlements, and repent it all their lives after.

I do not ſay that this is always the caſe: for virtue and good ſenſe is not confined to any order of men or women; and without doubt there are excellent men and ladies amongſt the quality. But I appeal to general experience, whether what I have ſaid be not moſt commonly the real truth. And who dares be ſo ſanguine, as to hope that it will not be the caſe of his own poſterity, if ſomething be not done to mend the preſent education of youth; which never can be done, without mending that which muſt mend every thing elſe? For thoſe who have an intereſt in keeping the nobility and gentry ignorant, debauched, and extravagant, and conſequently neceſſitous and dependent, will never voluntarily endeavour to leſſen their own power and influence.

This is indeed a melancholy, but true, ſcene of modern greatneſs. And is this a condition to be envied or courted by any who have plentiful (though not great and exorbitant) fortunes? who have all the means of enjoying private happineſs, and of educating their children in virtue, knowledge, and public principles, and can make a modeſt proviſion for them after their death; and, by leaving them examples of frugality, and prudent œconomy, enable them to abound in the true neceſſaries and conveniencies of life; which the other (like *Tantalus*) want in the midſt of profuſion?

Nature is eaſily contented, and with few things. The moſt luxurious palate may be gratified by what moderate circumſtances can afford. Thoſe who have the moſt magnificent palaces, chooſe to live in the leaſt and meaneſt apartments of them; and ſuch as have the richeſt and moſt expenſive cloaths, and other perſonal ornaments, wear the worſt when by themſelves; ſo that all the reſt are only pride and oſtentation, and often procure emulation and ill-will from neighbours and acquaintance, but ſeldom true and real reſpect. However, ſince the mind of man, like every thing elſe in nature, is in conſtant progreſſion, and in perpetual purſuit of one thing or other, I do not condemn the moderate purſuit of wealth, if we do not buy it too dear, and at the price of our health or integrity; for riches in a wiſe man's hands are certainly conducive to happineſs, though they are more often the cauſes of miſery to others.

Men, for the moſt part, are not ſo ſolicitous to acquire them for the real pleaſure that they give, and to ſatiate perſonal appetites, as in compliance with the cuſtom of the world. We ſeldom examine ourſelves, but enquire of others, whether we are happy or not; and provided we can make thoſe whom we do not value, and who do not value us, envy and admire our felicity, are contented to know that we

have none. Such is the force of prejudice, flowing from fooliſh vanity, pride, or cuſtom! True happineſs reſides alone in the mind; and whoever hunts after it elſewhere, will never find it. All the hurry and tumults of faction, moſt of the eager purſuits after vice under the name of pleaſure, and the vain and noiſy chaces of ambition, are but ſo many diſguiſes to cover internal uneaſineſs, and ſtratagems to fly from ourſelves; but *hæret lateri lethalis arundo*: the deer is ſtruck, and, where-ever he flies, muſt carry his griefs about him.

Nothing can fill the mind of a truly great man, but the love of God, of virtue, and of his country. All other pleaſures ought to be but amuſements, and ſubſervient to theſe, and very often turn to misfortunes; but here is an inexhauſtible ſource of inward ſatisfaction, which is the only true happineſs, which wicked men never feel; and conſequently they are the moſt unhappy of all men.

T *I am*, &c.

Saturday, November 17. 1722. N°. 103.

Of eloquence, conſidered politically.

SIR,

IN free ſtates, where public affairs are tranſacted in popular aſſemblies, eloquence is always of great uſe and eſteem; and, next to money and an armed force, is the only way of being conſiderable in theſe aſſemblies. This talent therefore has been ever cultivated and admired in commonwealths, where men were dealt with by reaſon and perſuaſion, and at liberty to ratify or reject propoſitions offered, and meaſures taken, by their magiſtrates, to examine their conduct, and to diſtinguiſh them with honours or puniſhnts as they deſerved. But in ſingle monarchies,

where reaſon is turned into command, and remonſtrances and debating into ſervile ſubmiſſion, eloquence is either loſt, or perverted to ſanctify public violence, and to deify the authors of it.

In the free ſtates of *Greece* and *Rome* this popular eloquence was of ſuch force and conſequence, that the beſt ſpeakers generally governed them; and their greateſt orators were often not only their chief magiſtrates, but their principal commanders. Rhetoric was the firſt and great ſtudy, becauſe the firſt and great offices of the ſtate were the ſure price of rhetoric. By it *Cicero* came to be the firſt man in *Rome*, and *Pericles* the firſt man in *Athens*. *Themiſtocles*, *Thucydides*, *Xenophon*, and *Alcibiades*, could ſpeak as well as they could fight: ſo could *Sylla*, *Pompey*, *Cæſar*, *Cato*, *Brutus*, *M. Antony*, and many more; who were not only great orators, as well as great ſoldiers, but for the moſt part owed their military power to their powerful ſpeaking. Not that eloquence is neceſſary to a ſoldier, no more than ſkill in war to a civil officer: but both were neceſſary parts, and indeed the principal parts of the *Roman* education; and the candidates for preferments were either good ſpeakers, or ſupported by ſuch. *Pompey*, though he principally derived his fame and credit from military glory, had been far from neglecting the other accompliſhments of the gown and the bar. We have the teſtimony of *Cicero*, that he was a graceful and engaging ſpeaker. His great employments, and many wars, had with-held him long from the exerciſe of declaiming, and his eminent authority in the ſtate had made it for ſome time unneceſſary: but he reſumed it with great application in the latter years of his life; when *Curio*, a young tribune of vaſt ſpirit and eloquence, being gained by an immenſe ſum of money to the intereſt of *Cæſar*, was by public and perpetual harangues miſleading the people into his party. *Cicero* continued this exerciſe till near his death; and *Mark Anthony* and *Auguſtus* in the midſt of their wars.

The chief power of a ſtate being in the people, and all the great offices in their gifts, made eloquence a neceſſary qualification in every one who courted their favour, and ſought their ſuffrages. And a candidate thus qualified, rarely miſſed gaining them; till money, more prevailing than eloquence, and every other accompliſhment, corrupted their hearts, aboliſhed their integrity, and, finding their ſouls and their voices ſaleable, made them firſt the market, then the ſlaves, of ambition. But in the times of their purity, before their virtue was vanquiſhed by irreſiſtible gold, which has been ever an over-match for the probity of the ſons of men, it muſt be owned, to their honour, that in almoſt all the queſtions and debates in the *Roman* ſtate, the juſteſt ſide was the ſtrongeſt; and he who ſpoke beſt, that is, with moſt reaſon and truth, had the moſt voices. Such was the equity and good ſenſe of the *Roman* people! Even in the days of their degeneracy they gave many proofs, that it was with ſhame and pain they had departed from their ancient integrity and public ſpirit: they continued to prefer many worthy citizens, merely for their worth: they carried *Cicero,* particularly, through all the conſiderable offices of the ſtate, only becauſe he deſerved them. *Cato* they created their tribune, in ſpite of violence and oppoſition; and would have choſen him *Prætor,* when he firſt ſtood for it, notwithſtanding the influence and bribery of the faction of the firſt triumvirate, had they not been cheated and terrified by a religious lye of *Pompey's,* who by it broke up the aſſembly. *Cato* was however choſen next year; and, by the uſual power of his eloquence and credit with the people, fruſtrated many of the pernicious deſigns of the triumvirate againſt his country, and conſequently prevented, for a time, many public miſchiefs, as he foretold them all.

The credit of eloquence amongſt the *Greeks* was at leaſt equally high, and its force as viſible. However, in *Greece* itſelf it was differently eſteemed and

practiſed, according to the difference of the forms of government in the ſeveral *Greek* cities. In *Sparta*, where little riches were to be acquired, and the acting power of the ſtate was chiefly in the ſenate, the faculty of haranguing was leſs ſtudied, in proportion to the ſmaller power of the people, who had only a negative vote, and the bare right of confirming or refuting the laws propoſed to them, and none to debate about them, nor to explain them, much leſs to offer new laws. Their laws therefore, and their public deliberations, being carried, as far as regarded the people, without popular ſpeeches and cabals, that city was no proper ſcene for popular ſpeakers; and, doubtleſs, it was the moſt perfect and beſt eſtabliſhed ſtate then in the world; but not being formed for conqueſt, nor indeed for trade, or increaſe of people, it was undone by an endeavour to enlarge it.

At *Athens* it was far otherwiſe: the multitude, the unrepreſented multitude, being the legiſlature, governed all things, and were themſelves governed by their orators; who therefore ſwarmed in that city, and filled all the great offices in it, as they always will do in ſuch a ſtate. They would never ſuffer any thing to remain fixed and quiet; but, to make themſelves conſiderable, were for ever ſtarting new projects, new treaties, and new wars; which, at laſt, ruined the ſtate, as I ſhall ſhew in another letter. *Ariſtotle* finds juſt fault with their demagogues, who were making them continually drunk with torrents of inflammatory eloquence. There wanted a proper power to check and balance that of the people; the court of *Areopagus* being only a court of juſtice, and its credit and authority broken by *Ephialtes* and *Pericles*, two of the chief orators, who hated to ſee any authority in *Athens* but their own.

As eloquence itſelf is neceſſary, or checked, or quite diſcouraged, in different forms of government; ſo the manner of eloquence muſt vary, even where it is uſeful, according to the various claſſes of men to

whom it is addreſſed. There is a conſiderable difference between the ſpeeches ſpoken by *Cicero* in the ſenate, and thoſe which he ſpoke to the people. In an aſſembly of gentlemen, he who ſpeaks with brevity and clearneſs, and ſtrong ſenſe, ſpeaks beſt. The chief court is to be paid to the underſtanding; and ſilence is better than a rote of good words, that carry with them no conviction. I do not deny, but in the moſt polite aſſembly, the manner of ſpeaking, the voice, and the choice of words, will conſiderably recommend the ſpeech and the ſpeaker: but it is equally true, that a theatrical action, and an oſtentation of language, prejudice both, as they break in upon propriety; and, inſtead of adorning good ſenſe, diſguiſe it with ſhew and ſound.

But in ſpeeches to aſſemblies of the people, much greater latitude is allowed; and vehemence of tone and action, a hurry and pomp of words, ſtrong figures, tours of fancy, ardent expreſſion, and throwing fire into their imaginations, have always been reckoned proper ways to gain their aſſent and affections. I think *Valerius Maximus* ſays of *Pericles*, that whenever he ſpoke to the people, he always left a ſting in their ſouls: and hence, *ſine armis tyrannidem geſſit*, he was a tyrant without an army. *Demoſthenes* gave many proofs of the ſame dictatorial force of ſpeaking, not only at *Athens*, but all over *Greece*; which, in ſpite of all king *Philip*'s arts, and power, and ambaſſadors, and bribes, he worked up into a general inſurrection and confederacy againſt him. The *Thebans*, particularly, though terrified by *Philip*'s name and conqueſts, and dreading to riſque again the calamities of war which they had lately felt, no ſooner heard *Demoſthenes*, but they were ſubdued by the dint of his words; and, loſing all terror of the *Macedonians*, ran headlong into the war. "He "inflamed their minds, *ſays the hiſtorian*, with a paſ- "ſion for glory and liberty, and covered all their wa- "ry conſiderations in the magical miſt of his elo-

" quence; ſo that, inſpired by it, like men poſſeſſed, " they took ſudden, bold, and honourable reſoluti- " ons."

The ſubſtance and reaſoning part of this potent ſpeech might have been compriſed in a few plain and ſhort propoſitions, more proper than a copious harangue for a cool council of wiſe men, taught by experience to weigh every ſtep which they took, and to examine the ſoundneſs of the ſenſe diveſted of deceitful words: but ſuch a ſummary and dry repreſentation of the orator's meaning would probably not have moved a fifth part of his auditority; or had the oration itſelf been read by a clerk, or uttered by one of our pleaders in *Weſtminſter-hall*, in an unaffecting tone, and with an unanimated geſture, I doubt it would have had the ſame or no effect. But it was an oration, and an oration pronounced by an orator, with all the lightning of figures, and thunder of expreſſion: he poured forth perſuaſion like a torrent; and in his voice, when he cried to war, they heard the ſound of a trumpet.

By what I have ſaid of our own pleaders, I mean no ſort of reflexion upon the gentlemen of the long robe, or upon their manner of ſpeaking, which I think is the only proper manner for our bar; where the rules of proceeding being ſtrict and aſcertained, there is no room for haranguing. The judge is tied to the rigid letter of the law, and not to be moved from it by pity or reſentment; and therefore an addreſs to his paſſions would be ridiculous and offenſive. In a ſpeech to an aſſembly that acts by diſcretion, or to an abſolute prince who has life and death in his hands, it is the buſineſs of the ſpeaker, by flattering inſinuations, to ſteal into the affections of his judges, and, by a hurricane of tropes and impetuous words, to animate their paſſions in his behalf: but a ſpeech of this ſort would be waſte language in *Weſtminſter-Hall*, and the author of it would be thought fit for *Moorfields*, where the imagination has more ſcope. At our bar many excel-

ent pleaders have been very bad orators; and ſome good ſpeakers, very bad pleaders. To know law, and to ſpeak to the point, is the only rhetoric approved, or indeed allowed, there; and therefore the jokes which witty men have made upon the cold and plain manner of ſpeaking there return upon the makers.

In the pulpit there is much more latitude for oratory, and the preacher has the affections and imaginations of his hearers much more in his power; and, by diſtracting them with terrors, or elevating them with joys, may awaken and enkindle their paſſions almoſt as much as he will. He has a vaſt field, and full ſcope for decorations, fine phraſes, lively deſcriptions, and all the pompous array of language; and if he has a fine tuneable voice, and his audience a good ear, I know no wonders which he may not work. But as the plaineſt ſermons have generally the beſt ſenſe and moſt piety in them, I am almoſt amazed that the very fine figurative ones do no more harm.

If we enquire into the uſe and purpoſes of eloquence, and into the good and evil which it has done, we muſt diſtinguiſh between eloquence and eloquence. That which conſiſts of good ſenſe, put into good words, is every-where uſeful and commendable: but as to that which conſiſts of fine figures and beautiful ſounds, artfully and warmly applied to the paſſions, and may diſguiſe and baniſh ſenſe, embelliſh falſhood as well as truth, and recommend virtue as well as vice; it has done ſome good, and infinite miſchief. It is the art of flattering and deceiving, as one of the ancients calls it: it fills the mind with falſe ideas; and, by raiſing a tempeſt in the heart, miſleads the judgment: it confounds good and evil, by throwing falſe colours over them; and deceives men with their own approbation: and it has in many inſtances unſettled all good order, and thrown flouriſhing ſtates into pangs and deſolation.

But though rhetoric in this ſenſe be but a bad art, yet I do not think it poſſible to deſtroy it, without de-

ſtroying with it moſt other good arts; for it almoſt always flouriſhes and decays with them: and wherever politeneſs, liberty, and learning ſubſiſt, rhetoric will be cultivated as part of them. It is an evil growing out of much good; and nothing but the aboliſhing of all liberty and learning can abſolutely cure it. In this cure the *Turks* have ſucceeded beſt; and they who would be like them in this, muſt be like them in all things. Beſides, as the ſeveral ſtates of *Europe* are now conſtituted, they do not ſeem to have much, or any thing to apprehend from the power of rhetoric, except that which comes from the Popiſh eccleſiaſtics, who in the midſt of monarchies form a democracy every-where; and every village has one or many popular orators, who have but too ſucceſsful a talent at turning the heads of the multitude, and inflaming their hearts; a misfortune which has coſt many countries very dear: inſomuch that preaching monks have been reckoned public plagues; as it would be, no doubt, a ſort of a public bleſſing, if they were all alike idle and dumb. Even the *Lutheran* monks at *Hamburgh* are every day preaching that free city into ſtrife and confuſion; and will at laſt, if they are not better controuled, preach it out of its liberty, as more than once they have well nigh done.

G *I am*, &c.

Saturday, November 24. 1722. N°. 104.

Of eloquence, conſidered philoſophically.

SIR,

IF we now enquire how eloquence operates upon the minds of men, we muſt conſider three things or cauſes: the ſenſe, the ſound, and the action. The firſt is addreſſed to the underſtanding, and the other two to the paſſions, and have conſequently the greateſt force.

Nothing is too hard for ſound, which ſubdues every thing, and raiſes the higheſt and moſt oppoſite perturbations. One ſound lulls men to ſleep; another rouſes them from it: one ſort ſets them a fighting, another to embracing; and a third ſets them a weeping: it makes them groan or rage; it melts them into compaſſion, or animates them to reſentment. And as to action, in which I alſo comprehend the motions of the countenance, and of the eyes, it is of ſuch force, that *Demoſthenes* being aſked, Which was the firſt excellency of an orator? anſwered, *action;* that the ſecond was *action;* and the third was *action.* Here is a teſtimony of a great and experienced judge.

Now the power of action ſeems to ariſe chiefly from hence: as it is a ſign that the ſpeaker is in earneſt, and vehemently means what he ſpeaks, it begets an opinion, that what he ſays is juſt, and reaſonable, and important: and ſo his hearers adopt his paſſions and opinions, and are equally animated with him who animates them, and often more. Hence it is poſſible for a man, who thus carries his ſpirit in his geſtures, and his meaning in his face, to look another into his ſentiments and out of his ſenſes, only by ſhewing, in the energy of his countenance, that he himſelf is ſtrongly affected with that paſſion which he would convey to another, and that his external motions are but the reſult of his internal. Men have been converted into *Quakeriſm* at the ſilent-meetings of *Quakers;* and ſolemn looks, dumb ſhew, and ghoſtly groans, have had all the moſt prevailing effects of eloquence.

Nothing is ſo catching and communicative as the paſſions. The caſt of an angry or a pleaſant eye will beget anger, or pleaſure: one man's anger, or ſorrow, or joy, can make a whole aſſembly outrageous, or dejected, or merry; and the ſame men are provoked or pleaſed by the ſame words ſpoken in different tones; becauſe they who hear them, take them juſt as he who ſpeaks them ſeems to mean them. I have ſeen a preacher of mean ſenſe and language ſet a whole congregati-

on a howling, merely becauſe he himſelf howled. By repeating the words *heaven* and *hell*, with diſtortion and clamour, he poſſeſſed their imaginations with all the joys of the bleſſed, and all the torments and terrors of the damned; and, by making them feel both by turns, raiſed their paſſions higher than the reading of our bleſſed Saviour's crucifixion, or his ſermon upon the mount, could have raiſed them.

The fancy, when once it is heated, quickly improves the firſt ſpark into a flame; which being an aſſemblage of ſtrong and glowing images, is, while it laſts, the ſtrongeſt motion, and conſequently the greateſt power, in a man; for all animal power is motion. And when a man has thus got a fire in his head, his reaſon, which is the gradual and deliberate weighing of things, and the cool comparing of one inward impulſe with another, muſt ſhift its quarters till his brains grow cool again. I dare ſay, that many men, and ſtill more women, who have without emotion heard the great Dr. *Tillotſon* talk excellent ſenſe and morality for half an hour, would have been powerfully edified, that is, violently tranſported, with the tuneful and humble reveries of *John Bunyan*, of biſhop *Beveridge*, or *Daniel Burgeſs*.

This aptneſs to be moved by ſounds is natural, but improveable by education and the uſe of words. There are in the brain certain fibres, or ſtrings, which naturally ſtretch and exert themſelves as ſoon as certain ſounds ſtrike upon them; but without being able to annex to them any determinate idea, only, in general, that they feel pleaſure or pain. It is like rubbing the hand of a man born deaf and blind with a file, or a fleſh-bruſh: he feels the ſkin irritated, or ſoothed, but knows not with what. When theſe fibres are touched, they diſperſe the motion to the whole animal ſpirits, and create in them motions and agitations according to the force and quality of that ſound which was the firſt mover. Hence people are ſaid to be cur-

ed of the bite of the *Tarantula* by muſic; which, by quickening the motions of the animal ſpirits, raiſes in the blood ſuch a ferment, as drives out the poiſon.

But when deſcription is added to thoſe ſounds, when they convey particular and diſtinct images, when ſcenes of horror or of joy are preſented in ſounds proper to convey them; then the ſenſe and the ſound heightening vaſtly each other, their united power over the ſoul is infinite and uncontroulable. The word *hell*, for example, is, without doubt, capable of being pronounced in ſuch a hideous tone and action, as to affect and affright even a *Hottentot*, who knows nothing of *hell*: but if, with the ſound of *hell*, the deſcription of *hell* be likewiſe conveyed; that it is a dark, immenſe, and baleful dungeon, guarded by frightful and implacable furies, armed with whips and torches; that it is filled with ſuffocating and burning ſulphur, and unintermitting fire; that it is inhabited by the damned, whoſe inceſſant ſhrieks, hideous roarings, and diſmal yells, are the chief entertainments there; and by devils, who by their endleſs inſults add, if poſſible, to their intenſe tortures and horrible burning, which are never, never, to end -----

-------- Sights of woe,
Regions of ſorrow, doleful ſhades, where peace
And reſt can never dwell, hope never comes,
That comes to all; but torture without end
Still urges, and a fiery deluge, fed
With ever-burning ſulphur unconſum'd----

I ſay, this idea of *hell*, added to the ſound of *hell*, would dreadfully aggravate the horror even in a *Hottentot*. He might likewiſe be charmed with a ſoft and melodious ſound of *heaven*, well pronounced, without having any conception of *heaven*; but ſtill much more charmed, if the idea of it accompanied the ſound, and all the celeſtial ſcenery of delight, a bleſſed immortality, God, and glory, were ſet, as it were, before his eyes.

Such force has ſound over the human ſoul, to animate and calm its paſſions; and when proper action is added to proper ſound, which two parts conſtitute the mechanical power of eloquence, the effects of it are as certain as the effects of wine, and its ſtrength as irreſiſtible. In this reſpect men reſemble muſical inſtruments, and may be wound up, or let down, to any pitch, by touching ſkilfully the ſtops and chords of the animal ſpirits. An expert hand can make a violin rage as violently, weep as bitterly, beg as heartily, and complain as mournfully, as words can expreſs thoſe ſeveral paſſions; and more than words, without proper modulation, can expreſs them. *Timotheus* the muſician played before *Alexander* the great an aire ſo martial and animating, that he ſtarted from the table in a warlike fury, and called for his horſe and his arms; and by another ſoft aire ſo quelled the hoſtile tumult in his mind, that he ſat down quietly to meat again. Thus was the conqueror of the world himſelf conquered by ſound! Drums and trumpets make men bold: and the marquis *de Biron*, one of the braveſt men that ever lived, died like a coward for want of them.

In a day of battle, when the onſet is animated by all the awakening military ſounds of a camp, the eager neighing of the horſes, and even the buſy and hollow treading of their feet; a general and warlike murmur of every man preparing to fight; the clattering of arms, calling into the imagination the ſudden uſe that is to be made of them; the haſty thunder and vehement rattling of drums, inſpiring an impatience for battle; the dead and ſullen dubbing of the kettle-drums, creating a ſteady and obſtinate bravery; and, above all, the loud and ſhrill clangor of the trumpet, rouſing a chearful and lively boldneſs; all theſe hoſtile ſounds, each of them deſtructive of coldneſs and fear, muſt occupy and incenſe every ſpirit that a man has in him, ſet his ſoul in a flame, and make even cowards reſolute and brave.

I have ſeen a beggar gain an alms by a heavy and affecting groan, when a ſpeech of *Cicero*'s compoſing, ſpoken without *Cicero*'s art, would not have gained it. That groan ſtruck the animal ſpirits ſympathetically; and, being continued to the imagination, raiſed up there a thouſand ſudden conjectures and preoccupations in his favour, and a thouſand circumſtances of diſtreſs, which he who uttered it perhaps never felt, nor thought of. Looks and appearances have the like efficacy: another beggar, ſhivering and naked in a cold wet day, with humble, pale, and hungry looks, or deſpairing ones, ſhall be as eloquent, without uttering a word, as the other by uttering a groan. The human ſympathy in our ſouls raiſes a party for him within us, and our fancy immediately repreſents us to ourſelves in the ſame doleful circumſtances; and, for that time, we feel all that the beggar feels, probably much more; for he is uſed to it, and can bear it better. If to the above melancholy ſound and miſerable ſight, we add the grievous ſymptoms of pain, ſickneſs, and anguiſh, (as one often meets with objects under all theſe terrible claſſes of miſery) there is no pitch of human pity and horror, that ſuch a *groupe* of human woes cannot raiſe.

Now, if ſingle ſound be thus bewitching, and geſture alone thus perſuaſive, and ſtill greatly more when united; how vaſtly prevailing muſt be their force, when it comes arrayed and heightened by a ſwelling and irreſtible tide of words, enlivened by the moſt forcible and rapid ideas, and bears down all before it? When the orator attracts your eyes, charms your ears, and forces your attention; brings heaven and earth into his cauſe, and ſeems but to repreſent them, to ſpeak their ſenſe, and to contend for their intereſt? When he carries your paſſions in his hands, ſuſpends or controuls all your faculties, and yet perſuades you that your own faculties guide you? When he leſſens great things, magnifies little things, and diſguiſes all; his very geſture is animated, and every muſcle per-

ſuades; his words lighten, and his breath is on fire; every word glows, and every image flames; he fills, delights, kindles, and aſtoniſhes, your imagination; raiſes a ſtorm in your heart, and governs you in that ſtorm; rouzes all that is human in you, and makes your own heart conſpire againſt you!---- In this magical and outrageous tempeſt, you are at the entire mercy of him who raiſed it.

Cæſar was reſolved to puniſh *Q. Ligarius*; but *Cicero* had a mind to ſave him, and undertook his defence. *Cæſar* admitted him to ſpeak, only out of the gaiety of his heart, and for the mere pleaſure of hearing him; for he was determined not to be ſhaken from his purpoſe. But he was deceived: *Cicero* in the very beginning of his ſpeech wonderfully moved him, and proceeded in it with ſuch a variety of *pathos*, and ſuch an amazing grace, that *Cæſar* often changed countenance; and it was plain that his ſoul was in a hurricane, and that all his paſſions were agitated. But the orator touching artfully upon the battle of *Pharſalia*, ſo tranſported him, that he trembled all over; the papers which he held dropped out of his hands; and, being quite overcome, he acquitted *Ligarius*.

What an amazing inſtance of the power of ſpeaking! Behold the great and conquering *Cæſar*, the abſolute maſter of *Rome*, and of all the *Roman* world, provoked at a man who had borne arms againſt him, fixed upon his doom, and life and death in his hands! Behold this great and arbitrary man, this angry, awful and prepoſſeſſed, judge, overpowered by the force of eloquence, diſarmed of his wrath, his deſigns wreſted from him, his inclinations, when he thought himſelf beſt fortified in them, entirely changed, and himſelf, from being terrible, brought to tremble! *Cæſar* too was a great orator, and had often tried upon others, with ſucceſs, the power of his own rhetoric; but was not then aware how much it could do upon himſelf. It was *Cicero*, it was the orator, and

not the cauſe, that triumphed here. The bare ſenſe of that fine ſpeech would not have ſuſpended *Cæſar*'s diſpleaſure for a moment: but the ſpeaker was not to be reſiſted: all oppoſition fled, and every ſpark of reſentment vaniſhed, before him. The emperor was enchanted by the orator; and *Cæſar* was, as it were, poſſeſſed of *Cicero*.

I am, &c.

P. S. I have in theſe two letters compriſed all that I purpoſed to ſay upon eloquence: in my laſt I have conſidered it politically, in this philoſophically; and in both I have ſhewn its force. I have likewiſe examined the ſeveral kinds of it, as far as it affects my preſent purpoſe; and ſhewn, how it affects government and human nature, and from what ſources in both it proceeds. Thoſe who would ſtudy it as an art, and know the many accompliſhments neceſſary to excel in it, muſt read *Cicero de oratore*, and *Quintilian*.

G

Saturday, December 1. 1722. N°. 105.

Of the weakneſs of the human mind; how eaſily it is miſled.

SIR,

THINGS of the greateſt ſeeming difficulty appear the eaſieſt to us when found out. There was no wit neceſſary to ſet an egg on one end, when *Columbus* had ſhewn the way. Jugglers do many things by ſlight of hand, which to a gaping beholder appear to be witchcraft; and when he knows how they are down, he wonders at himſelf for wondering at them. A ſhip as big as a caſtle is ſailed by a rudder and a puff of wind; and a weight, which a thouſand men cannot move, may be eaſily managed by one, by the help of wheels and pullies. The ſame is true in the direction of mankind, who will be al-

ways caught by a ſkilful application to their paſſions and weakneſſes, and be eaſily drawn into what they will be very difficultly driven. The fierceſt horſes are ſubdued by the right management of the bits; the moſt furious wild beaſts tamed by gratifying their appetites, or working upon their fears; and the moſt ſavage tempers are made tractable by ſoothing their foibles, or knowing how to manage their panics.

This is what is called the knowledge of mankind, which very few of them know any thing of. Pedants hope to govern them by diſtinctions and grave faces; tyrants by force and terror; philoſophers by ſolemn lectures of morality and virtue. And all theſe have certainly a ſhare in influencing their minds, and determining their actions; but, all together, not half ſo much as applying to their reigning appetites, appearing intereſts, and predominant foibles, and taking artful advantages of favourable opportunities, and catching at lucky conjectures, to affect at once what a long ſerious of wiſe counſels, and the beſt concerted meaſures, cannot bring about.

Wiſe ſtateſmen well underſtand this foible in human nature, and often take advantage from a plot diſcovered, or a rebellion quelled; from the tranſports of a reſtoration, or a victory obtained; or during the terrors of a peſtilential diſtemper, or the rage of a prevailing faction, or the fears of a diſponding one, to accompliſh what neither threats nor armies could extort, nor bribes nor allurements perſuade.

The ſame advantages have been as luckily taken by the leaders of popular parties, upon ſudden diſcontents and unſucceſsful acts of power, to obtain conceſſions and privileges which they durſt not think of, much leſs hope for, at other times. My lord *Clarendon* furniſhes us with many inſtances of ſuch conceſſions, which neither the crown would have granted, nor the people been prevailed upon to aſk, nor perhaps accept, before, or poſſibly after. Whereas a prepoſterous and ill timed attempt, on either ſide,

would have encreaſed the power which they deſigned to leſſen, or take away. The greateſt ſecret in politics is, to drive the nail that will go.

If a ſolemn ſoothſayer, a poet, or philoſopher, talk of the dignity of human nature, man is lifted up to a reſemblance with his great Creator: he is lord of the univerſe; all things are made for his uſe, even ſuch as are of no uſe to him, but do him miſchief. The ſun is placed in the firmament to ripen his cabbage, and dry his linen; and infinite millions of ſtars are ſtuck there, many thouſand times bigger than the earth, to ſupply the want of farthing candles, though vaſtly many of them are not to be ſeen but by glaſſes, and, without doubt, infinite others not to be ſeen with them. He is made wiſe, diſcerning, formed for virtue, mutual help and aſſiſtance; and probably it was all true before the fall: but as he now is degenerated, I fear that the reverſe of all this is true. It is plain that he is fooliſh, helpleſs, perfidious, impotent, eaſily miſled and trepanned, and, for the moſt part, caught by as thin ſnares and little wiles as his fellow creatures, which, we are told, are made for his uſe; and his boaſted faculty of reaſon betrays him to ſome from which the others are exempt.

True reaſon has little to do in his ſpeculations or his actions. Enthuſiaſm or *panic* fear often ſupplies the place of religion in him: obſtinacy is called conſtancy; and indifference, moderation: his paſſions, which direct and govern all the motions of his mind, ſeem to me to be purely mechanical; which perhaps I may ſhew more at large hereafter: and whoever would govern him, and lead him, muſt apply to thoſe paſſions; that is, pull the proper ropes, and turn the wheels which will put the machine in motion. When *Chryſippus* was introduced into the preſence of *Dionyſius*, and, according to the cuſtom of the court, fell upon his face, and kiſſed the oppreſſor's feet; he was aſked by *Plato*, How he, who was a *Greek*, a free man, and a philoſopher, could fall proſtrate before a

tyrant, and adore him? He anſwered merrily, "That "he had buſineſs with the tyrant; and if his ears were "in his feet, he muſt ſpeak to him where his ears lay."

Now moſt people's ears lie in the wrong place; and whoever will be heard, muſt apply accordingly: we rarely ſee a wiſe man, who does not carry a half-fool about him; one who, by ſoothing his vanities, flattering his paſſions, and taking advantages of his other weakneſſes, can do more with him than all the world beſides. Indeed moſt men are governed by thoſe who have leſs wit than themſelves, or by what ought leaſt to influence them. Men, like other animals, are caught by ſprings, wires, or ſubtilties: foxes are trepanned by traces, pheaſants by a red rag, and other birds by a whiſtle, and the ſame is true of mankind.

A lucky thought, a jeſt, a fortunate accident, or a jovial debauch, ſhall bring about deſigns and revolutions in human affairs, which twenty legions in the field could not bring about. A filthy ſtrumpet made *Alexander*, for a kiſs, burn *Perſepolis*, the auguſt ſeat of the *Perſian* empire; and I have heard, ſomewhere or other, of a great prince, who being prevailed upon to ſwear by his miſtreſs's bum, That he would diſſolve the ſtates of his kingdom, religiouſly kept that oath againſt his intereſt, though he never valued all the reſt that he took upon the evangeliſts. How often hath a merry ſtory in our days turned a debate, when the moſt grave and ſolemn arguments, and the moſt obvious repreſentations of public advantage, could not prevail? And how many a fair and accompliſhed lady has been won by bribing her chambermaid, when perhaps all the ſolicitations of her parents and relations, and all the motives of ſelf-intereſt, would have proved ineffectual?

The lucky adjuſting of times and ſeaſons, taking advantage of prevailing prejudices and panics, and knowing how to humour and lay hold of the predominant enthuſiaſm of human nature, has given birth to moſt of the revolutions in religion and politics

which ever happened in the world. A juggler ſwallowing bibles and hour-glaſſes, ſhall do more with a modern mob than a philoſopher; and a ſcarecrow prater, with diſtorted limbs and underſtanding, ſhall make thouſands of them weep and wring their hands, when the oratory of *Demoſthenes*, or the reaſonings of Mr. *Locke*, would make them laugh or hoot. There is a certain aſſimilation of paſſions and faculties in men, which attract one another when they meet, and always ſtrike together. As when two fiddles are tuned up to the ſame pitch, if you hit the one, the other ſounds; ſo men are eaſieſt operated upon by thoſe of like underſtandings with their own, or thoſe who the beſt know how to dally and play with their foibles, and can do the ſame thing with deſign as the others do naturally.

I doubt not but I ſhall be cenſured for making thus bold with the Lord of the creation, by thoſe who make much more bold with him on other occaſions, and who would have the monopoly of enjoying all the ſcandal to themſelves. But, by the leave of thoſe ſolemn gentlemen, I ſhall take the liberty of conſidering man as he is, ſince it is out of our power to give a model to have him new made by.

Since then, by the ſins of our firſt parents, we are fallen into this unhappy and forlorn condition, all wiſe and honeſt men are obliged, in prudence, and duty, not only by lectures of philoſophy, religion, and morals, to faſhion this ſovereign of the univerſe into his true intereſt, but to make uſe of his weakneſſes to render him happy, as wicked men do to make him miſerable; in which I ſhall be more particular hereafter.

T

I am, &c.

BRITISH 11 NOV 85 MUSEUM

The End of the Third Volume.